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Preface  I 
 
Preface 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the marginalised real estate investment markets. 
Investors in the Western countries consider the market to be very risky. In many cases 
such fear is exaggerated compared to the reality on the ground. It is worth noting that, 
many countries in the region have, over the last two decades, been undertaking major 
structural adjustments which have significantly improved the investment environment 
in the region. Among the positive impacts of the reforms include some significant 
increase in real estate investment allocations by corporate investors especially pension 
funds, noticeable participation of retail investors in the real estate market and gradual 
entry of foreign real estate investors. 
 
Poor flow of accurate information and paucity of research and publications focusing on 
the region are some of the main reasons for the persistence of the distorted image of 
the region. This book is an attempt to address the dearth of comprehensive real estate 
research literature in the region and presents a research work investigating the 
practice of agency conflicts mitigation in real estate investment activities. The study, 
upon which this book is based, uses investment activities of selected corporate and 
foreign real estate investors in Tanzania, to investigate the practice of agency conflicts 
mitigation. The research involved examining various forms, catalysts and mitigating 
techniques of opportunistic tendencies arising in the real estate investment activities of 
the selected investors. The study also entailed identifying and comparing various 
institutional constraints of human behaviour, which were then tested for their 
effectiveness in constraining agents’ opportunistic tendencies. 
 
The study reveals prevalence of various forms and catalysts of agency problems in 
real estate investment activities, suggesting ineffectiveness of various formal 
institutional remedies of agency problems. The situation is noted to be largely 
aggravated by the nascence of the prevailing formal institutions and property market 
opacity. However, the study also reveals that, in the absence of strong formal 
institutions, informal institutions and other human behaviour drivers play a 
considerable role in constraining opportunistic behaviour in agency contracting. This 
observation reinforces the argument for inclusion of informal institution attributes in 
agency theory modeling and in devising society-specific remedies of agency problems. 
II  Preface 
 
The findings of the study further underscore the importance of blending formal and 
informal institutions in order to have more effective and society-specific remedies of 
agency problems. To address property market opacity, the book underlines the 
importance of strengthening corporate governance, education, research and property 
market institutions. 
 
This book is one of the pioneering works testing out agency theory using real estate 
investment activities taking place in a market setting which is dominated by informality, 
market opacity and nascent corporate governance institutions. This piece of work is 
also unique for its significant deviation from the common focus of real estate 
researchers in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Most of the existing research literature 
in the region has focused on issues of land rights, land conflicts, land acquisition, 
informal settlements, affordable housing and property taxation. It is our hope that this 
book will stimulate thinking, debate and research on the subject. 
 
The author has been awarded a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree by Ardhi 
University in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Apart from its academic importance, this book 
is also very useful to real estate investors, professionals and policy makers. Real 
estate investors in the Western countries should equally find this book a useful guide 
when contemplating the mode of market entry and in recruiting and dealing with local 
partners, agents, managers and employees. 
 
Prof. Dr. Karl-Werner Schulte 
Prof. Dr. Stephan Bone-Winkel 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schäfers 
 
IRE|BS International Real Estate Business School 
University of Regensburg 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the problem 
 
1.1.1 Real property investment 
Real property investment is one of the oldest activities in history (Renaud, 2003; 
Naubereit and Gier, 2002). In many societies, real property ownership has traditionally 
been considered to be a symbol of wealth and power. It is estimated that real property 
forms about 50% of the global wealth (Ling and Archer, 2007; Malpezzi, 2000). The 
nature and form of property as an investment vehicle have however significantly 
evolved over time. As an investment vehicle of modern times, property takes many 
different forms. Following financial engineering innovations, property investment can 
now be pursued by either acquiring direct property or by purchasing indirect property 
investment vehicles. Direct property investment entails ownership of physical land and 
buildings whereas indirect property investment entails land and buildings through some 
forms of financial instruments (Ling and Archer, 2005; Hoesli and MacGregor, 2000). 
 
However, property investment is still perceived by many to be physical or direct 
property investment products (Thrall, 2002; Pyhrr et al, 1989). Such a simplistic 
outlook focusing only on physical or space aspects disregards the far reaching 
implications that property investment has on the wider economy. A more 
comprehensive view of property investment considers both space and capital market 
products of property investment (Geltner et al, 2007; Eppli and Tu, 2004). 
 
There is quite a wide range of indirect property investment vehicles. It is common 
however to group them into three main categories namely, indirect equity, debt 
instruments, and property derivatives (Hoesli and MacGregor, 2000). Some authors 
categorise indirect property investment into equity, debt and hybrid vehicles (Lindberg, 
2002; Rowland, 1997). Indirect property investment vehicles, like all other financial 
instruments, can also be grouped according to the purpose they serve i.e. market 
broadening instruments, risk management instruments, and arbitraging instruments 
(Fabozzi and Modigliani, 2009). Recent observations show that many institutional 
investors worldwide have significantly increased indirect property investment vehicles’ 
allocations in their investment portfolios (Cauchie and Hoesli, 2006; Bone-Winkel et al, 
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2005; Cieleback, 2004). It is estimated that about 40% of real estate holdings of 
institutional investors in Europe are in indirect investment vehicles (Bone-Winkel et al, 
2005). It is important however to note that a well functioning capital market is one of 
the major preconditions for a market of indirect property investment. 
 
The complexity of real property as an asset and investment product clearly suggests 
that pursuit of investment activity in this form of investment avenue is equally complex 
(Rowland, 1998). Both direct and indirect forms of property investment require the 
involvement of many people. Direct property investors, for instance, normally seek the 
services of investment analysts, architects, engineers, property managers, estate 
brokers etc. Similarly, indirect property investors also engage investment consultants, 
fund managers, and brokers. Besides, considering that the underlying real assets of 
indirect property investment are direct property assets, it is evident that indirect 
property investment process involves more people than that of direct property 
investment. These include people involved in the acquisition and management of the 
indirect investment vehicles and those involved in the acquisition and management of 
the underlying direct property assets (Wilson and Zurbruegg, 2003). Concisely, 
property investment activity entails a complex network of people working as principals 
or agents. 
 
The complex relationships arising in the course of property investment activities could 
be analysed using the institutional theory. Over the recent years, the institutional 
theory has received noticeable attention from scholars amongst economists, 
sociologists and political scientists (Greif, 2006; Shapiro, 2005). Some renowned 
economists have come up with a vigorous theoretical analysis incorporating 
institutional theory into neoclassical economic theory thereby paving way for a new 
economics perspective named New Institutional Economics – NIE (e.g. Coase, 1998; 
Klein, 1999; North, 1990; Eggertsson, 1990; Williamson, 1975). NIE is mainly centred 
on three theories namely, property rights theory, transaction cost theory and agency 
theory (Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Junker, 2005; Cieleback, 2004). This study 
contextualises some aspects of the new institutional theory to the field of property 
investment. In particular, the study employs the agency theory in an attempt to explain 
the property investment process in an environment characterised by high market 
imperfections and weak formal institutions. 
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1.1.2 Agency theory and the real estate investment 
Agency theory is basically concerned with the conflicts of interest arising in agency 
relationships and how to align them. The theory deals with the agency problem, which 
exists in two main categories namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection or pre-contractual opportunistic behaviour refers to the problem of 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The problems of this 
nature show up when the potential agent owns private information about something 
which can cause damage to the principal in the course of agency contract execution. 
On the other hand, moral hazard or post-contractual opportunistic behaviour refers to 
problems related to the agent not putting forth the agreed upon effort (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Such problems show up when the agent does not undertake the agreed upon 
activities, and the principal cannot control the contract implementation in its entirety 
(Rebernik and Bradac, 2006). Instances of moral hazard include falsehood, fraud, 
larceny, shirking, free-riding, cost-padding, exploitation, negligence, and carelessness 
(Rebernik and Bradac, 2006; Popov and Simonova. 2006; Cieleback, 2004; Aubert et 
al, 2003). 
 
Agency problem is a common phenomenon in many forms of associations (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), but the extent of the problem and its effects differ depending on a 
number of factors. Information asymmetry and opportunism are particularly the 
defining factors of agency problem. The problem occurs when information asymmetry 
exits i.e. when one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared to 
another. The party with information advantage should also be motivated to take 
advantage of the information. Whereas virtually all common forms of business 
activities are subject to agency conflicts, in investment activities, agency conflicts 
manifest themselves primarily through sub-optimal investments (Deephouse and 
Wiseman, 2000; La Porta et al, 1999; Bricker and Chandar, 1998). 
 
Real estate investment, owing to its idiosyncratic characteristics and involvement of 
many people who in most cases execute their duties in the form of agency 
relationships, is more vulnerable to agency problems (Ling and Archer, 2007; 
Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004; Cieleback, 2004; Rottke, 2004; Naubereit and Gier, 
2002; Rowland, 1998; Graff and Webb, 1997). Theoretically, in the absence of well 
developed formal institutions, agency conflicts are hard to mitigate. Neo-institutionalists 
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however insist that informal institutions are equally necessary for the effectiveness of 
the remedies of agency conflicts (Temel-Candemir, 2005; Casadesus-Masanell and 
Spulber, 2005). This argument is cognizant of the fact that agency relationships are not 
formed in isolation; rather they are embedded in social relationships. Accordingly, this 
study further investigates the effectiveness of informal institutions in mitigating the 
problem. 
 
Tanzania, being one of the reforming infant markets, provides a suitable setting for the 
purpose of this study. Over the last two decades, property investment activities in 
Tanzania have recorded a noticeable growth. This is mainly a result of institutional 
reforms which have been taking place since the mid 1980s. During the period, many 
formal institutions catering for a wide range of activities have been formed. Growth in 
property investment activities has promoted growth of real property related professions 
and consultancy activities. The number of property management agents and the use of 
outsourced property management services have increased remarkably over the recent 
years. Owing to the capital intensiveness of property investment, the market is 
nevertheless still largely dominated by institutional investors; particularly pension 
funds, National Housing Corporation (NHC) and a few foreign investors. Indirect 
property investment vehicles are still at their infant stage of development and are 
mainly in the form of private equity vehicles sponsored by large investors. Besides, 
most of the property investments owned by private individuals or families are owner-
managed, which minimises or eliminates altogether incidents of agency conflicts. For 
these reasons, this study is centred on property investment activities of these large 
investors namely, pension funds, NHC and foreign investors. 
 
1.1.3 Pension funds’ investments activities 
A pension fund is basically a fund reserved to pay workers' pensions when they retire 
from service (Brueggeman and Fisher, 2005). The term pension fund is also normally 
used to refer to the organisation responsible for the management of the funds. 
Worldwide, pension funds are notable institutional investors. Davis and Steil (2001) 
define institutional investors as specialised financial institutions that manage savings 
collectively on behalf of small investors toward a specific objective in terms of 
acceptable risk, return maximisation, and maturity of claims. It is clear from this 
definition, that pension funds are therefore mere depositories of their members’ 
1 Introduction  5 
 
 
money. Literally, members of pension funds can be compared to shareholders of 
public limited liability companies. Administrators of pension funds have a fiduciary 
responsibility to the insured persons and are expected to act prudently in carrying out 
their investment duties (Tamagno, 2000). 
 
Pension funds in Tanzania operate more as defined benefits schemes. In defined 
benefit schemes, each member pays regular contributions into the fund and on 
retirement the member receives benefits that are related to the member’s salary 
(Beam and McFadden, 2007; Geho 1997). The plan sponsor (the government in the 
case of Tanzania) bears all the risks of a possible shortfall between the accumulated 
contributions and the final pay-out which would be required. Each of the statutes 
establishing the different government sponsored pension funds in Tanzania carries a 
provision stating government’s obligation to pay members’ dues in the event the 
respective pension fund is unable to meet such a liability. The success of a fund, 
therefore, hinges very much on the quality of the business acumen of the plan 
sponsors and their advisors (Geho, 1997). 
 
Pension funds can also be classified according to their maturity status. Whereas a 
mature fund is the one where the existing employees’ net contributions are insufficient 
to meet the liabilities to retired members, an immature pension fund is the one whose 
contributing members’ net contributions match or exceed the payments to be made to 
retired members (Geho, 1997). From the liability structure of pension funds in 
Tanzania, which shows that assets are more than liabilities, it can be suggested that 
the schemes are immature. Logically, immature pension funds invest in assets which 
will provide future income flows to match the liabilities which will occur as the fund 
matures. It is thus not surprising that pension funds’ investment portfolios in Tanzania 
have significant real estate investment allocations. 
 
Pension funds are known worldwide for holding substantial proportions of real estate 
assets in their investment portfolios. For instance, in the USA, since the 1950s 
allocation to property has been kept in the range of 0% to 17% (Worzala and 
Bajtelsmit, 1993). The situation has been more or less similar in the UK over the same 
period of time, although prior to the 1980s some isolated cases of UK pension funds 
recorded up to over 20% investment property holdings (Investment Property Forum, 
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1993). More recently, average real estate investment holdings by pension funds in the 
USA, UK, Germany, Netherlands and Australia are 3.4%, 6%, 12%, 10% and 11% 
respectively (Worzala et al, 2006; Geho 1997). Limited literature exists on property 
allocations by pension funds in Africa. Newell et al (2002) report that about 8% of the 
portfolios of insurance companies and pension funds in South Africa comprise of real 
estate assets. At times, pension funds in Tanzania have allocated up to more than 
20% to direct real estate assets (Mpogole, 2006; Kongela, 2005; Geho, 2001). 
 
Pension funds, currently considered to be property market movers in Tanzania, have 
been experiencing the weight of money problem (Mpogole, 2006; Geho, 2001). Each 
year, pension funds have about US $ 500 million investible funds at their disposal 
(Kwaku, 2007). Administrators of these Funds have been trying to diversify portfolios 
by investing in different avenues. Pension funds in Tanzania hold both direct and 
indirect property investment. Indirect property investment has been through acquisition 
of shares in companies (private equity) which invest in real property. Examples of the 
companies in which pension funds hold shares include Ubungo Plaza Ltd., 
International House Properties Ltd, NHC/PPF IPS Building Co. Ltd, and Hifadhi 
Processing Zone Ltd. National Social Security Fund (NSSF) has also shares in Serena 
Hotels. Parastatal Pensions Fund (PPF) and NSSF are also the majority shareholders 
of Azania Bank, which is one of few banks in Tanzania providing mortgage finance 
(Mpogole, 2006; Kongela, 2005). 
 
Pension funds have also been participating in large real property and infrastructure 
government-sponsored projects. For instance, pension funds have financed the 
construction of the National Assembly hall in Dodoma (Mpogole, 2006). Pension funds 
are also currently involved in the construction of Dodoma University buildings, which 
upon completion, are estimated to cost about TZS 1,000 billion. Pension funds are also 
currently financing the construction of Mandela Institute of Science and Technology in 
Arusha. Some other government projects largely financed by pension funds, include 
the construction of 252 houses for government senior officials in Dodoma 
(Mwambalaswa, 2003); construction of the University of Dar es Salaam students’ halls 
of residence at Mabibo; and construction of Dar es Salaam petty traders’ market 
building (NSSF, 2007). NSSF is also on the verge of financing the construction of a 
700 metre Kivukoni Bridge. LAPF is currently financing the construction of Hombolo 
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Local Government Institute buildings. LAPF also financed the construction of Msamvu 
bus terminal in Morogoro municipality. Other pension funds have also been 
constructing and selling houses to their members on hire-purchase arrangements. On 
a few occasions, some pension funds have also been advancing loans to private 
property developers (NSSF, 2008; Whitehouse, 2007; PPF, 2005). 
 
All large pension funds in Tanzania are compulsory contributory schemes financed by 
both employers and employees during their working life in return for terminal and short 
term benefits (Dau, 2003). To protect the money of the members, the government 
exercises close control of the administration of pension funds. The government is 
involved in the appointment of members of the Boards of Trustees and the Chief 
Executive Officers of the pension funds. 
 
Nevertheless, some pension funds have been widely criticised for their property 
investment decisions (Whitehouse, 2007; Mpogole, 2006). The problems with pension 
funds’ investment decisions and management have led to the establishment of the 
Social Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA). Underscoring the importance of SSRA, 
The Daily News (dated 3rd August 2009) quoted the Minister responsible for the 
supervision of pension funds insisting that: 
 
… the regulatory body will also help the pension funds to operate more efficiently and 
ensure that investments are made in the best interests of its members, who are the main 
beneficiaries of their respective schemes…. 
 
The property investment process and management of pension funds involve many 
people starting from the government down the line through property managers or 
brokers. It is apparent that some of the problems associated with property investment 
decisions are a reflection of agency conflicts inherent in the investment process. 
Members of the pension funds have no direct control over the decisions of the 
administrators of their respective pension funds. Although the government oversees 
the management of the pension funds, it also plays a role of an agent (of the 
members), which creates a room for agency conflicts. Cases of senior government 
officials interfering in the investment decisions of pension funds are a good example of 
government’s conflict of interest in pension funds administration, and thus agency 
conflicts (Whitehouse, 2007). 
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1.1.4 National Housing Corporation investment activities 
Apart from pension funds, the government, through National Housing Corporation 
(NHC) is also a key direct player in the real estate investment market. NHC is still 
wholly owned by the state. The Corporation was formed in 1962, primarily to provide 
and facilitate the provision of housing and buildings for other uses in urban areas. Until 
1989, NHC had already built 16,039 housing units (Kironde et al, 2003). In 1990 the 
government transferred to NHC all properties which were held by the Registrar of 
Buildings (RoB). Properties held by RoB were those nationalised in 1971, in the course 
of implementing socialist policies. In terms of stock size, NHC is the largest owner of 
real estate in Tanzania, but most of its stock comprises rundown and old buildings 
commanding low rent. Many of such properties are however located in prime areas, 
making them very valuable for redevelopment. Apart from managing the old stock 
buildings, the Corporation is also engaged in property development. Owing to the large 
size of its operations, NHC also engages a large number of people in its real estate 
investment activities, which attracts agency conflicts. 
 
The Corporation is headed by the Board of Directors whose chairperson is appointed 
by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. The management is headed by 
Director General. The Director General is appointed by the Minister for the ministry 
responsible for housing matters. Different levels of principal-agent relationship exist in 
NHC structure and operations. The agency levels are between the government 
(owner) and the Board of Directors, between the Board of Directors and the 
Management, between the Management and employees and external contracting 
parties such as property managers, estate agents, contractors, auctioneers, architects, 
etc. Besides, having properties scattered all over the country, further complicates the 
monitoring and control of the operations. 
 
Being a public corporation, NHC has for many years been under constant pressure 
from dissatisfied members of the public. Lack of transparency in allocating housing 
units and unofficial subletting of properties by NHC officials and some tenants are 
some of the commonly reported problems. Non-performing assets and inefficient 
manpower are the other problems that have been facing NHC for years. Even the 
newly appointed Director General (in 2010) openly confessed that the Corporation’s 
public image was tarnished by the actions of some unfaithful officials and lack of 
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transparency in the operations (Kagaruki, 2010). Similarly, being a state owned 
enterprise, NHC has also apparently been associated with unofficial interference from 
some senior government officials and politicians. 
 
1.1.5 Foreign property investors’ investment activities 
Like pension funds and NHC, foreign investors also use a great deal of agents in the 
property investment process. Over the recent years, the property market has 
witnessed entry of foreign investors. Some of the foreign real estate investors currently 
in Tanzania include Integrated Property Investments Ltd. (IPI), CDC and Aga Khan 
Foundation all of the UK; Island View of Botswana; African National Congress of South 
Africa; and a number of small investors mainly from Middle East, India, China and 
some other African countries (Kusiluka, 2008a). Some of the foreign investors currently 
contemplating starting up their property investment activities in Tanzania include 
Rutley Capital’s East African Real Estate Fund and African Real Estate Company 
(Rositer, 2007). Despite its small nominal GDP which is estimated at about US $ 18 
billion (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009), Tanzania is said to be attracting more 
foreign investors than actually expected (Baum, 2008). Apart from institutional reforms, 
the country’s geographical location coupled with its natural tourist attractions, is one of 
the additional factors making it a suitable place for real estate investment (Broll and 
CBRE, 2009). Most of the foreign investors have focused on commercial properties, 
prime residential houses and tourist hotels. 
 
Foreign investors have been engaging agents in market studies, feasibility studies, 
land acquisitions, construction management, project marketing, property management, 
and property selling. In the course of the use of agents, some investors have 
apparently encountered several problems. For instance, Mlimani City investors (Island 
View) had to revisit their plans to be able to continue with the project after failing to 
raise capital locally contrary to what had been initially envisaged. This investment 
project entailing development of approximately 100 acres of prime land, has suffered 
delays in completion. Bahari Beach Resort project is another example. The project, 
which is undertaken by Integrated Property Investments Limited of the UK, entails 
development of a beach resort consisting of more than 600 housing units and the 
accompanying amenities. Like Mlimani City, this project has also had problems in 
sticking to its original plan. Investors have had to review investment financing and 
10  1 Introduction 
capital structure. They finally resorted to inviting equity investors amongst local private 
and institutional investors. 
 
1.1.6 Nature of conflicts in real estate investment activities 
Owing to the nature and operations of the selected investors in Tanzania, the main real 
estate investment activities requiring the services of agents include land acquisition, 
feasibility studies, building designing, construction, property marketing and renting, 
estate agency, property management, and valuation. As highlighted in subsection 
1.1.3 to 1.1.5 of this chapter, it is apparent that property investment activities of 
pension funds, NHC and foreign investors are highly vulnerable to agency conflicts. 
This is due to high involvement of agents in their investment decision process. Apart 
from their own employees, these investors have from time to time had to involve 
different people or parties including professional consultants, management teams, 
partners, and sometimes government agencies. With all these parties involved, 
contracts catering for the relationships between different parties are common. 
Loopholes in the enforcement of these contracts give a room for agents to pursue their 
own interests instead, or at the expense, of their principals’ interests. Such agents’ 
actions and omissions undermine investment efficiency. The extent and effects of 
agency conflicts are apparently worse in market settings which generally have 
restricted or vague owners’ property rights and high market imperfections. It is thus 
very likely that most of the investment decisions made by agents on behalf of their 
principals are in the first place meant to serve agents’ interests or are just made 
without agents’ best sense of care and responsibility. 
 
Pension funds have invariably been criticised for some of their property investment 
decisions (Mpogole, 2006). The common concern has been whether or not such 
investment decisions reflect the best management of members’ funds (Daily News, 3rd 
August 2009). Similarly, NHC has been under pressure for failure to address housing 
problem and management inefficiency. Foreign investors, on the other hand, owing to 
their little knowledge of the local market, have also inevitably been engaging many 
agents in their investment activities. Apparently, agency conflicts have in some cases 
resulted into serious problems to investors such as delays in project completion, failure 
to raise finance from local sources, and major re-organisation of activities. Some 
foreign real estate investment project plans have been shelved or abandoned 
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altogether. It is mainly the complexity of the real estate investment process of pension 
funds, NHC and foreign investors that exposes them to more agency conflicts. 
Theoretically, the agency problems faced by these investors is much higher owing to 
the fact that their investment activities are carried out in a market setting which is 
dominated by high market imperfections and weak institutions. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Robust conceptual literature and empirical studies on agency conflicts over the recent 
decades have culminated into agency theory. The theory is thus still at its early stages 
of development (Temel-Candemir, 2005). Despite its success in addressing some 
corporate governance and other agency contracting issues, the theory still suffers a 
number of limitations. It is mainly the limitations of the theory in addressing some real 
life issues, which have attracted scholars from a wide range of disciplines into a debate 
on various aspects of the theory. One of the widely disputed aspects of agency theory 
is its assumption that individuals are rational and self-interested utility maximisers 
prone to opportunism (Bathula, 2008; Temel-Candemir, 2005; Shapiro, 2005; Brennan, 
1994). This assumption is widely considered to be one of the major limitations of the 
institutional theory as a whole (High et al, 2005; Frank, 2004). Agency theory is also 
challenged for not addressing different contexts of cultural behaviour (Johnson and 
Droege, 2004). The theory overlooks the role of informal institutions in constraining 
human behaviour (Brennan, 1994). Proponents of stewardship theory also criticise 
agency theory for ignoring stewardship in agency relationships (Davies et al, 1997). 
 
Limitations of agency theory are also manifested through ineffectiveness of some of 
the remedies of agency conflicts in checking agents’ opportunistic tendencies. Some of 
the common remedies of agency conflicts include performance incentives, stock 
options, and long term job contracts (Parkin et al, 2008). Given the complexity of a 
human being and the heterogeneity of the institutional environments in which agency 
contracting takes place, the effectiveness of some of these remedies remains to be 
theoretical and a subject of contention (Padilla, 2002). For instance, the economic 
analysis of incentives is widely criticised for disregarding the role of indirect incentives 
(Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005). The proponents of indirect incentives insist 
on the role of informal institutions in checking opportunistic behaviour in business 
transactions. 
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Besides, real estate literature focusing on agency theory is still limited. Most of the 
existing theoretical analysis and empirical studies testing out various aspects of 
agency theory are to a large extent confined to corporate finance, corporate 
governance and managerial economics aspects of general businesses (Gunasekarage 
and Reed, 2008; Junker, 2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Ang et al, 2000). Real estate 
investment activities, despite their relative high vulnerability to agency conflicts, have 
until very recently not been given comprehensive treatment in the literature. Even the 
few existing studies have concentrated on corporate governance issues of corporate 
real estate investors (e.g. Kohl and Schaefers, 2009; Schulte and Kolb, 2008; 
Klingenberg and Brown, 2006) and some aspects of real estate management and 
brokerage (e.g. Rutherford et al, 2005; Gibler and Black, 2004; Zietz and Newsome, 
2001; Rosenberg and Corgel, 1990). Besides, most of the studies have been carried 
out in the developed real estate markets i.e. Europe, USA and, more recently, Asia. 
Such markets have significantly different institutions from those obtaining in infant real 
estate market settings. 
 
The paucity of comprehensive agency theory literature focusing on real estate 
investment activities taking place in market settings which are characterised by 
nascent formal institutions like Tanzania has left players in such markets with limited 
options of dealing with agency problems. The absence of comprehensive agency 
theory studies carried out in infant property markets has also led to a dearth of 
knowledge of the common forms, catalysts and mitigation techniques of agency 
problems in such markets. This study is an attempt to fill this gap. Apart from applying 
agency theory to investigate opportunistic tendencies in real estate investment 
activities, this study also examines the effectiveness of institutions and other human 
behaviour attributes in mitigating agency problems. The study uses a real life setting 
which is characterised by nascent formal institutions and high market imperfection to 
extend the discussion on the main limitations of agency theory. Apart from its 
contribution to knowledge, the study is important for real estate investors in less 
developed markets in dealing with agency conflicts. The study is also useful to policy 
makers, employers, and human resource managers in devising appropriate remedial 
institutions to address agency conflicts in real estate investment activities. 
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1.3 Objectives of the study 
 
1.3.1 General objective 
The general objective of this study is to investigate agency problems in real estate 
investment activities and to determine the effectiveness of institutional remedies and 
other human behaviour drivers in mitigating the problems. The study was carried out in 
Tanzania, which is an infant real estate investment market characterised by nascent 
formal institutions. 
 
1.3.2 Specific objectives 
To address the general objective, below are the specific objectives. 
 
(i) To describe the link between real estate investment and the institutional 
environment 
 
(ii) To investigate the forms, catalysts and mitigation techniques of agency 
problems in real estate investment activities 
 
(iii) To examine the effectiveness of the formal and informal institutional remedies in 
constraining agents’ opportunistic behaviour in the real estate investment 
activities 
 
(iv) To examine the association between institutional attributes and other human 
behaviour drivers in controlling agents’ opportunistic behaviour 
 
1.4. Research questions 
Below are the research questions corresponding to the specific objectives listed in 
subsection 1.3.2 above. 
 
(i) How is real estate investment linked with the institutional environment? 
 
(ii) What are the forms, catalysts and mitigation techniques of agency problems in 
real estate investment activities 
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(iii) How effective are the formal and informal institutional remedies in constraining 
agents’ opportunistic behaviour? 
 
(iv) What is the association between institutional attributes and other human 
behaviour drivers in controlling agents’ behaviour? 
 
1.5 Identification and definition of institutional parameters 
Agent’s behaviour, formal institutions and informal institutions are the key variables 
defining this study. It is thus posited in this study that the behaviour of agents involved 
in real estate investment activities is a function of the prevailing formal and informal 
institutions. Institutions are defined by North (1990) as society’s rules of the games, or 
more precisely, the constraints that we have devised to shape human behaviour i.e. 
they are rules, norms and regulations by which a society functions. Institutions reduce 
uncertainty to social interaction by providing a structure to everyday life (Ebohon et al, 
2002). They serve a number of important economic functions, such as handling 
situations with missing or asymmetrical information, facilitating and enforcing market 
and non-market transactions, substituting for missing markets, co-ordinating the 
formation of expectations, encouraging cooperation and collective action and reducing 
transaction costs (Mooya and Cloete, 2007). Institutions are developed by human 
activity and, therefore, reflect the power and interests within the society (Viruly, 2009). 
 
The economists’ definition of the term institution is slightly different from that of political 
scientists and sociologists. Acknowledging this problem, Greif (2006) crafts a more 
inclusive definition of the term institution which incorporates economics, political 
science and sociology perspectives. The author refers to institutions as: 
 
…rules of the game in society; as formal or informal organisations (social structures), such 
as parliaments, universities, tribes, families, or communities; as beliefs about others’ 
behaviour, or about the world around us and the relationship between actions and 
outcomes in it; as internalised norms of behaviour, and as regularities of behaviour or social 
practices that are regularly and continuously repeated, including contractual regularities 
expressing themselves in organisations such as firms (Greif, 2006: 39). 
 
Institutions comprise both formal and informal constraints. Formal institutions are 
constraints comprising norms and rules devised by the society to govern the conduct 
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of its members and their sanctions are guaranteed through formal processes (Ebohon 
et al, 2002). Formal institutions are officially codified and are mostly enforceable 
through legal recourse or arbitration (Lauth, 2004). Informal institutions, on the other 
hand, are much more difficult to define. The term ‘informal’ may refer to almost 
anything that is not formal and appears in the context of a dizzying array of 
phenomena, including personal networks, clientelism, corruption, clans, civil society, 
traditional culture, and a variety of legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic norms (Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2004). It is however, common in many disciplines to define informal 
institutions as social norms that represent evolved practices with stable rules of 
behaviour that are outside the formal system (Sen, 2006). They are institutions which 
are not formally codified in official documents, but they reflect acceptable behaviour 
which is governed through a set of known sanctions or through powerful processes of 
internalisation without recourse to sanctions (Lauth, 2004; Sen, 2006). 
 
The key difference between formal and informal institutions is that while the former are 
centrally designed and enforced the latter can remain in the private realm (Williamson, 
2009). Whilst formal institutions are guaranteed by state agencies and their violation is 
sanctioned by the state, most of the informal institutions are based solely on their 
existence and effectiveness. The sanctioning possibilities they imply are largely due to 
social mechanisms of exclusion or are based on the condition that its non-utilisation 
minimises the chances of gaining access to needed goods and services (Lauth, 2004). 
Although informal institutions are not codified in the formal documents such as laws 
and constitutions, they are normally implied in such documents. This is important 
because the enforcement and the effectiveness of such formal institutions are 
dependent on the informal institutions prevailing in the society in question (Casadesus-
Masanell and Spulber, 2005). 
 
Many studies have attempted to link economic development and the level of 
institutional development (Williamson, 2009; Tabellini, 2008; Glaeser et al, 2004; de 
Soto, 2000). There is a general consensus that the existence of strong institutions is a 
prerequisite for economic development. Whereas some literature insists on formal 
institutions (de Soto, 2000), more recent studies suggest that formal institutions are not 
effective in the absence of strong informal institutions (Williamson, 2009; Tabellini, 
2008). It is thus suggested that, in a bid to reform economies, the introduction of formal 
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institutions should entail a process of mapping such institutions onto the existing 
informal institutions, and not replacing them (Boettke et al, 2008). Empirical evidence 
shows that countries with strong informal institutions perform better economically than 
those whose reforms have entailed strengthening formal institutions while ignoring 
informal institutions (Williamson, 2009). 
 
A number of formal institutions are in place to address agency conflicts. These include 
policies, laws, rules and regulations. Agency laws, contract laws, financial markets 
laws, professionals’ codes of conduct, professional bodies, credit institutions, agency 
contracts, employment contracts and policies are some of the formal institutions which, 
among others, regulate the conduct of agents. To assess the effectiveness of formal 
institutions in checking agency conflicts in real estate investment activities of pension 
funds, NHC and foreign investors in Tanzania, this study focuses on how such formal 
institutions control the actions and omissions of agents and principals in discharging 
their duties. Cognizant of the infancy of most of the market and corporate governance 
formal institutions, this study assigns equally significant weight to informal institutions 
as complementary institutions in regulating the actions of agents. As North (1992) 
suggests, formal rules and informal norms can either compensate or substitute for 
each other. Owing to the weakness of the formal institutions in Tanzania, informality 
dominates most of the human activities. 
 
In assessing the effectiveness of informal institutions in mitigating agency conflicts in 
the real estate investment activities, various forms of informal institutions, as gleaned 
from institutional theory literature, were considered. For instance, North (1990) 
attributes informal institutions to social sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and 
social code of conduct. In addition to customs and traditions, Pejovich (2006) further 
cites moral values, religious beliefs, and norms of behaviour as defining aspects of 
informal institutions. Brennan (1994) also adds altruism as one of the important 
constraints of human behaviour against opportunism. Some authors (e.g. Casadesus-
Masanell and Spulber, 2005; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004) also cite social network as 
another important behaviour constraint. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the 
following forms of informal institutions were adopted: social norms, customs, traditions, 
taboos, social sanctions, social code of conduct, social network, spirituality, altruism, 
and moral values (e.g. trustworthiness and respect). 
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1.6 Significance of the study 
Many sub-areas of real estate investment in less developed countries are still under-
researched. This has resulted into high dependence on literature meant for developed 
investment markets, which is in many cases inadequate to address specific needs of 
the less developed market settings. The paucity of literature catering for such settings 
has left real estate investment market players without practical tools to deal with 
problems arising from the weak formal institutional environment in which they operate. 
This study is an attempt to address some of the knowledge problems in dealing with 
agency conflicts arising out of relationships formed in the course of executing various 
real estate investment activities in the context of the developing markets. The study 
provides some insights on how agency conflicts can perpetuate sub-optimal real estate 
investments thereby undermining investors’ wealth maximisation efforts, and how such 
a problem can be addressed using the institutional approach. 
 
The study comes up with tailored remedies for agency conflicts based on the real life 
institutional environment obtaining in developing countries. Since this study generates 
the knowledge necessary in pursuing efficient real estate investment activities, the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the study are both the existing and potential real estate 
investors. The study is useful to policy makers and investors in devising more effective 
ways of mitigating agency conflicts using both formal and informal institutions. Policy 
makers in the government and its institutions charged with fostering economic growth 
through investment facilitation and promotion will also find this study useful in 
formulating policies related to real estate investment. The knowledge acquired from 
this study may equally be relevant to other emerging markets which share key 
similarities with Tanzania. 
 
1.7 Book arrangement 
As shown in Figure 1.1, this book is organised into seven chapters. Chapter One gives 
a general introduction to the study. It covers the background to the study and 
statement of the problem. It also presents the objectives of the study, research 
questions and the significance of the study. Chapter Two presents the theoretical 
framework underlying the study. A critical review of the pertinent conceptual and 
empirical literature is also presented in this chapter. Research methodology is 
presented in Chapter Three.  
18  1 Introduction 
Figure 1.1 Book structure 
 
 
Chapter Four gives an account of the institutional environment underpinning real 
estate investment activities and then shows how institutional reforms in Tanzania have 
promoted growth in the real estate sector. Data analysis, results and discussions are 
devoted to Chapter Five and Six. Whereas the nature, forms, catalysts and remedies 
of agency problems in real estate investment activities are covered in Chapter Five, 
analysis of institutional remedies is presented in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven presents 
the findings, conclusions, recommendations and areas for further study. 
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2 Institutionalism, Agency Theory and Real Estate Investment 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Both conceptual and empirical literature on institutional theory has received 
considerable attention following the emergence and growth in popularity of the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). NIE literature has focused on explaining how institutions 
arise and what purpose they serve with its fundamental message being that institutions 
matter for economic performance (Williamson, 2009; Tabellini, 2008; Junker, 2005). 
The literature shows that institutions emerge to deal with frictions in the society 
(Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990; Harriss et al, 1995). It also explains why inefficient 
institutions may persist or may be perpetuated in societies. The literature on 
institutional theory has mainly focused on three theories namely, property rights, 
transaction costs and agency (Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Cieleback, 2004, Fischer, 
2004). 
 
Many strands of literature on agency theory have focused on explaining how managers 
of corporations, being agents of shareholders, use the resources of the shareholders 
to pursue their own interests instead of those of their principals and how such 
behaviour of managers can be controlled (Kaymak and Bektas, 2008; Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2007; Danielson and Scott, 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This chapter examines the institutional theory literature with a 
particular emphasis on agency theory and its applicability in real estate investment 
activities. A critical analysis of the theory is presented, thereby identifying gaps which 
need to be filled by the current study and subsequent studies. Cognizant of the fact 
that the agency theory is still at its early stages of development (Temel-Candemir, 
2005), this chapter sets the ground for testing the theory by contextualising the 
investigation of agency relationship to real estate investment activity occurring in an 
investment market setting which is characterised by weak formal institutions. 
 
2.2 The institutional theory 
 
2.2.1 Basics of New Institutional Economics 
The new institutional theory insists that human behaviour cannot only be explained 
using formal rules and value-maximising rationality, but also by focusing on the role of 
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norms, symbols, myths, belief systems, and informal arrangements forming the culture 
of the organisation or society in question. In the words of Scott (2005: 460): 
 
The institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. 
It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and 
routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. Different 
components of institutional theory explain how these elements are created, diffused, 
adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse. 
 
A robust development and application of the institutional theory in economic analysis is 
widely associated with the emergence of NIE academic movement. NIE can be traced 
back to the work of a Nobel laureate Ronald Coase (1937), but its development into a 
self-conscious academic movement is largely attributed to Williamson’s (1975) work. 
Since then, NIE has developed as a movement within the social sciences that unites 
theoretical and empirical research examining the role of institutions in furthering or 
preventing economic growth (Cieleback, 2004). NIE builds on, modifies, and extends 
neoclassical theory and retains, and builds on, the fundamental assumption of scarcity 
and hence competition. NIE developed in an effort to deal with the unrealistic 
assumption of neoclassical economics theory of markets, which maintains that firms 
operating within the market act as rational decision makers (Kim and Mahoney, 2005, 
Junker, 2005). To the contrary, markets are not perfect. As a result, some forms of 
economic organisations have been arising to compensate for market failures. 
Cognizant of this fact, some scholars have attempted to incorporate more realistic 
assumptions into the microeconomic model, thus paving way to NIE. Three theories 
namely, property rights, transaction cost, and agency dominate NIE literature (Kim and 
Mahoney, 2005; Junker, 2005; Cieleback, 2004). The sub-sections below briefly look 
at the three theories. 
 
2.2.2 Transaction cost theory 
Institutions evolve to minimise frictions and uncertainty, collectively regarded as 
transaction costs, and they change and develop over time as circumstances and 
experiences dictate (Harriss et al, 1995; Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990). It is important 
though to acknowledge that not all emerging institutions are necessarily efficient. 
Inefficient institutions may persist where nobody has the knowledge or motivation to 
change them, and sometimes inefficient institutions exist to serve the interest of 
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influential members of the society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; North, 2003; Keogh 
and D’Arcy, 1999). The concept of transaction costs can be traced to Adam Smith, but 
the path-breaking economic analysis of transaction costs was first carried out by 
Coase (1937), in a bid to explain why firms carry out some activities, procedures or 
services internally while others are bought and sold in the market (Vitikainen, 2007; 
Cheung, 1983). Scholars’ interest in transaction costs became more noticeable in the 
1960s and 1970s. This is the time when property rights and agency theories also 
gained significant ground (Hobbs, 1996; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 1967; 
Alchian, 1965). Williamson (1975; 1979) is widely acknowledged to have pioneered the 
development of the transaction costs theory. 
 
Different authors have attempted to categorise transaction costs into various groups. 
For instance, Furubotn and Richter (1998) group transaction costs into three 
categories namely, search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs and, 
supervision and enforcement cost. Parkin et al (2008), also agree that transaction 
costs are costs arising from finding someone with whom to do business, of reaching an 
agreement about the price and other aspects of the exchange, and of ensuring that the 
terms of the agreement are fulfilled. Considering the idiosyncratic features of real 
estate investment, it is apparent that real estate business attracts many forms of 
institutions to deal with a multiple of transaction costs associated with it. As noted by 
Geltner et al (2007), transaction costs in buying and selling property are much greater 
than those in the security market. Contextualising transaction costs to real estate 
business, Mooya and Cloete (2007) provide that search and information costs relate to 
the cost of the process of finding the right transaction partner, bargaining and decision 
costs are incurred once a suitable prospective transaction partner is found and, 
supervision and enforcement costs arise after the transaction has been completed and 
relate to the need to monitor and enforce agreements. A further breakdown of 
transaction costs attributable to real estate business provides six categories of the 
costs namely, search costs, legal costs, administrative costs, adjustment costs, 
financial costs, and the costs of uncertainty (Stubkjaer et al, 2007; Quigley, 2002). 
 
In all cases of practical importance, transaction costs are recognised as being greater 
than zero and, transaction costs economics is concerned with reduction of transaction 
costs to a level at which exchange is possible (Greif, 2006; Furubotn and Pejovich, 
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1972). However, whereas there is a general consensus that transaction costs exist, no 
significant empirical work has been done owing to difficulties in quantifying them. 
Measurement of transaction costs has not kept pace with theoretical developments 
(Stubkjaer et al, 2007; Buitelaar, 2004; Loader, 1997; Hobbs, 1996). Transaction costs 
have been treated in many texts in a heuristic sense and the texts have dwelt much on 
providing theoretical explanation of how these costs affect the allocation of resources 
(Buitelaar, 2004). 
 
Unlike production costs, transaction costs are neither easy to separate from other 
managerial costs nor readily measurable. The problem of quantifying transaction costs 
is analogous to the difficulty accountants have in assigning costs of jointly used assets 
to individual enterprises in a multiple enterprise firm. Owing to the complex nature of 
most of the institutions, the costs of their operations are not easy to quantify and the 
data which one might use to measure transaction costs are not usually collected by 
governments or by the standard accountancy practices of firms (Hobbs, 1996). From 
the cited bottlenecks, quantification of transaction costs associated with real estate 
investment activities has largely remained a theoretical phenomenon. In studying 
impediments to mortgage finance in Tanzania, Mbele (2009) looks at, among other 
things, the transactions costs associated with mortgage finance. However, owing to 
difficulties in quantifying transaction costs, the author does not give a comprehensive 
treatment of the transaction costs involved in mortgage finance in Tanzania. 
 
2.2.3 Property rights theory 
Property rights refer to the sanctioned behavioural relations among ‘men’ that arise 
from the existence of things and pertain to their use (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). 
They are social institutions that govern the ownership, use, and disposal of anything 
that people value (Parkin, et al, 2008). Property rights specify the norms of behaviour 
with respect to things that each and every person in a society must observe in his 
interaction with other persons, or bear the cost of non-observance. Property rights are 
the fundamental foundation of market economy i.e. by establishing property rights and 
the legal system that enforces them, governments enable markets to function (Parkin 
et al, 2008). Sometimes it is possible to reduce inefficiency arising from externality by 
establishing a property right where one does not exist. 
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The term property rights has a double connotation i.e. first it essentially refers to the 
ability a person has to enjoy a piece of property, and secondly it is what the state 
assigns to a person (Barzel, 1997). The first connotation of property rights is also 
referred to as economic (property) rights while the second is referred to as legal 
(property) rights. Economic rights are actually the end i.e. what people ultimately seek, 
whereas legal rights are the means to achieve the end. The value of any good 
exchanged depends on the bundle of property rights that is conveyed in the 
transaction. Honore (1961) points out twelve rights of full property ownership namely, 
the right to possession (exclusive control), the right to use (usufruct), the right to 
manage, the right to income, the right to capital, the right to security, the right to 
transmissibility, the right to divisibility, prohibition of harmful use, absence of term, 
liability to execution, and residual character. 
 
Security and clarity of property rights differ from one society to another and from one 
asset to another. Some societies have imposed more restrictions on property rights 
than others. Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) refer to such restrictions as ‘attenuation of 
property rights’, which implies limitations on owner’s rights to change the form, place, 
or substance of an asset, transfer of all rights to an asset to others at a mutually 
agreed upon price. With this definition of property rights, it is generally rare to find a 
society with absolute property rights. In contemporary economies, without the rule of 
law, protection of property rights is often awarded by the politically powerful to some 
individual members of the society who can reciprocate through their economic activity 
or political support (Greif, 2006). This is analogous to the argument that inefficient 
institutions may exist in a society in the interest of the people in power to make 
decisions. 
 
Issues of property rights are paramount in real property compared to personal 
property. This is mainly explained by the fact that landed property is the single largest 
asset accounting for about 50% of global wealth (Ling and Archer, 2005). Wealth and 
livelihoods of many people in the world are directly attached to real property. There are 
different land tenure arrangements found in different parts of the world. Africa and 
many other developing regions are popular for embracing hostile land tenure systems 
inhibiting economic development (de Soto, 2000; Gough and Yankson, 2000; Besley, 
1995). Ownership, use and occupation of landed property are indeed some of the main 
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sources of conflicts amongst individuals, clans, tribes and even nations (Mpogole and 
Kongela, 2009). The situation is different in developed countries where property rights 
on landed property and other assets are relatively secure, more defined and protected. 
 
A rich body of literature in the field of economics affirms that clearly defined and 
enforced property rights contribute significantly to economic development (Parkin et al, 
2008; Joireman, 2006; Ebohon et al, 2002; Asiedu, 2002; de Soto, 2000; Svensson, 
1998; Besley, 1995; Feder and Feeny, 1991). Property rights theory underlines the 
importance of institutions securing property rights for the operation of markets (Greif, 
2006). Secure property rights encourage people to invest their resources and protect 
their investment against expropriation (Joireman, 2006; Asiedu, 2002). Ambiguity in 
the definition and clarity or enforcement of any of property rights leads to an increase 
in transaction costs in the exchange as well as residual uncertainty after any contract 
(Joireman, 2006). Property rights limitations largely account for the paucity of Foreign 
Direct Investment in African markets (Lim et al, 2006; Krugell, 2005; Ngowi, 2005; 
Kumssa and Mbeche, 2004; Goldstein, 2004; Asiedu, 2002). Issues of property rights 
limitations have featured in most of the studies on African real estate markets (e.g. 
Sjoestedt, 2007; Mooya and Cloete, 2007; Abdulai, 2006; de Soto, 2000; Svensson, 
1998; Besley, 1995). 
 
2.2.4 Agency theory 
Agency is simply a legal relationship in which one party, the principal, authorises 
another, the agent, to act on behalf of the principal. Agency relationships exist in all 
forms of organisations. Essentially, all contractual arrangements, ranging from the one 
between employer and employee to that between the state and the governed, contain 
important elements of agency (Ross, 1973). This implies that, agency relationships 
exist in all organisations and in all cooperative efforts and at every level of 
management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in 
governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally 
classified as agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and 
the market for real estate (Jensen and Meckling, 1979). 
 
The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of 
social interaction (Ross, 1973). The origin of agency relations in business activities is 
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also associated with pre-modern international traders. Greif (2006) cites examples of 
the 11th century merchants namely Maghribi traders from the Muslim world and 12th 
century Genoese traders from the Latin world, to show the risk of using agents and 
how such a risk can be mitigated by introducing institutions through which an agent 
can commit himself ex ante i.e. before receiving merchant’s capital, to be honest ex 
post i.e. after receiving the merchants goods. Historical cases of agency in 
international trade are also reported in Africa. Cohen (1969) documents agency 
relationship in the Hausa trade diaspora where landlords in Ibadan, Nigeria employed 
agents to sell cattle from dealers located elsewhere in the trade route. Being owners of 
immovable and illiquid real estate, the landlords were considered reliable agents, as 
they could not easily sell their real estate and leave after embezzling the money of 
traders. 
 
Common examples of agency relationships in a corporate setting are those involving 
shareholders, managers and workers. The first scenario, is that in which shareholders 
are the principals while managers are the agents. In the other scenario, managers may 
be principals while workers are the agents. There is a chain of principal-agent 
relationship within the firm. A noticeable documentation of agency relationship and the 
associated conflicts in firms was done by Adam Smith (1776)1. Presupposing existence 
of an invisible hand coordinating all individual actions through the price mechanism, 
Adam Smith maintained that, the welfare of all will be maximised if each individual 
maximises his or her own welfare. The assumption was however that all individuals 
work within a legal structure where there is complete and accurate information. 
Unfortunately, in reality, markets are not always that efficient. Mindful of this reality, 
Adam Smith acknowledged existence of a problem in agency relationships. 
Commenting on the agency problem experienced by limited companies, whose 
management is separated from ownership, Adam Smith stated: 
 
The directors of such [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to 
small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a 
                                            
1 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edinburgh, 1776 
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dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more 
or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
 
The salience of Adam Smith’s work on agency conflicts in business was not realised 
until the expansion of capitalism in the late 1880s and 1900s which led to a 
widespread separation of ownership and control functions of the firm (Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2007). In the modern business environment which is dominated by large business 
organisations, the use of agents in the execution of various activities has become 
inevitable. The work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is widely cited as one of the 
pioneering works on agency conflicts which have culminated into agency theory. The 
theory deals with the analysis of legal contractual relationships when ownership and 
control are separated and market information asymmetries are present (Cieleback, 
2004). In the context of New Institutional Economics, agency theory is viewed as an 
economic analysis of cooperation in situations where externalities, uncertainty, limited 
observability, or asymmetric information exclude the pure market organisation 
(Bamberg and Spremann, 1989). Key aspects of agency theory as applied in an 
organisation are summarized in Figure 2.1 (see next page). 
 
In agency relationship, principals assign agents to perform some service on their 
behalf, which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. Agents 
are expected, and indeed obliged, to act in the best interest of their principals, but this 
is not always the case. Mindful of the world with imperfect and inaccurate information, 
Jensen and Meckling (1979) commenting on Adam Smith’s proposition, argue that if 
both principal and agent are utility maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that 
the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The agents to whom 
the principal delegates authority have an objective function that diverges from that of 
the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). Agents tend to pursue their own goals, 
which may be conflicting with those of their principals, thereby imposing costs on the 
principals. In other words, when agents maximise their welfare by pursuing actions 
which conflict with the goals of their principals, they undermine the welfare of their 
principals. The costs that arise when there is a conflict of interest between principals 
and agents are referred to as agency costs (Berk and DeMarzo, 2007). Owing to the 
complexity of agency relationships, agency costs can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary. 
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Figure 2.1: Key aspects of agency theory 
 
Source: Modified from Eisenhardt, 1989 
 
Agency theory is closely related with both transaction costs and property rights 
theories (Junker, 2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Kowtha, 1997). This link can be 
illustrated using a simple scenario. Using their information asymmetry power, agents 
are capable of forming or perpetuating inefficient institutions for their personal interests 
at the expense of their principals’ resources. To check such negative actions or 
omissions of agents, principals on the other hand, have to incur costs (agency costs) in 
creating complete agency contracts or applying other remedies such as incentives 
(van Ees et al, 2009; Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005). Since transaction costs 
are the opportunity costs of conducting a transaction, the agency costs incurred by 
principals are the transaction costs of the agency contract. On a wider scope, societies 
and governments strive to improve property rights in order to deal with such 
contracting problems i.e. to minimise transaction costs. A society whose private 
property rights are clearly defined and secure is likely to attract people to undertake 
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investment activities (Parkin et al, 2008; Joireman, 2006; Ebohon et al, 2002; Barzel, 
1997; de Soto, 2000; Svensson, 1998). This is because dealing with agency costs and 
transaction costs issues becomes relatively easy. In other words, a market setting with 
well developed institutions will have clearly defined and secure property rights, which 
are a prerequisite of low transaction costs, and hence low agency costs. 
 
Development of agency theory has forced some scholars to reconsider the traditional 
economists’ outlook of a firm. The traditional economists have regarded a firm as a 
profit maximising ‘black box’ that simply converts inputs into output, thereby 
disregarding the behavioural implication of the human beings involved in production 
and management process (Jensen, 1998). Mindful of the complexity of human 
behaviour, a firm is now widely viewed as a social sub-system of interacting individuals 
that process information and coordinate activities with a view to achieving some 
predefined objective (Kulkami and Heriot, 1999). The capacity to achieve this objective 
is however limited by the inherent conflicts of interest among the parties to the firm 
(Temel-Candemir, 2005). 
 
Despite the negative aspects of agency relationships emanating from the opposing 
effects of the objective functions of the principals and those of the agents, the use of 
agents in modern business cannot be avoided. Apart from the large size of business 
activities, agents are also used because of their better skills, knowledge, information, 
professional qualifications and experience compared to that of their principals (Bendor 
et al, 2001). Various remedies have been devised to address agency conflicts. These 
include stock options, performance incentives and long term agency contracts (Parkin 
et al, 2008). Studies have shown that alignment of interests of the agents and those of 
the principals can be achieved by giving agents some shares (ownership), or by 
rewarding them for good performance and vice versa, and by improving agents’ 
security of tenure by granting long term employment contracts. These remedies are 
however subject to some criticisms. Some of the main weaknesses of these remedies 
are discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
2.3 Empirical studies of agency theory 
Agency theory has also attracted many empirical studies especially in the fields of 
corporate finance and managerial economics (Gunasekarage and Reed, 2008; Junker, 
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2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Ang et al, 2000; La Porta et al, 1999; Lang et al, 1995; 
Jassim et al, 1988). Most of the literature has focused on investigating how agency 
conflicts affect the performance of firms. It is evident from most of the literature that 
corporate investment decisions are fraught with agency conflicts (Kaymak and Bektas, 
2008; Shin and Kim, 2002). Such agency conflicts result in suboptimal business 
decisions, which undermine firms’ performance (Deephouse and Wiseman, 2000; 
Bricker and Chandar, 1998). Many studies confirm that agency conflicts have negative 
effects on the performance of firms (Danielson and Scott, 2007; Nicholson and Kiel, 
2007; Guilding et al, 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Rosenberg and Corgel, 1990). 
Some studies compare performance of corporations managed by owners with those 
managed by outsiders. Results confirm that corporations managed by insiders show 
superior performance (Fuess et al, 2011; Dolde and Knopf, 2010; Capozza and 
Seguin, 2003). 
 
There are, however, some studies which do not see conclusive evidence that firms 
managed by owners perform better than those managed by non-owners (Bucholtz and 
Ribbens, 1994), or that firms managed by non-owners perform better than those 
managed by owners (Beatty and Zajac, 1994). However, most of the studies showing 
different findings are those based on firms whose members of the boards or executive 
management are also shareholders, but not the only owners of the firms. Such owner-
managers, apart from managing the firms which are considered to be their own, also 
represent other shareholders who are not in the management. Such a representative 
role of these owner-managers turns them into agents of the remaining shareholders 
thereby creating agency conflicts between them. Failure of some studies to isolate 
other firms’ performance variables, and reliance on small samples are also some of the 
other reasons that explain such abnormal findings (Rowland, 1998). 
 
Some other strands of agency theory literature have focussed on corporate 
governance issues. Corporate governance is mainly concerned with the design of 
institutions that induce management in their actions to take into account the welfare of 
stakeholders, investors, employees, communities, suppliers, and customers (Ayogu, 
2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is simply the mechanism through which outside 
investors are protected against expropriation by insiders. Expropriation by managers 
can take many forms including outright theft of assets, transfer pricing, excessive 
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executive compensation and diversion of funds to unsuitable projects that benefit one 
group of insiders (Nganga et al, 2003). To check the actions of managers, the boards 
of directors are put in place. The Boards are widely regarded as a monitoring device 
whose job is to review and evaluate the performance of management in running the 
firm, and is ultimately responsible for ensuring that shareholders’ wealth is maximised 
and agency problems are minimised (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Ironically, many 
studies show that agency conflicts also exist between boards and shareholders, which 
implies that more remedies for agency problems are needed (Kaymak and Bektas, 
2008; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). 
 
The use of incentives as a remedy for agency conflicts has been widely recommended. 
A large body of literature supports the effectiveness of incentives in aligning the 
interests of agents and those of principals (van Ees et al, 2009; Nagar et al, 2003; 
Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Jensen and Kevin, 1990). Nevertheless, there are some 
cases which show that incentives may also have opposite effects. For instance, Coffee 
(2004) notes that changes in executive compensation in the 1990s in the USA, which 
were designed to align executives’ interests with those of shareholders, provided 
irresistible incentives to managers to inflate reported earnings. The case of Enron is 
cited in most of the recent corporate governance literature to demonstrate the negative 
effects of incentives (Clarke, 2005; Coffee, 2004; Healey and Palepu, 2003). The 
generous stocks options given as incentives to Enron executives provided a powerful 
incentive to manipulate short term corporate earnings than to improve long term 
performance (Clarke, 2005). 
 
2.4 Limitations of agency theory 
Agency theory is still at its early development stage. The theory has been subject to a 
number of criticisms for some of its oversights. For instance, the theory is criticised for 
not considering the context in which the agency relationship is undertaken or the 
context in which the transaction takes place (Temel-Candemir, 2005). Dealing with 
behaviour aspects of human beings, the theory ought to have considered the differing 
institutional aspects shaping behaviour of a human being. Focusing investigation on 
the agency relationship and disregarding the institutional background, which dictates 
and shapes the human relationship, is a major oversight of the theory. Social, 
economic, legal and political factors play an important role in shaping the behaviour of 
2 Institutionalism, Agency Theory and Real Estate Investment 31 
 
 
the members of the society in question. As a result, the behaviour of people from 
different societies differs according to the institutions prevailing in their environment. 
This is an important consideration in the administration of incentives to agents 
(Johnson and Droege, 2004). 
 
Agency theory presupposes, for instance, that people in Africa or Asia simply behave 
in the same way as those in the Western developed countries, or that people in highly 
religious societies behave similarly to those in societies where religious values are no 
longer effective in shaping behaviour. Some other aspects shaping human behaviour 
such as age, gender, level of income, and level of education have not been given due 
consideration in the development of the agency theory. The theory insists on a human 
being driven by self-interest rationality, which disregards altruism in a human being’s 
behaviour (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005; Temel-Candemir, 2005; Brennan, 
1994). Ridley (1996) notes that, although individuals behave with self-interest foremost 
in mind, they also do that in ways that do not harm, and sometimes even benefit, 
others. To identify self-interest with rationality represents an oversimplification of an 
economic individual and is not descriptive of human behaviour (Brennan, 1994). 
 
Agency theory is also criticised using stewardship theory. While agency theory 
assumes that principals and agents have divergent interests and that agents are 
essentially self-serving and self-centred, stewardship theory takes a diametrically 
opposite perspective (Bathula, 2008). Proponents of stewardship theory posit that 
stewards, referred to as agents in the agency theory, derive a greater utility from 
satisfying organisational goals than through self-serving behaviour (Davis et al, 1997). 
The main argument is that the attainment of organisational success also satisfies the 
personal needs of the stewards (Davies et al, 1997). Stewardship theory therefore 
suggests that managers should be given autonomy based on trust, which minimises 
the cost of monitoring and controlling behaviour (Bathula, 2008). 
 
The economists’ treatment of incentives as a remedy of agency conflicts is another 
main source of disagreement in the agency theory. Scholars from other fields of study, 
especially law, sociology, psychology and political science, have different views, 
especially on the types of incentives and their effectiveness. Whereas all scholars 
generally agree on the effectiveness of incentive in mitigating agency problems, the 
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economist’s perspective of incentives is criticised for focusing only on contractual 
incentives and failing to capture social, legal and market contexts of incentives. In 
other words, incentives are administered without due regard to social institutions 
prevailing in the different societies. Considering the importance of informal institutions, 
Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2005) among others, provide a broader perspective 
of incentives, as summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Agency performance incentives 
 Explicit and implicit incentives 
Contract Contract terms 
Contractual incentives: 
Rewards and penalties based on performance 
Legal context Legal duties 
Legal remedies: 
Penalties for breach of duty and breach of trust 
Social context Social norms 
Social pressures: 
Violating norms affects social status and conscience 
Market context Market standards 
Market remedies: 
Penalties based on reputation, future transactions, 
access to market network 
Source: Modified from Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005 
 
Apart from classifying them as explicit or implicit categories, incentives can also be 
grouped into four main categories i.e. contract terms, social norms, legal duties and 
market standards. Contractual incentives are those provided in the agency contract or 
agreement. These are mainly in the form of rewards or penalties based on 
performance. Social norms are customary rules of behaviour that coordinate 
interactions in the society. Social norms reduce the transaction costs of forming 
agency relationships by specifying standards of behaviour. Examples of social norms 
include loyalty, reciprocating favours and gifts, and abiding by the terms of unwritten 
agreements (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004). 
 
Legal duties, on the other hand, refer to the rules of the law of agency. By specifying 
the duties of service, loyalty and remedies for breach, agency law reduces the 
transaction costs that stem from moral hazard and adverse selection. Market 
standards on the other hand, refer to established specific market norms to which 
individual agents are expected to conform. Market incentives are valuable when 
monitoring actions require industry knowledge and where remedies that affect future 
2 Institutionalism, Agency Theory and Real Estate Investment 33 
 
 
business dealings are more effective than legal remedies. Agents are expected to 
uphold honesty in order to earn reputation in the market, which could yield greater 
returns to future business relationships as well as greater numbers of business 
referrals. Penalties for failure to conform to market standards can be exclusion from 
the market or blacklisting. 
 
A close look at most of the incentives, especially the implicit incentives suggests that 
their effectiveness is a function of the level of institutional development of the society in 
question. In the absence of well established institutions, most of the incentives are 
hard to implement. For instance, social norms which condone corruption and 
disrespect for law undermine the effectiveness of both explicit and implicit incentives. 
An oversight of implicit incentives in the development of the agency theory is one of 
the major limitations of the theory. Institutions dominating the environment in which 
agency relation or transaction takes place are paramount to the extent and effect of 
agency conflicts and the effectiveness of incentives in mitigating the problem. Less 
developed countries, owing to their lack of institutional remedies and oversight coupled 
with business traditions that enable managers to follow diffuse and vague goals, are 
more vulnerable to agency problems (Kaymak and Bektas, 2008). 
 
Most of the African markets are typical settings characterised by the existence of a 
large number of state-owned enterprises, the culture of graft or the pursuit of easy 
wealth, the weak nature of institutions, the lack of transparency in the business 
environment, and low financial intermediation (Okeahalam, 2004; Mensah, 2003; 
Yakasai, 2002). Over the recent years, many African countries have introduced a 
number of corporate government institutions, but many of such institutions are still at 
their embryonic stage. Besides, the effectiveness of corporate governance institutions 
also depends on the interaction of many other institutions, both formal and informal. 
Investors still face many problems which are not very common in markets with well 
developed formal institutions (Amoako, 2003; Nganga et al, 2003; Mensah, 2003). A 
survey conducted by McKinsey & Company2 in 2002 shows that 85% of foreign 
investors in Africa considered corporate governance to be as important as financial 
factors. 
                                            
2 McKinsey & Company is one of the leading global management consulting firms mainly specialising on 
issues of strategy, organisation, technology, and operations. 
 
34                                                               2 Institutionalism, Agency Theory and Real Estate Investment 
2.5 Agency theory in the context of real estate investment 
 
2.5.1 Complexity of real estate investment 
Real estate is in many aspects a complex investment vehicle. Real estate as an 
investment vehicle has some unique features. Some of these features include 
immobility, illiquidity, lumpiness, high government control, localised market, lack of 
transaction information, lack of central trading, management requirements, specialist 
valuation requirement and existence of few buyers and sellers (Hoesli and MacGregor, 
2000). These features of real estate investment which are also considered to be its 
main weakness as an investment vehicle are mainly associated with the direct form of 
real estate investment. Some of these weaknesses have been significantly reduced by 
the introduction of indirect investment vehicles. Today, there is a long list of indirect 
investment vehicles investors can choose from. It is still however common in both 
forms of real estate investment to engage a number of people in the investment 
process, which attracts agency problems. Figure 2.2 (see next page) captures some 
hidden information associated with real estate investment prompting agency conflicts. 
 
Figure 2.2 Real estate investment information iceberg 
   
 
Source: Author’s modification of Schulte and Schaefers (2004) concept 
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Both direct and indirect real estate investment vehicles suffer from the hidden 
information problem shown in Figure 2.2. The problem is however more pronounced 
with direct real estate investment. Direct real estate investment is the traditional and 
more common form of investment in real estate. This entails the holding of physical 
land and buildings in the form of residential, commercial, industrial and other types of 
properties. Pursuit of direct real estate investment activities attracts the use of agents 
who perform various functions incidental to real estate investment process. One of the 
main reasons of hiring agents is their knowledge of the hidden information and their 
expertise in dealing with technical issues. It is ironic though that, agents may use this 
information power to their benefit and at the expense of their principals. 
 
2.5.2 Indirect real estate investment vehicles and agency problem 
Indirect real estate investment vehicles are basically financial assets. The difference 
between real estate financial assets and other financial assets is that the underlying 
real asset for the former is real estate. Indirect real estate investment vehicles fall 
under two broad categories namely, equity investment and debt instruments (Hoesli 
and MacGregor, 2000). Property derivatives and a hybrid of debt and equity 
instruments, arising from recent financial innovations form a new category 
(Brueggemann and Fisher, 2005; Hoesli and MacGregor, 2000). 
 
Although all forms of financial instruments whose underlying real assets comprise real 
estate may be referred to as indirect real estate vehicles, there are some forms which 
are more common than others. Similarly, different real estate financial instruments 
have different exposure to agency conflicts. The financial instruments with equity 
nature are more vulnerable to agency problems. Debt financial instruments are less 
fraught with agency problems because their claims are predetermined. The popularity 
of the different indirect real estate investment vehicles differs from one market to 
another. Some of the major indirect real estate investment vehicles depicted in Figure 
2.3 are discussed below. 
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Figure 2.3: Main types of indirect real estate investment vehicle 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation, 2011 
 
2.5.2.1 Equity Investment Vehicles 
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
A REIT is simply a tax conduit company dedicated to owning, managing, and operating 
income producing real estate (Imperiale, 2006). Some REITs also engage in financing 
real estate construction. Unlike other corporations, which tend to retain most of their 
earnings and pay tax at the corporate level, the income tax burden for REITs is 
substantially shifted to the shareholder level. The structure of REITs may differ slightly 
between countries. For instance, whereas in the USA REITs may either be private or 
public companies, in Germany all REITs must be listed companies (Sotelo, 2008b). In 
many countries, REITs are required by law to hold at least 75% of their total assets in 
real estate assets and to derive 75% of their gross income from rental income, capital 
gain, or interest on mortgages (Pfeffer, 2009; Schulte, 2007; Brueggeman and Fisher, 
2005). 
 
REITs have their origin in the USA where in the mid 19th century business trusts were 
formed (Imperiale, 2006). Investors could avoid taxation because trusts were not taxed 
at the corporate level if income was distributed to the trust beneficiaries. The trusts 
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were formed to enable the wealth accumulated as a result of industrial revolution to be 
invested in real estate. At that time, the law prevented companies from owning real 
estate unless the property was an integral part of the business, as such it was not 
possible to use companies as vehicles for investing and dealing exclusively in real 
estate (Chan et al, 2003). With time the trusts lost popularity until 1960 when they were 
revived, but with some amendments. The main reason for their re-establishment was 
to make investments in large-scale income producing real estate accessible to smaller 
investors (NAREIT, 2004). Some similar REITs structures were later introduced in 
other countries such as the Netherlands (1969), Australia (1971), Luxemburg (1988), 
and later in Belgium (1995), Japan (2000), France (2003), Great Britain and Germany 
(2007) (Bone-Winkel et al, 2008). 
 
There are three main types of REITs namely, Equity, Mortgage and Hybrid (NAREIT, 
2004). Equity REITs are those which own and operate income-producing real estate 
while Mortgage REITs are those whose main business is lending money to real estate 
owners and operators or extending credit through the acquisition of loans or mortgage 
backed securities (MBS). On the other hand, Hybrid REITs are the ones that own 
properties and issue loans to real estate owners and operators. REITs’ ability to allow 
small scale investors to access real estate investment which has been unavailable 
without significant capital outlays or tax inefficiency and their potential to improve 
housing market are some of the main reasons why the UK has recently introduced 
them (HM TREASURY, 2005). UK also introduced REITs in order to provide corporate 
bodies with more options to release property assets from their balance sheets into 
professionally managed companies. More or less similar reasons apply to Germany 
and other countries. 
 
REITs form one of the largest indirect investment vehicles class in terms of market 
capitalisation. In 2008, out of about $1.9 trillion of real estate securities worldwide, 
about $661 billion were in REIT securities (AME Capital, 2008; Parker, 2010). USA 
accounts for more than 45% of the global REIT market (Investment Property Forum, 
2008; Parker, 2010). By 2010, USA REITs owned approximately $500 billion of 
commercial real estate assets, and Equity REIT market capitalisation stood at $359 
billion (NAREIT, 2011). Figure 2.4 shows a global REIT market share distribution in 
2010. 
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Figure 2.4: Global REIT market share distribution 
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Source: Parker, 2010. 
 
Real Estate Funds 
Real estate funds exist in two major forms namely, Open-Ended funds (also known as 
mutual funds) and Closed-Ended funds. Open-Ended funds and Closed-Ended funds, 
whose origin is arguably in the 19th century in the US, are also commonly known as 
investment companies (Anderson and Born, 1992). These collective investment 
schemes mobilise resources from investors and undertake investment on behalf of 
investors (Schulz-Gebeltzig et al, 2002). Real estate funds are very popular in 
Germany (Suarez and Vassallo, 2005). German Open-Ended Real Estate Funds 
(GOEFs) are an exception internationally to have been very successful for almost 50 
years. 
 
Like other indirect investment vehicles, these schemes also offer investors the 
advantages of diversification and professional management. Members or investors in 
these schemes unlike in companies, hold units instead of equity shares. Units of these 
schemes are normally not traded in the secondary capital market. However, Open-
Ended Real Estate Funds remain open for investors to cash-in their units and new 
investors to buy units, and for this reason they are very liquid (Bodie et al, 2005). It is 
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however now getting common to put some restrictions on the frequency of cashing-in 
of units. This is done to deal with the risk of ‘run on’ the Funds. A detailed discussion 
on GOEFs is deferred to subsection 2.6.2 of this chapter. 
 
Real Estate Corporations 
Equity investment is also possible through property corporations. These corporations 
are more common in Europe, particularly in the UK (Ooi, 2001). Unlike REITs, 
common property companies are not tax efficient (Lindberg, 2002). Two main 
categories of real estate corporations exist. These are Property Trading Corporations 
(PTCs) and Property Investment Corporations (PICs). While the former include firms 
that buy and develop real estate with a view to selling them in the short term; the latter 
include firms that acquire and develop real estate for rental income and long term 
capital growth (Ratcliffe and Stubbs, 2001). 
 
2.5.2.2 Debt investment vehicles 
Using debt instruments, property investors can invest through debt owed by real estate 
companies or non-real estate companies, but for the real estate services (Hu and 
Pennington-Cross, 2001). In raising capital, real estate corporations, instead of issuing 
equity shares, may issue corporate bonds (Brown, 1991) which are typical debt 
financial instruments. Bonds can be listed in stock exchanges and can thus be traded 
in such secondary markets. 
 
Another way through which indirect real estate investment can be effected is Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBS). These are bank originated securities that are backed by a 
pool of mortgage loans (Brueggemann and Fisher, 2005). These securities therefore 
represent payment claims against Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) that are backed 
by a pool of secured loans. These securities represent derivative real estate cash flows 
(Breidenbach, 2005). Most of them take the form of a mortgage backed bond, 
mortgage pass through security, and collateralised mortgage obligation (Breidenbach, 
2003). These securities facilitate the existence and operation of a secondary mortgage 
market. About 50% of residential mortgage loans in the USA are sold in the secondary 
mortgage market (NAREIT, 2004). Conversion of primary mortgages into secondary 
mortgages is possible through a process known as securitisation. 
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2.5.2.3 Hybrid investment vehicles 
Some mortgage arrangements take a hybrid form. In such cases, the underlying real 
estate financial instruments have both debt and equity elements. According to Ratcliffe 
and Stubbs (2001), the investments taking the hybrid form are convertible mortgages, 
participating mortgages and mezzanine financing. In a convertible mortgage 
arrangement, a lender is given an option to convert the loan into a predetermined 
percentage of the value of the property after a certain period, usually between five to 
ten years (Rowland, 1998). With participating mortgages the lender gets an interest 
plus a percentage of the equity cash flow or the capital gain. In some countries 
participating loans may be listed on stock exchanges (Lindberg, 2002). On the other 
hand, mezzanine financing entails a second or subsequent loan to property developers 
granted at a higher rate of interest than the first mortgages requiring the developer to 
surrender a share of the profits. This arrangement enables investors to borrow almost 
all of the cost of a property or development by offering some of the equity to an 
individual or institution. 
 
2.6 Popular cases of agency conflicts in real estate investment 
 
2.6.1 The global financial crisis 
Both direct real estate investment vehicles and indirect real estate investment vehicles 
are equally vulnerable to agency conflicts. As seen in the previous section, indirect real 
estate investment is mainly pursued through corporate bodies or quasi corporate 
bodies, both of which entail investors using outsiders to undertake investment 
activities, thereby exposing themselves to the principal-agent problem. The most 
recent and global-scale case of agency problem directly linked to real estate 
investment can be demonstrated using the global financial crisis whose effects started 
being felt in 2007. Events and actions that led to the financial crisis are summarised in 
Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: Real estate link to the global financial crisis 
 
Source: Author’s compilation, 2011 
 
Concisely, the financial crisis had its origin in the stock market crash in 2000. 
Responding to the stock market crash, the USA Federal Reserve lowered interest 
rates to zero (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2010). Many other central banks around the 
world followed suit. The aim was to increase credit in the economy to encourage 
lending. Among other effects, the lower interest rates attracted a housing bubble. 
Banking and non-banking mortgage originators could borrow money at about 1% and 
lend it at approximately 5%-7% (Murdock, 2010). Real estate assets, opportunistic 
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agents, and failed institutions were at the centre of the financial crisis. The long and 
steep increase in housing prices coupled with low interest rates resulted in aggressive 
lending on the expectation that future price increases would act as quasi-collateral and 
that even if the homeowners defaulted on their mortgages, lenders’ losses would be 
recovered from the appreciating collateral property (Rona-Tas and Hiss, 2010). 
 
As a result of such price increase optimism, mortgage lending was extended to 
subprime borrowers (see Smith, 2010; McLean and Nocera, 2010). Borrowers with 
poor creditworthiness became even more attractive because they were categorised as 
high risk, which meant a relatively higher interest rate charge (Mizruchi, 2010). As a 
result, in only four years, mortgage origination had risen by 400% (Fligstein and 
Goldstein, 2010). Between 2000 and 2007, the business of Mortgage Backed 
Securities (MBS) increased from US $3.2 trillion to US $7.4 trillion (Murdock, 2010). To 
avoid being forced to make provisions for bad debt in the balance sheets and to collect 
as much in lending fees as possible, mortgage originators institutions were selling the 
mortgages to Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) which in turn repackaged the mortgage 
through securitisation and sold them to investors globally. Knowing that they would be 
selling the mortgages to investment banks, mortgage originators become even less 
concerned about the creditworthiness of the borrowers (Mizruchi, 2010). The proceeds 
obtained from the sale of mortgages to SPVs enabled the primary mortgage 
institutions to increase their subprime lending. The volume of subprime mortgages 
increased from US $100 billion in 2000 to US $600 billion in 2006, a 500% increase 
(Murdock, 2010). 
 
Opportunistic actions of a number of key players who were performing their roles as 
agents of some kind contributed to the formation of the financial crisis. The main 
players include mortgage brokers, lenders’ employees and, the executives of the 
mortgage lending institutions, investment banks, rating agents and insurance 
companies. Some mortgage brokers and lenders’ employees, for instance, falsified 
documentation attesting to homebuyers’ eligibility for loans, which injected more 
questionable credit-worthy homebuyers into the system (Palmer and Maher, 2010). 
The actions of these individuals were motivated by the commission they got for each 
mortgage deal concluded. Investment banks were busy buying mortgages from 
mortgage originators, repackaging and selling them to investors globally as bonds 
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(MBS). Investment banks and commercial banks also provided credit to mortgage 
originators, which guaranteed the flow of loans to homeowners including subprime 
borrowers. Owing to their liquidity, the MBS were also accepted by commercial banks 
as collateral for loans. 
 
The bonus and stock option incentives to which the executives of the financial 
institutions and rating agencies were entitled, motivated them to come up with riskier 
investment products (Perrow, 2010). Some executives of some of the financial 
institutions were involved in inside dealing. For instance, Angelo Mozilo, the CEO of 
Countrywide Financial (which was the largest mortgage originator), after knowing that 
his firm was to experience heavy losses as a result of the downturn in the housing 
market, decided to sell his stocks in the firm to avoid personal losses, while projecting 
an optimistic outlook for the firm to bolster shareholders confidence (Palmer and 
Maher, 2010). In 2007, Mozilo sold over US $130 million worth of his shares in 
Countrywide Financial before the market of the stocks plummeted (Murdock, 2010). 
Similarly, even the Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac took huge risks on subprime mortgages that fueled their high profits and profligate 
executives’ compensation. 
 
Rating agencies, mainly Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s, also had their portion 
of blame in the financial crisis. Owing to the complexity of the innovative financial 
instruments in the financial markets, many investors around the world did not have 
expertise or time to analyse them. Instead, they trusted rating agencies whose job was 
to assign ratings to the various securities. Such institutions were meant to protect the 
public, and in fact they enjoyed the trust of the investors. They thus had a duty (agency 
role) to protect the interests of the public. Evidence however shows that the rating 
agencies got carried away by the lucrative business opportunity in the financial 
markets which resulted from the surge in subprime lending. Eager to make fortunes, 
the rating agencies conducted lucrative business with the underwriters, which placed 
them in a conflict of interest. The agencies were paid by securities issuers for their 
rating services (Rona-Tas and Hiss, 2010). Besides, the agencies also offered 
lucrative consulting business to issuers on how to design securities that would have 
high rating scores (Murdock, 2010). 
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Insurance companies, like AIG (the world’s largest insurance company then), were 
also part of the problem. AIG, for instance, was engaged in selling of Credit Defaults 
Swaps (CDSs), which covered the issuers of Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
against default risk. The transparency of such financial instruments was however low 
because they were privately traded (Murdock, 2010). This made their rating exercise 
more complicated, thus rendering their rating scores less realistic. Such a CDSs 
business was unimaginably too risky to be undertaken by an insurance company, 
mainly because of information asymmetry that existed between the issuers and the 
insurers. The issuers were actually better informed about the riskiness of their debtors 
(homeowners) than the insurers. However, due to the high potential cash inflows from 
such financial instruments, AIG decided to insure the issuers against default by 
borrowers. Both conjecturally and with the support of theoretical financial modeling, 
AIG executives were somehow convinced that a danger of massive credit default was 
not imminent. Such a risk taking nerve was motivated by the cash and stock incentives 
to which the executives were entitled (see Dobbin and Jung, 2010; Perrow, 2010; 
McLean and Nocera, 2010). 
 
The financial crisis ensued when mortgage defaults reverberated through the financial 
system. High rates of early payment default (EPD) among subprime mortgages, which 
is when a borrower defaults in the first year of mortgage origination, triggered large 
financial losses among many subprime lenders and contributed to the largest financial 
crisis since the Great Depression (Mayer et al, 2009). Decline in home prices is main 
cause of mortgage defaults (Sanders, 2008). Mortgage defaults triggered a fall in MBS 
prices. As the prices and liquidity of MBS dropped, banks that had taken loans to buy 
them had to either pay off those loans or put up more collateral to keep the loans 
(Fligstein and Goldstein, 2010). As many banks were highly leveraged, it was 
impossible to raise enough capital to cover their loans. As a result, many banks were 
under threat to collapse and the growing panic translated into plummeting prices of 
securities in stock markets. Many of the top subprime lenders became insolvent or 
were bought out at distressed prices. Of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006-2007, 
only 5 were until 2010 still in the lending business (Murdock, 2010). As a result of such 
debt exposure, AIG was during the onset of the crisis taken over by the US 
government. Investment banks are still stuck with foreclosed homes and have to try to 
sell them in an economy where house values have dropped (Smith, 2010). It is 
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estimated that the value of homes which are under foreclosure has gone down by 63% 
(Murdock, 2010). 
 
Although the proponents of agency theory argue that bonuses and stock options are 
capable of checking agency conflicts, reality shows that such incentives also have a 
fatal flaw in that they do not take into account the different risk profiles of shareholders 
and that of members of the management. Shareholders have a sunk economic stake 
in their investment in stock and a risk profile that is more conservative than managers 
(Murdock, 2010). Events and actions behind the global financial crisis provide 
compelling evidence suggesting that the way incentives (bonuses and stock options) 
were structured, created a short-term focus for management and did not align 
management’s interests with those of the shareholders (Dobbin and Jung, 2010). It is 
clear from the actions that preceded the financial crisis that although incentives are 
important, it is also important to ensure that incentives properly align the interests of 
shareholders or the public with those of the executives or public officials. Amongst 
many authors, Schulte and Kolb (2004) warn that although incentive fees can reduce 
agency conflicts, the technique cannot eliminate the problem completely, calling for 
application of multiple techniques. 
 
2.6.2 The crisis of German Open-Ended Real Estate Funds 
Another example of real estate crisis can be drawn from Germany. With an estimated 
net asset value of about €8 trillion (Schulte, 2012), Germany has the largest real estate 
stock amongst European countries. Quoting IFO study carried out in 2005, Sotelo 
(2008b) reports that real estate accounts for about 88% of the total capital stock in 
Germany. By 2006, more than €378 billion worth of real estate investment in Germany 
was held by institutional investors (Schulte, 2007). Out of this amount, closed-ended 
real estate funds held 34%, real estate leasing companies held 23%, foreign investors 
held 21%, open-ended real estate funds held 9.5%, insurance companies and pension 
funds held 9.5% and public real estate corporations held 3%. Most of institutional real 
estate investment is held in direct investment vehicles. For instance, in 2006 insurance 
companies and pension funds were respectively holding 74% and 58% of their real 
estate investment in direct investment vehicles (Worzala et al, 2006). 
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Indirect real estate investment in Germany is mainly in private markets, which is 
different from other developed markets such as the USA and the UK markets whose 
indirect real estate investment vehicles are publicly traded (Sotelo, 2008b). In 
Germany, indirect investment is done through closed-ended real estate funds, open-
ended real estate funds, real estate corporations and more recently (in 2007) REITs 
(G-REITs). The number and size of G-REITs have not been convincingly growing. By 
the beginning of 2011, there were only three REITs in Germany, with a combined 
market value of their real estate assets estimated at €2.5 billion (Sebastian, 2011). 
Unlike the USA REITs, G-REITs operate under some restrictions. For instance, all 
REITs in Germany are required by law to operate as listed companies. They are also 
not allowed to invest in residential properties which were constructed before 2007. 
Only foreign residential property or German residential property built after January 
2007 may be transferred into a G-REIT (Fritsch et al, 2010). Unless some restrictions 
are removed, REITs are likely to remain a marginal real estate investment vehicle in 
Germany (Sotelo, 2008b). Like all other REITs, G-REITS are prone to several agency 
problems (see Schaefers et al, 2008; Becker, 2008) 
 
Of all the indirect investment vehicles listed above, Germany Open-Ended Real Estate 
Funds (GOEFs) have attracted the interest of many researchers the most. GOEFs are 
very popular indirect real estate investment vehicles in Germany. Just as REITs are 
identified with the USA, Open-Ended Real Estate Funds are globally indentified with 
Germany. These funds have been in existence since 1959, but their number and asset 
size grew noticeably starting from the 1990s (Kurzroc et al, 2009; Worzala et al, 2006; 
Focke, 2006). Some of the main reasons for the introduction of GOEF are similar to 
those that led to the establishment of REITs in the USA in the 1960s. One of the main 
reasons for the establishment of GOEF was to enable both institutional and retail 
investors to take part in the real estate investment. Accordingly, GOEF are divided into 
two groups i.e. those meant for retail investors (Publikumsfonds) and those meant for 
institutional investors (Spezialfonds). Between 1992 and 2001 the funds became 
increasingly popular due to the German reunification in 1989, which had widened the 
pool of potential investors as well as the domestic property investment market 
(Kurzrock et al, 2009). 
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GOEFs became even more popular amongst private investors in the early 2000s when 
many private investors sought an alternative safe haven following a downturn of stock 
markets (Focke, 2006). Besides, amendment of the Investment Act 
(Finanzmarktfoerderungsgesetz) in 2001, allowed asset management companies to 
take on currency risks, which fundamentally altered the investment spectrum for these 
funds (Kurzrock et al, 2009). Between 2002 and 2004, there was a boom of GOEFs 
which resulted into 40 new funds (Kurzrock et al, 2009). By the beginning of 2011, the 
value of real estate assets held by these funds was estimated at €96 billion (Sebastian, 
2011). Since their inception in 1959 until 2008, no single GOEF had recorded negative 
nominal annual returns (Glaesner, 2010). Compared to other indirect real estate 
investment vehicles, GOEFs have survived many financial downturns including the 
most recent global financial crisis (Benk et al, 2008). Such a success story of GOEFs 
has been used to explain the delayed introduction of REITs in Germany. During the 
debate to introduce REITs in Germany, some argued that Germany should export 
GOEF rather than import a REIT set up (Sotelo, 2008b). 
 
GOEFs are regulated by German Investment Companies Act (InvG), and managed by 
asset management companies (Kapitalanlagegesellschaften). Their share certificates 
cannot be traded on secondary markets. However, being open-ended funds, 
redemption and issue of shares can be done daily. The shares could be redeemed 
without prior notification which makes the investment as liquid as publicly traded stocks 
and bonds (Focke, 2006), but following reforms some exceptions have been recently 
introduced (in 2011). One of the major threats to the survival of these funds is the 
danger of a run on the Capital Investment Companies (CICs). This may happen when 
investors believe that fund’s assets are overvalued or a danger of the Net Asset Value 
(NAV) of the fund plummeting is imminent. To address the problem of a run on the 
Funds, GOEFs can put up a moratorium to stop the re-purchase of shares certificates 
for some time when running out of cash reserves. Investors also have to pay a 
premium of 5% when purchasing the shares, which should discourage them from 
redeeming the shares over the short-run period. The liquidity threat has been 
discouraging managers of the funds from engaging in some forms of opportunistic 
tendencies. 
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However, over the recent years, many of the funds have experienced severe liquidity 
problems following huge cash withdrawals by investors. Doubts over the accuracy of 
the valuations and the corresponding fear of value adjustments is one of the main 
reasons that sparked off withdrawal of substantial amounts of money from the funds 
(Sebastian, 2011; Fecht and Wedow, 2010). No comprehensive study has so far been 
conducted to clearly establish that managers’ opportunistic actions have been behind 
the liquidity problems faced by the funds over the recent years. However, 
overvaluation or undervaluation of the funds’ assets could either be caused by 
weaknesses in the valuation methods or expertise. It could also be motivated by 
opportunistic tendencies of the people involved such as the valuers or CICs’ 
executives and staff. In 2006, the Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(BaFin), which is the authority responsible for overseeing GOEFs, opened an enquiry 
on the charge that property developers, architects and construction companies 
systematically used bribes to persuade CICs to acquire their buildings. Some reports 
have also suggested that bribe deals were struck between fund companies to influence 
the outcome and price of property acquisition bids (Financial Times, 2006). Popular 
cases of huge cash withdrawal which were apparently motivated by credibility issues in 
the valuation of assets of funds set off in 2004. Two of the oldest and largest funds, 
namely Deka-Immobilien Fonds and Grundbesitz Invest, were the early funds to suffer 
the effect of valuation credibility. 
 
In 2004, the whole GOEFs sector was hit by a valuation scandal, when properties of 
Deka-ImmobilienFonds, one of the largest funds with assets worth €4.7 billion as of 
January 2004 were reported to be significantly overvalued (Schulte and Becker, 2006; 
Sebastian and Tyrell, 2006). This triggered panic amongst investors. In only a few 
weeks, the fund lost more than €500 million in redemptions (Sebastian and Tyrell, 
2006). DEKA Bank, the owner of the funds’ management company, decided to buy 
back large amount of shares in order to rescue the Fund from the threat of a run. In a 
similar case, unscheduled revaluation of the assets of Grundbesitz Invest which was 
announced in December 2005 resulted in investors’ fear of fall in redemption price of 
units (Fecht and Wedow, 2010). In such a state of panic, Grundbesitz Invest investors 
withdrew €300 million in a single day (EPRA, 2011). Unlike Deka Bank, Deutsche 
Bank, the owner of the fund’s management company (DB Real Estate), did not pump 
liquidity into Grundbesitz Invest as a measure to deal with the run. Instead, between 
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December 2005 and March 2006 share redemption was suspended. The closure of 
share redemption by Grundbesitz Invest accelerated the rush for share redemption for 
the entire sector, reaching €7.3 billion for only between December 2005 and January 
2006 (Schulte and Becker, 2006). In January 2006, two funds managed by KanAm 
were also closed for redemption (Sebastian and Tyrell, 2006). 
 
Although the performance of German open-ended real estate funds was relatively not 
severely affected by the global financial crisis, a ‘dash on cash’, especially by 
institutional investors was experienced in 2008 following the collapse of Lehman’s 
Brothers and government’s guarantee of cash deposits (Pylypchuk, 2010). In October, 
2008 GOEFs reported over €5 billion net outflows, and consequently 12 funds had to 
suspend share redemptions. The situation persisted until January 2009 when two of 
the funds, namely DEGI International and Catella Nordic Cities re-opened 
redemptions. By mid 2009, the funds had in total suffered net outflow of more than 
€7.4 billion (List, 2009). Starting from April 2009, more funds started considering re-
opening redemptions. As of the end of January 2010, seven funds were however still 
closed for redemption. By early February 2011, three funds were in liquidation and 
other ten funds had suspended redemption (Credit Suisse, 2011). About €25 billion 
worth of assets under management were in the funds which had suspended share 
redemptions (EPRA, 2011). 
 
Concerns over liquidity crises which have been facing the German open-ended real 
estate funds over the recent years culminated into a debate about the necessity of 
regulatory changes to improve transparency in the operations of those funds. In a bid 
to address the problem of liquidity threatening the funds, new regulations were in the 
process of being introduced in 2011. The new regulations would mainly affect share 
redemption, liquidity management, frequency of asset valuation, and limits on 
permitted leverage (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2011). The new regulations for 
GOEFs introduce a 12-month notice period for redemptions and a two-year minimum 
holding period within which only redemptions not exceeding €30,000 for every six 
months will be permitted for each investor. There are further restrictions on the amount 
of and periodicity that money can be withdrawn. However withdrawals of up to €5,000 
per month will be exempt from the restrictions on liquidity, implying that GOEFs can 
still be used as a source of regular pension income for individual investors (Pylypchuk, 
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2010). Under the new regulations, the funds are required to provide more information 
publicly and to investors. Some of the key facts that would have to be included in their 
valuation reporting would be current market values, incidental acquisition expenses, 
and the official valuations of an advisory committee (Pylypchuk, 2008). 
 
Like all other corporate forms of real estate investment vehicles, GOEFs are also 
subject to agency conflicts in that CICs serve as agents in managing a pool of 
investments for less informed investors who are the principals. Such arrangement 
makes information and control issues to be of paramount importance, especially from 
the investor perspective (Kurzrock et al, 2009). The ease with which investors can 
redeem GOEFs shares may have in a way been mitigating some agency problems. 
The argument is that liquidity threat has been forcing GOEFs managers to credibly 
refrain from opportunistic actions for fear that investors will withdraw their money as 
soon as they perceive any managers’ misconduct that may have negative impact on 
their funds. The liquidity problems that have been facing the GOEFs sector over the 
recent years may partly suggest a feeling by investors that their funds are somehow 
being mismanaged. The delicate nature of GOEFs, in terms of the constant liquidity 
threat, also serves as a mechanism of dealing with agency problems in indirect real 
estate investment. This investment vehicle is however more ideal for real estate 
markets which have high liquidity. 
 
2.7 Agency problem and NIE literature in real estate studies 
 
2.7.1 The focus of analysis of agency problem in real estate studies 
The complexity of real estate discipline and the relevance of agency problem in real 
estate business can be summarised using the ‘House of Real Estate’ framework (in 
Figure 2.6). The framework, which was developed in 1993 by Karl-Werner Schulte, 
captures the multi-disciplinarity of real estate studies as a scientific discipline (Schulte, 
2002). Although the present study mainly focuses on the left column of the House of 
Real Estate i.e. institutional aspects, it also inevitably touches on many more sections 
of the house. Real estate investors, developers, and service providers are the main 
contracting parties in the agency relationships investigated in this study. These people 
are mainly investors and professionals i.e. economists, lawyers, architects, engineers, 
spatial planners, real estate agents, real estate analysts and other service providers. 
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Another interdisciplinary dimension of this study is based on its application of the new 
institutional economics and corporate governance concepts in the field of real estate. 
 
Figure 2.6: Interdisciplinary approach to real estate studies 
 
Source: Schulte, 2008 
 
Some of the unique features which differentiate real estate from other forms of 
investment include lack of market transparency, specialist management requirement, 
large number of parties involved in concluding a transaction, high investment value, 
fixity, and long investment cycles (Brueggerman and Fisher, 2005; Brown, and 
Matysiak, 2000; Hoesli and MacGregor, 2000). For this reason, property investment 
decision process is lengthy and in many cases involves many people who work as 
agents or principals, or both. Rowland (1998) identifies the following common agents in 
property investment: managers of institutional property funds, managing agents, 
brokers, developers, co-occupiers or co-owners, debt and equity holders, and tenants. 
Such idiosyncratic features of property, coupled with the multiplicity of agency 
relationships, make property investment activity more vulnerable to agency conflicts. 
As studies show, agency conflicts in the investment decision process are a source of 
suboptimal investment decisions (Shin and Kim, 2002; Deephouse and Wiseman, 
2000; Bricker and Chandar, 1998). The large number of agency relationships created 
in the property investment process increases the chances of suboptimal investment 
decisions. 
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Substantial developments in the new institutional economics over the last few decades 
have spurred a surge in both theoretical and empirical studies on agency theory and 
other aspects of institutional theory. Most of agency theory studies have mainly 
focused on corporate finance, corporate governance and managerial economics. 
There is a dearth of robust literature on the application of institutional theory, 
particularly agency theory, in the field of property investment. Few studies have 
focused on agent conflicts in property management (Klingenberg and Brown, 2006; 
Guilding et al, 2005; Gibler and Black, 2004; Rosenberg and Corgel, 1990), sales of 
properties (Lee and Lee, 2005; Rutherford et al, 2005; Zietz and Newsome, 2001), and 
real estate market inefficiency (Graff and Webb, 1997). Some authors have looked into 
the problem from ethical point of view (Pheng and Tan, 1995). Others investigate 
agency problems in some forms of investment vehicles, such as securitized real estate 
vehicles (Naubereit and Gier, 2002), real estate opportunity funds (Rottke, 2004), non-
listed indirect real estate investment (Cieleback, 2004). A detailed discussion of some 
strands of literature cited above is deferred to section 2.8 of this chapter. 
 
2.7.2 NIE in real estate studies 
A notable body of real estate literature entrenched in the new institutional economics 
has focused on the analysis of property market maturities. Market maturity is a term 
used both frequently and loosely by participants in the property market to describe a 
stage of development or evolution achieved by a market (Armitage and Keogh, 1996). 
These studies have focused on understanding how property markets emerge, mature 
and perform (Lee, 2001). Knowledge of property market evolution and maturity level 
has also been important in determining appropriate types of real estate products to be 
offered to the market (Chin et al, 2006; Seek, 1996). Owing to their robustness, studies 
focusing on evolution and determining the level of maturity have culminated into a 
property market maturity paradigm. This paradigm gives a useful framework for 
understanding the evolution process of property markets, which is useful in interpreting 
current market behaviour for investment decisions and assists with the prediction of 
future likely pattern of activity. 
 
Studies advocating the new institutional economics approaches appreciate the 
complexity of property market analysis and thus offer a holistic view instead of simply 
explaining the market using a price mechanism which presupposes many conditions to 
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be constant (Keogh and D’Arcy, 1999). This approach avoids a simplistic explanation 
of the property market process adopted in the mainstream economics and Neo-Marxist 
approaches. The institutional economics perspective considers property market as an 
institution which can be explained alongside other institutions (Keogh and D’Arcy, 
1994). It is important however to bear in mind that by considering property markets or 
some other markets to be institutions, it does not imply that they are unified and 
cohesive entities like companies or government agencies. It is rather the network of 
rules, conventions and relationships which collectively represent the system through 
which commodities are determined and traded. 
 
The institutional framework of property market analysis has been widely applied in 
property market studies in the emerging economies, mainly Eastern European and 
Asian cities (Chin et al, 2006; Sim et al, 2003; McGreal et al, 2002; Walters, 2002; 
Armitage and Keogh, 1996). Studies covering some segments of African real estate 
markets have also favoured the institutional approach (Viruly, 2009; Mooya and 
Cloete, 2007; Lim et al, 2006; Ebohon et al, 2002; Gough and Yankson, 2000; Besley, 
1995). Application of the new institutional economics approach to research in the field 
of real estate took a noticeable leap after a pioneering work of Keogh and D’Arcy 
(1994), which applied the approach to compare market maturity and property market 
behaviour of three cities namely, London, Barcelona and Milan. In a series of their 
subsequent papers, Keogh and D’Arcy further extended the discussion and application 
of the institutional approach in the analysis of real estate investment markets (Keogh, 
1996; D’Arcy and Keogh, 1997; D’Arcy and Keogh, 1998; Keogh and D’Arcy, 1999; 
D’Arcy and Keogh, 2002; D’Arcy, 2006). 
 
It is clear from the cases cited above that most of the empirical studies applying the 
institutional theory to the field of real estate have focused on developed countries 
settings. Such settings differ remarkably from those in the less developed countries, 
particularly African countries. Literature catering for Africa is almost non-existent. The 
little literature available has mainly focussed on corporate governance issues of listed 
companies (Okeahalam, 2004; Nganga et al, 2003; Amoako, 2003; Mensah, 2003). 
Most of real estate research activities in less developed markets have focused on 
property rights issues, especially in informal settlements and rural lands (Mooya and 
Cloete, 2007; Abdulai, 2006; Joireman, 2006; Gough and Yankson, 2000; de Soto, 
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2000; Svensson, 1998; Besley, 1995; Feder and Feeny, 1991). The studies carried out 
in the developing countries are thus very useful in this study, as it draws much of its 
theoretical and methodological base from them. 
 
2.8 Real estate literature focusing on agency theory aspects 
 
2.8.1 An overview 
As already pointed out previously, agency theory has over the recent years been used 
by scholars from different disciplines attempting to explain some of the recent 
corporate scandals. In the field of real estate, agency theory is similarly increasingly 
receiving the attention of corporate governance researchers. The focus has been the 
difference in the goals between real estate firms’ managers and shareholders, the 
need and ways to align those goals. REITs, listed real estate corporations, and real 
estate mutual funds dominate such literature. On the other hand, traditional studies 
focus on testing out agency theory by investigating the behaviour of real estate 
professionals when discharging their duties such as real estate brokerage, property 
management, and valuation. Over the recent years, agency theory has also been used 
to explain why some property owners are hesitant to incur extra costs to add 
sustainability features in their rented buildings. One of the reasons is that immediate 
benefits of sustainability would be enjoyed by tenants. 
 
2.8.2 Corporate governance in mitigating agency conflicts 
 
2.8.2.1 Nature of agency conflicts in a corporate environment 
The nature and forms of agency conflicts in the corporate real estate investment 
activities have been documented by, among many authors, Kohl and Schaefers 
(2009), Kurzrock et al (2009), Kohl (2009), Schaefers et al (2008), Schulte and Kolb 
(2008); Sotelo (2008a); Kolb (2007), Sebastian and Tyrell (2006), Schulte et al (2005), 
Schulte and Kolb (2004), Cieleback (2004) and Rottke (2004). These authors, all of 
whom focus on the German real estate investment market, reiterate the existence of 
agency conflicts in real estate investment activities of the various corporate investors. 
Investigating a REIT organisational set up, Schaefers et al (2008), for instance, 
acknowledge existence of goal difference between shareholders (principals) and 
managers (agents). They argue that whereas REIT shareholders’ goal is to increase 
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investment value, the goal of the managers is to enhance their own power, prestige 
and wealth using shareholders’ assets. On the other hand, Kurzrock et al (2009) and 
Sebastian and Tyrell (2006) also acknowledge the existence of agency problems in the 
German Open-Ended Real Estate Funds (GOEFs), but they note that the problem is 
much less pronounced compared with other corporate set-ups of real estate 
investment. They attribute the low incidents of agency problems in GOEFs to their high 
liquidity requirements. They argue that the constant run threat on GOEFs keep their 
managers under pressure not to engage in undesirable activities which may trigger 
investors’ skepticism, and thus a run on the funds. 
 
Many authors (e.g. Kohl and Schaefers 2009; Schaefers et al, 2008; Schulte and Kolb, 
2008; Sotelo, 2008a; Kolb, 2007; Schulte et al 2005; Schulte and Kolb, 2004; 
Cieleback, 2004) underscore the importance of corporate governance in dealing with 
agency problems. The authors argue that corporate governance improves 
transparency and by so doing asymmetrical information between principals and agents 
is reduced thereby minimising principal’s exposure to agent’s opportunistic tendencies. 
Schulte et al (2005) define corporate governance as a set of rules that ensures not 
only efficient management and leadership but also corporate control, so that the agent 
(management) is called accountable for corporate performance and the return on the 
invested capital paid to the principal (investor). Corporate governance issues include 
how major policy decisions are made in business corporations, how various 
stakeholders can influence the process, who is held accountable for performance and 
what performance standards are applicable (Schulte and Kolb, 2004). Concisely, 
corporate governance is a mechanism of dealing with agency problems between 
managers and shareholders or creditors in a firm (Chau et al, 2010). Corporate 
governance has become a crucial success factor for companies that are dependent on 
external finance (Kohl, 2009). 
 
2.8.2.2 Corporate governance and enhancement of firm’s value 
There are some empirical studies which demonstrate how corporate governance 
techniques are useful in enhancing the value of the firm by addressing some agency 
problems in the corporate environment. For instance, Kohl and Schaefers (2009) use 
Tobin’s Q to show how corporate governance enhances firm’s value of listed real 
estate companies. To capture corporate governance structure, they adopt the following 
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variables: board size, board independence, insider ownership, block ownership and 
institutional ownership. After addressing some econometric shortcomings such as 
omitted variable bias, endogeneity and reverse causality, they examine the market 
valuation of selected listed real estate companies in the UK, France, the Netherlands 
and Germany. Among others, the findings of the study show that capital market 
participants investing in listed property companies seem to appreciate smaller boards 
of directors, higher levels of managerial ownership and greater transparency of real 
estate-specific disclosure. They recommend that, in order to increase shareholder’s 
value, unentrenched managers of listed property companies should support any efforts 
to reduce board size, to implement long-term equity-based compensation packages or 
to increase their equity stake in the company and to improve transparency of real 
estate-specific disclosure by complying with EPRA’s Best Practice Policy 
Recommendations. 
 
Some similar empirical studies investigate some issues of corporate governance in 
enhancing the value of REITs. Han (2006), for instance, notes that some of the special 
regulations under which REITs operate weaken alternative mechanisms to control 
agency problems. The author reports an empirically significant and robust nonlinear 
relation between Tobin’s Q and REIT insider ownership that is consistent with the 
trade-off between the incentive alignment and the entrenchment effect of insider 
ownership. Hsieh and Sirmans (1991) also report that some REITs are created as 
captive-financing affiliates to their sponsor, which creates additional agency problems 
and hence agency costs that potentially reduce the value of the REIT. Many other 
studies also report that agency problems are more severe in REITs than in other forms 
of indirect real estate investment vehicles because of the high dividend payout (e.g. 
Ghosh and Sirmans, 2006; Chaudhry et al, 2004; Gyourko and Keim, 1992). 
 
Some other authors however report that insider holding is a good incentive in aligning 
interests of managers and owners in REITs. For instance, Capozza and Seguin (2003) 
apply agency theory to investigate the effect of insider holding in REITs valuation. 
They report that REITs with greater insider holdings tend to invest in assets with lower 
systematic risk and use less debt in their capital structure. They also note that as 
insider ownership increases managerial expenses are reduced. They thus conclude 
that higher relative valuation is associated with higher levels of insider ownership. 
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Fuess et al (2011) also report similar findings. Dolde and Knopf (2010) further report 
that incentives alignment as indicated by REIT risk-taking, is achieved when insider 
ownership is above 20%. 
 
2.8.2.3 The need for corporate governance in the real estate industry 
Schulte and Kolb (2004) cite idiosyncratic features of real estate which make it very 
different from other asset classes, as one of the main reasons for having specific 
corporate governance institutions to cater for the real estate industry. The argument is 
cognizant of the fact that many countries already have general corporate governance 
codes which have not been effective in dealing with some issues in the real estate 
industry. Immobility and long value chain, the multitude of parties involved, high 
investment stakes, long-term investment cycles and mostly lack of market 
transparency and market data are some of the special features that underline the 
complexity of real estate. Investors are increasingly demanding similar transparency 
and professionalism as in stock and bond markets to be convinced to put and keep 
their money in real estate assets. 
 
A property market lacking transparency suffers a problem of information asymmetry 
between market participants. Real estate markets can be described as transparent 
when it becomes clear how the market mechanisms and the variables behind these 
mechanisms work, i.e. when there is as much information as possible available at any 
point in time (Schulte et al, 2005). The ease with which one can obtain reliable data 
about a particular real estate market is what defines transparency of the respective 
market. According to Schulte et al (2005), in a transparent market it should, for 
instance, be possible to obtain reliable data related to sub markets such as rental 
market (e.g. average and top rents, lease rents, demand and supply of space); 
investment market (e.g. property rents and yields, purchase and selling prices); 
property and construction market (e.g. building costs); and capital markets (e.g. 
lending conditions). Availability of all such information should discourage some 
opportunistic tendencies common in agency relationships. Agency contracting in 
transparent market environments is much easier and effective. 
Schaefers et al (2008) bring up further reasons for the importance of embracing 
corporate governance in real estate investment. The three reasons are the growing 
trend of institutionalisation of real estate investment ownership through capital 
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markets, the integration of international capital markets and competition for 
international capital, and the increase in financial scandals caused by the misconduct 
of executives of large corporations such as Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and Parmalat. 
 
2.8.2.4 Techniques of improving transparency of real estate markets 
Attaining transparency in national real estate markets has been a daunting task even 
for some developed countries like Germany. Despite being the third world’s largest 
economy and the second largest real estate investment markets in Europe after the 
UK, Germany has until recently been criticised for its real estate market lacking 
adequate transparency (Becker and Breidenbach, 2006). The USA and the UK real 
estate markets are widely regarded as beacons of market transparency (Schulte and 
Kolb, 2004). Transparency of the German real estate market has however over the 
recent years significantly improved. Schulte et al (2005) attribute the recent positive 
developments in the German real estate market transparency to the introduction of 
academic institutions and courses focusing on real estate education, formation of 
research organisations, increase in the number of real estate brokers and consultants, 
significant role played by banks and the increased application of internet. It is 
noteworthy that until recently in Germany, real estate was not regarded as a separate 
professional and educational discipline (Schulte and Schulte-Daxboek, 2008; Schulte 
and Schaefers, 2008; Sotelo, 2008b). Other institutions which are credited for 
improving transparency in the German real estate market include RICS, INREV, 
EPRA, ICG and BVI (Schulte and Kolb, 2008; Cieleback, 2004). The roles of some of 
these institutions are briefly discussed below. 
 
Initiative Corporate Governance of the German real estate industry 
ICG (Initiative Corporate Governance der deutschen Immobilienwirtschaft) is another 
example of successful corporate governance institutions. This is a German institution 
which was established in 2002 aiming at promoting good and responsible corporate 
management by putting in place principles for transparent and professional corporate 
management in the real estate business. The institution was formed by a group of 
more than 50 renowned companies in the German real estate industry by tailoring the 
German Corporate Governance Code (also known as the Cromme Code) to the needs 
of the real estate industry. The member institutions include listed property companies, 
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open-ended real estate funds, consulting companies and private real estate 
companies. 
 
Since its inception, ICG has been able to produce a code for real estate business in 
Germany. ICG has also put in place principles of Proper and Fair Management for 
Real Estate Business, requiring members of the sector to comply with values such as 
professionalism and transparency. The principles also insist on avoidance of conflicts 
of interest or at least the need for the disclosure of such conflicts. The principles also 
place an obligation on enterprises to ensure that they select their auditors and 
members of their executive organs based on some criteria such as professional 
knowledge and independence. The principles also insist that managers and other 
professional staff members of real estate firms should possess appropriate real estate 
education and constantly keep abreast of events by participating in continuing 
education programmes. Emphasis is also on the use of appropriate valuation methods 
and independent experts. 
 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) 
RICS is a leading international organisation which brings together professionals in the 
real estate sector. The organisation has a global reputation for maintaining high 
educational and professional standards for its members. To become a member, one 
has to undergo a rigorous education and professional assessment. Even after getting 
membership, members are obliged to keep abreast of the latest developments in the 
industry by participating in compulsory continuing education programmes. In 
discharging the professional duties, members are similarly under constant obligation to 
keep high professional and ethical standards. Owing to RICS international reputation, 
its members also enjoy international recognition and can offer professional services in 
many countries without having to register with local professional bodies of the 
respective countries. However, RICS members normally have to apply for a waiver 
from the local professional body to be able to practice in those countries. By 2010, 
RICS had more than 100,000 qualified members and over 50,000 student and trainee 
members in over 140 countries around the world. 
 
RICS also gives accreditation to real estate related degree programmes which are 
offered by reputable institutions of higher learning around the world. To have their 
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courses accredited, the higher learning institutions must meet some strict standards. 
Likewise, institutions whose courses are accredited are obliged to maintain high 
educational standards. To ensure the standards are kept, accreditation status is 
regularly reviewed. Graduates of the accredited degree programmes stand higher 
chances of being employed internationally. To enhance their reputation, real estate 
professional firms may also voluntarily choose to be regulated by RICS. Such firms 
have to abide by a strict code of ethics and at least half of their directors or principals 
need to be RICS members. Besides, each year RICS publishes more than 500 
industry research and policy papers. Members enjoy access to most of the literature 
published or collected by RICS. The industry research and policy paper publication 
also enhance transparency in the market. 
 
The strict and high education and professional standards imposed on members and 
accredited higher learning institutions guarantee highly qualified and disciplined 
professionals. The problem of bounded rationality amongst agents is reduced by 
having professionals with high educational qualifications, who constantly keep 
themselves current with industry developments and knowledge. Similarly, such 
professionals are less likely to get involved in some other deliberate forms of agency 
problems, which may jeorpadise their membership with RICS and consequently their 
professional career. The high standards upheld by RICS are useful in protecting clients 
and consumers against opportunistic behaviour of providers of professional services in 
the real estate industry. 
 
INREV and EPRA 
INREV, standing for the European Association for Investors in Non-listed Real Estate 
Vehicles, was established in 2002 with the aim of improving accessibility of non-listed 
real estate funds by promoting transparency, accessibility, professionalism, and 
standards of best practice (INREV, 2011). INREV also promotes performance 
measurement, research and corporate governance in real estate in European 
countries (Schulte et al 2005). Until early 2011, INREV had more than 300 members. 
Among other achievements, INREV produces an index for non-listed property funds. 
On the other hand, the European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA) is a similar 
institution catering for listed real estate corporations in Europe. The institution was 
formed in 1999. Among its core activities include developing policies concerning 
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standards of reporting disclosure, ethics and industry practices. It also sponsors and 
publishes research projects. It is also involved in the production of a global real estate 
index, namely FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate Index Series. By early 2011, it 
had about 200 members. 
 
2.8.3 Literature on agency conflicts in the direct discharge of real estate services 
 
2.8.3.1 Real estate brokerage 
Real estate brokerage is perhaps one of the clear forms of agency relationship and for 
that reason it has attracted many studies. Rutherford et al (2005) for instance, apply 
agency theory to test opportunistic behaviour of real estate brokers in the USA. Their 
findings show that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned houses, but 
they sell at a price premium of approximately 4.5%. Similarly, based on the USA 
commercial real estate market, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) investigate how 
market participants deal with information asymmetries. They report that market 
participants resolve information asymmetries by purchasing nearby properties or 
properties with long history and avoid transactions with informed professional brokers. 
Hughes et al (2005) also apply agency theory to investigate whether professionalism 
override opportunistic tendencies of real estate brokers in the UK market. They find out 
that the reverse is true i.e. that opportunism overrides professionalism when 
professional brokers’ carry out their duties. Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1997), on the other 
hand, investigate the agency problem arising from co-operating estate brokers in the 
USA. They find out that when a buyer relies on the cooperating broker there is a 
potential for informational gain to the seller. To rectify the problem, the use of buyer 
broker is recommended. From all these studies, theoretical predictions of agency 
theory that agents behave opportunistically are reinforced. There are many other 
studies confirming agency problems in real estate brokerage activities (e.g. Clauretie 
and Daneshvary, 2008; William, 1998; Arnold, 1992; Marsh and Zumpano 1988). 
 
2.8.3.2 Property management 
Some studies have focused on agency problems arising in corporate real estate and 
property management activities. Gibler and Black (2004) for instance, look into agency 
conflicts in outsourcing corporate real estate services in the USA. The authors 
emphasise on the need to balance between in-house and outsourced services in order 
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to tap the advantages of outsourcing but at the same time minimise the effects of 
agency conflicts associated with outsourcing. The authors however do not consider the 
effect of inner-firm (employer-employees) opportunism. They focus on agency conflicts 
existing between companies and external contracting parties. In the absence of 
effective institutional remedies, inner-firm opportunism can even be more serious than 
outsourcing. On the other hand, Rosenberg and Corgel (1990) investigate the extent of 
agency costs arising from the practice of basing property management fees on gross 
rental collection rather than on net operating income because the former motivates 
property managers’ to act opportunistically. They report high agency costs associated 
with property management, and thus propose change of practice in order to align the 
interests of managers and owners. 
 
Somehow different findings are reported by Guilding et al (2005) who investigate 
agency conflicts arising between tourist-based condominiums owners and property 
managers in Australia. Findings show potential for moral hazard problems due to 
contracts that provide disincentive to owners to take any actions that may adversely 
affect their managers. These findings underscore the weakness of agency theory in 
presupposing a self-centred opportunistic human being. The strength of this study is its 
consideration of some institutional aspects in constraining the behaviour of parties to 
agency relationship. Institutional aspects in agency theory are also well articulated by 
Johnson and Droege (2004). The authors dwell on the limitations of agency theory in 
settings which have different culture than Western countries where the theory was 
developed and most widely applied. Despite being theoretical, the paper brings out a 
cultural dimension which largely defines the differences between societies. Culture 
defines informal institutions of the society. The paper augments the theoretical 
background of the present study which focuses on institutional remedies of agency 
problems in the context of real estate and a developing country cultural setting. 
 
2.8.3.3 Property valuation, taxation and lending 
Other researchers have applied agency theory to real estate valuation, taxation and 
bank lending. Dalbor and Andrew (2000) use agency theory, for instance, to explain 
valuation accuracy in the hotel appraisal process. They report that information 
asymmetry and moral hazard have significant effects on appraised hotel values. They 
also note that appraised values were lower than sale prices during the period of tax 
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reforms implying that values are lowered for taxation purpose. Conversely, the study 
also reveals that appraised values were higher than sale prices during the commercial 
lending booms, implying that values were inflated for borrowing purposes. The problem 
of agency conflicts in bank lending is also reported by LaCour-Little (2009), who notes 
opportunism in mortgage brokers providing the service of matching borrowers and 
lenders. A similar situation is also reported by LaCour-Little and Chun (1999). Many 
authors (e.g. Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Belsky and Wachter, 2010; Lind, 2008; Cole 
and Eisenbeis, 1996) have also cited agency problems while discussing the causes of 
credit scandals and sub-prime mortgage crises. 
 
2.8.3.4 Adoption of sustainable technologies in buildings 
More recently, agency theory has also been used in some studies to explain slow pace 
of adopting sustainable building technologies. Nelson et al (2010) report, for instance, 
that the agency problem arising from misalignment of building owner costs and tenant 
benefits limits investors’ interest in adopting sustainable technologies. They argue that, 
landlords are hesitant to incur extra capital costs for sustainable improvements 
because many of the benefits of the improvements accrue to the users of the property. 
As a result, they note that the majority of green buildings are owned by governments 
and corporate owner-occupiers compared to those occupied by third-party tenants. 
Misalignment of incentives between building owners and users is also reported by 
OECD/IEA (2007) to be a significant barrier in achieving energy efficiency in buildings 
in various countries such as France, the Netherlands, Japan, Australia, and the USA. 
Levine et al (2007) similarly cite agency conflicts as one of the barriers to adopting 
sustainable technologies in real estate. The authors note that incentives to the 
intermediaries involved in decisions to purchase energy-saving technologies or agents 
responsible for investment decisions are different from those benefiting from the 
energy savings. There are many other authors who report agency conflicts as a 
stumbling block in the adoption of sustainable construction practice (e.g. Pivo, 2010; 
Helgeson, 2009; Peretz, 2009). 
 
2.8.4 Gap in the literature 
Despite being useful in setting out the theoretical background of the present study 
which is necessary for exploring the envisaged developing market setting, it is evident 
from the studies presented above that none of them focuses on agency problems in 
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infant real estate markets. Some of this literature dwelling on developed real estate 
markets, which have relatively many effective institutional remedies of agency 
conflicts, is less relevant to infant real estate markets whose environments are 
dominated by informal arrangements and ineffective formal laws, rules and regulations. 
Besides, there are cultural differences between developed and developing countries, 
making it less realistic for infant markets to transplant human behaviour models 
developed from research carried out in developed markets. Confining agency theory 
studies to developed real estate market settings, leaves a gap of knowledge on 
behavioural real estate aspects occurring in different institutional environments. Many 
authors acknowledge failure of agency theory to address cultural differences (e.g. 
Bathula, 2008; Guilding et al, 2005; Johnson and Doege, 2004; Brennan, 1994). 
 
It is also evident from the reviewed literature that the focus of researchers has mainly 
been on agency problems in real estate brokerage, property management and 
investment, and more recently on sustainability. Although the literature 
comprehensively addresses issues of corporate governance, it is mainly confined to 
the relationships between managers and shareholders thereby leaving out other forms 
of inner-firm opportunism. The chain of sub-agency relationships created between 
senior officers and their subordinates within firms is not given much attention. Similarly, 
owing to the differences in the levels of development and sophistication, some of the 
real estate phenomena such as indirect real estate investment vehicles and 
sustainability which are common in developed markets are absent or insignificant in 
infant markets. This renders most of the literature on agency theory application to such 
phenomena less relevant in infant markets. One of the reasons for many agency 
theory studies concentrating only on some aspects of real estate could be that some 
forms of agency problems which are still prevalent in the developing countries are 
extinct or quite insignificant in the developed countries due to the presence and 
effectiveness of various institutional and technological remedies of agency problems. 
All these facts explain the paucity of agency theory literature in addressing issues 
which are relevant to real estate markets in the developing countries. However, the 
literature based on developed markets is still very useful in understanding universal 
forms and remedies of agency problems. 
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In a bid to fill the gap in the literature, one comprehensive study (a doctoral research) 
was recently carried out in Tanzania by Ntiyakunze (2011). The study identifies 
sources, causes and management of conflicts in building projects in Tanzania. The 
study shows that delayed payments to contractors, issuing of payments certificates to 
contractors, evaluation of contractors’ claims, design changes, poor communication, 
errors and mistakes in designs, multiple and different meanings of specifications, and 
incompatibility between contractors and subcontractors are the main sources of 
conflicts. Apart from other types of conflicts, the study also reports conflicts related to 
opportunism which is motivated by unclear and ambiguous contracts. The study 
indicates that the existing mechanisms and approaches of conflicts management in 
building projects in Tanzania are sufficient. 
 
Although this study was carried out in Tanzania, it is not particularly focused on agency 
conflicts. The study covers different kinds of conflicts arising in building projects. As a 
result, it does not comprehensively address many forms, causes, catalysts and 
remedies of agency conflicts. The study also does not give a comprehensive treatment 
of institutional remedies of the conflicts. Besides, the study is confined to construction, 
which is only one activity of real estate development cycle. It also does not look at 
construction activity from an investment perspective. By not taking a broad institutional 
outlook, and confining itself to only one activity of real estate development cycle, the 
study does not address many issues of agency conflicts in real estate investment 
activities in Tanzania. 
 
Another comprehensive study (also a doctoral research) focusing on Tanzania real 
estate investment market was carried out by Rothenberger (2010). The study uses 
Tanzania as a showcase to investigate the rationale for foreign real estate investors’ 
stigma against sub-Saharan Africa. Despite acknowledging the existence of many 
hurdles to investors, the study also finds out that foreign investors are overly skeptical 
about the market, suggesting that such fears may not necessarily be based on real 
facts prevailing in those markets, but rather lack of correct information. Although the 
study does not focus on agency problems, its findings and recommendations are 
useful in dealing with wider aspects of agency problems. The study advocates for more 
transparency to the real estate market, which will in turn attract foreign investors. 
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The study recommends that the governments and other real estate investment 
stakeholders in sub-Saharan African countries should put some efforts to increase 
market transparency and launch more effective awareness programmes to try to 
disseminate correct information about their markets to investors around the world. The 
study also recommends the use of national and regional real estate professional 
bodies such as TIVEA and AfRES to address some of the market transparency and 
publicity issues. The author also sees some foreign institutions such as IPD South 
Africa, IREBS Foundation for African Real Estate Research of Germany and RICS of 
the UK among others, as potentially important players in enhancing African countries’ 
image to investors in developed countries. This could be achieved through African 
property index production, market reports and research and publications. 
 
The two recent studies briefly discussed above similarly do not address many specific 
issues of agency relationship in real estate investment activities. The present study 
therefore fills the gap by exploring all forms of agency problems in real estate 
investment activities of some selected core investors in Tanzania. The selected 
investors are the common categories of investors in many developing countries. Owing 
to structural adjustment programmes, pension funds, for instance, are becoming key 
players in many African investment markets. Many African governments are however 
still directly engaged in the provision of housing. Through NHC, the government of 
Tanzania is still one of the main players in the housing market. Globalisation policies, 
on the other hand, have opened up developing countries’ markets to international 
capital. Many African countries are gradually attracting foreign investors. Accordingly, 
this study explores the agency problems experienced by the selected investors, 
considering the nascence of most of the formal institutions. 
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3 Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the focus of study and sets out the methodology of the study. The 
chapter begins with an overview of the nature and levels of agency conflicts in the set-
ups of the three real estate investors earmarked for this study i.e. pension funds, 
National Housing Corporation, and foreign investors. A brief account of real estate 
investment activities and corporate issues of these investors is presented before the 
summary of the research issue. The research methodology section forms another core 
part of this chapter. The methodology section documents the research design, data 
collection methods, validity and ethical considerations, and data analysis methods. 
Challenges encountered in the course of the study are presented in the last section of 
this chapter. 
 
3.2 Focus of the study 
 
Figure 3.1: Agency relationship levels for selected investors 
 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualisation, 2011 
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3.2.1 An overview of agency conflict levels 
Although agency conflicts are pervasive in all forms of association, their extent and 
effect differ from one economic setting to another and from one activity to another. In a 
corporate set up, three generic agency problems arise as reflected in potential conflicts 
between owners and managers, trustees and beneficiaries, majority and minority 
owners, and between the firm itself and contracting parties such as creditors, 
employees and customers (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005). The focus of this 
study is on agency conflicts arising in the course of real estate investment activities of 
pension funds, NHC and foreign investors in Tanzania. These investors use agents in 
most of their property investment activities. For each activity involving agents there is a 
potential for agency conflicts. Figure 3.1 captures the scenario under which investment 
decisions take place and the ensuing agency relationships, and thus the potential 
areas for agency conflicts. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the main agency levels involved in the real estate investment 
process of the three selected investors namely, National Housing Corporation (NHC), 
pension funds (for this case, NSSF, PPF; PSPF and LAPF), and corporate foreign 
investors. Description of the agency levels for each of the three real estate investor 
categories is given in subsections 3.2.2 – 3.2.4 below. 
 
3.2.2 Pension funds’ property investment activities 
Pension funds in the context of this study are corporate institutions responsible for 
collection, management and payment of money mainly meant for pension and other 
related benefits. The major sources of funds for the pension funds are monthly 
members’ contributions and investment income. In Tanzania, all major pension funds 
are state-sponsored and each one was established by an Act of Parliament. 
Membership to pension funds is mandatory for all people with formal employment. 
Each member must contribute 20% of his or her monthly salary. The burden of the 
contribution is shared between the employee and the employer, either by each one 
contributing 10% or by the employer contributing 15% and the employee 5%. Some 
employers pay the whole 20% for their employees. Employers are therefore also main 
stakeholders of pension funds. Owing to the importance of pension funds to the 
nation’s social security system, the government closely monitors their activities. 
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Each pension fund has a Board of Trustees which is similar to a Board of Directors in a 
limited liability company. Members of the Boards of Trustees represent the key 
stakeholders mainly, employees, employers, government and the Management of the 
respective pension fund. The chairpersons of the Boards of Trustees are appointed by 
the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, and other members are appointed by 
the minister of the ministry under which the respective pension fund falls. The 
Management team of each pension fund is headed by a Director General, who is also 
appointed by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. Other senior members 
of the Management are appointed by the respective Boards of Trustees. Just like the 
Board of Trustees, the management of a pension fund operates more or less like that 
of a limited liability company. The management executes all day-to-day activities of the 
pension fund, including investment activities. 
 
Pension funds are among the largest institutional investors in Tanzania. Unlike in the 
past, when pension funds were forced to invest most of their investible funds in 
government securities, pension funds can now diversify their investment portfolios 
across a broader spectrum of investment vehicles. This follows the enactment of 
Public Corporations Act No. 2 of 1992, which among others enhanced flexibility in the 
investment activities of parastatal organisations. As a consequence, real estate has 
become one of the popular investment vehicles held by pension funds. Pension funds 
invest in both direct and indirect property investment vehicles. The indirect property 
investment common amongst pension funds in Tanzania include private equity 
companies, loans to property developers, hire-purchase housing for members, and 
government bonds financing institutional property and infrastructure development. 
Over the last decade, their average portfolio allocation to direct property alone has 
been above 20% (Kusiluka, 2009). Pension funds are widely acknowledged in 
Tanzania for their role in the face uplifting of many large urban centres with their 
modern and expensive properties. 
 
More than 80% of the pension funds’ investible funds which are not invested in real 
estate are invested in government securities, public equities and debt instruments. Due 
to this fact, coupled with the inactiveness of capital markets and Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange (DSE) in terms of daily trading volumes, and thus less volatility of securities 
(Fumbuka, 2008; Kibola, 2008), pension fund managers have not been so much 
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preoccupied with the money invested in equity and debt instruments. Instead, they are 
more involved with investment in real estate. Apart from the Boards and Managements 
of pension funds, many more other people (agents) are involved in the investment 
decision making process. Such other people include property managers, lawyers, 
investment analysts and other consultants. As such, pension funds’ property 
investment activities have attracted the attention of many people including researchers 
(e.g. Mpogole, 2006; Kongela, 2005; Geho, 2004; Mwamoto, 2003; Geho, 2001). 
 
The network of relationships created in the property investment activities of the 
pension funds is of the principal-agent nature. Besides, the close involvement of the 
government in the affairs of pension funds adds another dimension of agency conflicts. 
Closeness of the government in the management of pension funds has led to a wide 
confusion that pension funds are state-owned organisations. As widely reported in 
corporate governance literature (Gupta, 2005; Liu and Sun, 2005; Shen and Lin, 
2009), state ownership or even partial state ownership and corporate performance are 
negatively correlated. The main argument is that corporate governance practice within 
state owned corporations is not effective, because even non-performing top managers 
are kept (Shen and Lin, 2009). 
 
Multiplicity of agents in the real estate investment activities of pension funds coupled 
with the involvement of the government in key decisions increase exposure to agency 
problems. Incidents of laxity of people assuming the role of principals in the monitoring 
of agents are apparent in all levels of agency relationship, from the boards of trustees 
to property managers. As Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) underscore, in the absence of 
a proper mechanism to control the actions of agents and credible performance 
benchmarks, corporate managements can easily produce less credible performance 
reports or conceal the real economic performance of the firm from its owners. 
Administrators of pension funds in Tanzania have often been criticised for questionable 
property investment decisions, despite the seemingly good performance reports 
released by the managements (Matotola, 2009; Kusiluka, 2008b; Mpogole, 2006). 
 
The focus of the investigation in this study is on the main agency relationships existing 
in the real estate investment activities. These include those between members and 
government, members and Boards of Trustees, government and Boards of Trustees, 
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Boards of Trustees and Management, Management and other contracting parties 
including in-house property investment experts and external property investment 
consultants. The multiple agency relationships and the underlying institutional 
environment typical with property investment activities of foreign investors have been 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
3.2.3 NHC investment activities 
The operational structure of NHC is very similar to that of pension funds. The main 
difference is in the ownership. Whereas pension funds are primarily owned by 
members, NHC is 100% state owned. A more critical analysis would however suggest 
that Tanzania citizens are the ultimate owners of NHC. The government is merely an 
agent of the people. However, this complex link falls out of the scope of this study. It is 
still important though to acknowledge that governments are also agents of the people. 
 
The Corporation was established in 1962, with the principal aim of providing and 
facilitating the provision of housing and buildings for other uses in urban areas. In 
1990, all properties under the Registrar of Buildings (RoB) were transferred to NHC. In 
terms of property stock size, NHC is by far the largest owner of real estate in Tanzania. 
The Corporation owns 2,310 properties, comprising 16,457 residential and commercial 
units (MoLHHSD, 2011)3. However, most of its stock comprises rundown and old 
buildings commanding low rent. Most of the rundown properties are however located in 
prime areas, commanding high redevelopment value. 
 
For many years, NHC like other landlords was operating within the confines of the rent 
control legislation (Rent Restriction Act of 1962 and later Rent Restriction Act No. 17 of 
1984). The legislation stipulated the ceiling rent or standard rent above which landlords 
were not allowed to charge. The standard rent was 14% and 18% of property value for 
residential and commercial properties respectively. The legislation also had many 
loopholes for tenants not to pay rent on time. This resulted into many civil suits 
between landlords and tenants. In the process of institutional reforms, rent control 
legislation was seen to be an impediment to the smooth functioning of market 
economy principles, and was thus in 2005 repealed paving way for market forces to 
                                            
3 One property may have many residential or commercial units. 
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determine rent. Despites the reforms, NHC has for many years continued to perform 
poorly. 
 
The main source of investible funds for NHC is rental income and capital gain from 
sales from its real estate development projects. Considering the infancy of financial 
institutions in the country and the large scale nature of NHC operations, finance has 
been one of the main stumbling blocks for redeveloping NHC properties. In 2010 major 
changes to the management and organisation structure occurred. The new 
management came with an ambitious plan to turn around the performance of the 
Corporation. A five year plan aiming at redevelopment of some properties located in 
prime areas was rolled out. In this plan, the management has stated its commitment to 
build 15,000 housing units over a five year period starting from 2010 (NHC, 2010). 
 
Unlike pension funds, real estate is the only significant investment vehicle held by 
NHC. Accordingly, most of the NHC employees are real estate specialists or somehow 
engaged in real estate related activities. The Corporation has real estate investment in 
all large urban centres in Tanzania, which has necessitated having branch or regional 
offices. Despite employing many real estate professionals, in some activities NHC also 
engages external professionals. This is done to supplement the in-house expert 
capacity. Some real estate activities such as valuation are normally required by law to 
be done by independent external professionals. In such activities, the Corporation 
must engage external professionals. Sometimes, the Corporation uses external 
experts to have a second opinion prior to making decisions. 
 
The Corporation is under the Board of Directors. The President of the United Republic 
of Tanzania appoints the chairperson of the Board of Directors. The Director General 
of the Corporation and other members of the Board are appointed by the Minister of 
Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development. Other members of the top 
management team are hired by the Board. As shown in Figure 3.1, there are many 
levels of agency relationship within the set up of NHC. The main levels are those 
between the government and the Board of Directors, the Board of Directors and the 
Management, the Management and other employees, the Management and the 
external contracting parties. Some of the external contracting parties commonly 
engaged by NHC include real estate valuers, real estate markets and investment 
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analysts, auctioneers, real estate brokers, property managers, architects, building 
contractors, and management consultants. 
 
3.2.4 Foreign investors’ property investment activities 
Apart from pension funds and some state owned corporations, private investors are 
also increasingly entering the property market in Tanzania. Owing to the capital 
intensiveness of property investment and shortage of local sources of funds, the 
property market still has few participants from local private investors (Kusiluka, 2009). 
Large private property investments are largely owned by foreign investors. Besides, a 
majority of properties owned by local investors are owner-managed or involve agents 
whose roles are very limited and intervention by owners in the agents’ duties is very 
common. Besides, most of property investments owned by local investors take the 
form of family businesses. Separation of ownership and management in such family 
businesses is minimal, which minimises chances of agency conflicts. To the contrary, 
property investments owned by foreign investors use a great deal of agents for various 
activities ranging from market studies to property management. 
 
Agency relations are very common in international investment (Greif, 2006; Cohen, 
1969). Like the pre-modern merchants, international real estate investors also use 
local agents starting from the investment decision making stage to investment 
management. One of main reasons for using agents is that international real estate 
investors need someone who is well versed with the local market. A typical case of 
agency relationships is given by Rottke (2004) who demonstrates the nature of agency 
problem arising out of actions of private equity opportunity funds investing in foreign 
markets. These emerging institutions are popular investment vehicles for institutional 
and large private investors. Having less expertise in the respective foreign markets, the 
opportunity funds prefer using local transaction partners; thereby creating a two-level 
principal-agent relationship i.e. the one between original investors and managers of the 
opportunity fund, and the other one between opportunity funds managers and local 
transaction partners. 
 
As noted by Williamson (1985), incompleteness in (ownership) contracts means that 
there are non–contractible elements due to difficulties in contemplating in advance all 
possible future contingencies and measuring performance under each contingency. 
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Hart (1988) refers to this cause of incomplete contract as bounded rationality. Although 
agency theory provides tools to help principals deal with agency costs, such tools are 
not always, or rather universally, effective. As pointed out by Junker (2005), agency 
problem grows with the size of the company or number of shareholders. Along the 
same lines of argument, it can be added that the extent of agency problem differs 
between local and foreign investors. Unlike local investors, foreign investors’ powers to 
create institutions to minimise agency costs in foreign countries may be limited. The 
situation worsens when less developed investment markets are involved. Institutions to 
address concerns of foreign investors are less developed in developing markets and 
much less developed in African countries (Abdulai, 2006; Asiedu, 2002; Feder and 
Feeny, 1991). Shrouded with property rights problems, such investment markets pose 
many problems in implementing contracts. 
 
Despite assertions that globalisation has removed institutional barriers to international 
investors, many regions including Africa are yet to realise substantial benefits of 
globalisation. As noted by Hamilton and Webster (2009), although globalisation has 
increased the flow of both Foreign Indirect Investment (FII) and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), this flow has mainly been within and between a few economic blocks 
namely, Western Europe, USA, Canada, and Japan. To attract more foreign 
investment, less developed countries have embarked on institutional reform 
programmes aimed at improving investment environment for private investors. For 
instance, to attract foreign investment, many less developed countries have 
established investment agencies, mainly to provide investors with information and 
assist them set up investment activities in the respective countries (Ebohon et al, 
2002). Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) is the agency (agent) catering for this service 
in Tanzania. 
 
Owing to the complexity of land ownership procedures for foreigners, foreign property 
investors normally find themselves in need of services of some government agencies, 
especially the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC). As such, the foreign investors 
somehow have to accept the advice given by TIC and consider it while making their 
investment decisions. However, TIC was established to fulfil its own interests, which 
may not always be in line with those of investors. With its main objective being to 
attract investors, TIC may not always act in the best interest of the investors. Some 
3 Research Design and Methodology  75 
 
 
foreign investors also prefer owning investments jointly with local partners. In most 
cases local partners also perform some agency roles such as making decisions on 
behalf of their foreign partners, taking active role in investment management, attending 
emergency cases etc. 
 
TIC and all other agents engaged by foreign investors, such as consultants for market 
studies, feasibility studies, construction, marketing, selling, and property management, 
expose investors to agency problems. For the purpose of this study only some 
principal-agent relationships are considered. These include those between investors 
and government agencies, investors and local market consultants, investors and 
managers, investors and local partners, managers and in-house property investment 
and management experts, managers and a multiple of external property investment 
and management experts such as property management and sales agents and other 
property consultants. Figure 3.1 illustrates the multiplicity of agency relationships and 
the underlying institutional environment typical with property investment activities of 
foreign investors. 
 
3.2.5 Summary of research issue 
Broadly, this study is an application of institutional theory to the analysis of an 
investment activity taking place in a setting which is characterised by nascent formal 
institutions. The study particularly employs agency theory to explain sub-optimal real 
estate investment activities. The study also looks into the various institutions 
constraining the behaviour of agents involved in the real estate investment activities in 
such an environment. As noted by the neo-institutionalists that some undesirable 
institutions are created and perpetuated in the society by people with power to serve 
their own interests, it is similarly posited in this study that people acting as agents may 
use their powers (of information) to pursue their own interests at the expense of their 
principals’ resources. In line with the institutional theory it is further posited that, in the 
absence of, or with weak, formal institutions, informal institutions play a decisive role in 
controlling agency relationships. The present study therefore examines whether 
informal institutions are effective in mitigating agency conflicts in a setting where formal 
institutions are still at their embryonic stage of development. This study is therefore 
based on the following propositions: 
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(i) Owing to the differences in the institutional environment, some of the agency 
conflicts remedies applicable in developed real estate market settings are less 
effective in infant real estate market settings. 
 
(ii) The agency problems in real estate investment activities resulting into sub-
optimal investment activities in Tanzania are exacerbated by weak formal 
institutions prevailing in the market setting. 
 
(iii) In the absence of effective formal institutions, informal institutions play an 
important role in mitigating agency conflicts in real estate investment activities in 
Tanzania. 
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A research methodology is the way to systematically solve the research problem 
(Silverman, 2008; Alasuutari, 1995). The research methodology entails various steps 
adopted by the researcher in studying the problem along with the logic behind them. It 
is implied from this broad view of research methodology concept that research 
methods are sub-sets of the research methodology. Accordingly, this chapter presents 
the research methodology adopted by this study. Details of research strategy, design 
and methods are presented, and the rationale for their selection is given. 
 
3.3.2 Research strategy 
This study employs a mixed methods research strategy. Mixed methods research is an 
approach to inquiry that combines or associates both qualitative and quantitative forms 
of research (Creswel, 2009). The weaknesses of each of the mono strategy research 
have widely been used to advocate for a mixed methods strategy (Creswel, 2009; 
Bergman, 2008; Creswel, 2007; Johnson and Turner, 2003). Nonetheless, there is still 
a dissension between the purists of a qualitative research strategy and those of a 
quantitative research strategy (Alastalo, 2008; Bryman, 2008; Brannen, 2008). One of 
the striking arguments of contention is that the two methods cannot be combined 
because they arise from different paradigms (Smith and Heshusius, 1986; Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Kuhn, 1970). Despite the war between the purists of each of the two 
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research strategies, practice shows that studies employing both qualitative and 
quantitative methods are very common to find. 
 
The mixed methods design is increasingly considered to be a hybrid design which 
takes the best of qualitative and quantitative methods and combines them (Bergman, 
2008; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008; Bryman, 2008). The philosophical orientation 
most often associated with mixed methods research is pragmatism (Teddlie and 
Tashakori, 2009). Mixed methods research strategy encourages thinking ‘outside the 
boxes’ of mono research strategies, which have been the source of paradigmatic war 
between researchers for many years (Brannen, 2008). DeCuir-Gunby (2008) identifies 
five purposes of mixed research, which are: triangulation, complementarity, 
development, initiation, and expansion. Three scenarios are common with studies 
employing a mixed research strategy i.e. quantitative component dominating and 
preceding the qualitative or qualitative component dominating and preceding the 
quantitative or qualitative component preceding the quantitative (Brannen, 2008; 
Creswel, 2008; Creswel, 2009). 
 
Mixed methods design is also emphasised in the field of real estate. For instance, 
Amaratunga et al (2002) insist that, owing to cognitive, affective and behaviour 
components of built environment research, the use of single method often fails to 
explore these components. The authors therefore recommend the use of mixed 
methods. Adoption of a mixed methods strategy in this study is further necessitated by 
paucity of research in the subject matter being investigated, particularly in the 
institutional setting obtaining in Tanzania and some similar settings. Although various 
aspects of agency theory have been widely studied over the recent past, very little has 
been done to cover the social settings with weak formal institutions. Besides, relatively 
little attention has been directed to real estate investment activities. Qualitative 
research strategy is widely recommended as a forerunner to quantitative research for 
areas of research which have not been previously investigated (Nganga et al, 2003). 
Accordingly, some of the qualitative methods used in this study were meant to facilitate 
the mapping exercise carried out to inform the research design and serve as a 
prologue to a quantitative phase. 
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Quantitative research is generally said to be directed at theory verification, while 
qualitative study research has typically been more concerned with theory generation 
(Punch, 2008). Although in this study the qualitative component is aimed at being a 
forerunner to the quantitative component, some of the results of the quantitative 
research are compared and contrasted with the results obtained from the qualitative 
analysis to enhance the conclusions of the study. Such a comparison of information 
from qualitative and quantitative analyses is referred to as triangulation (Hammersley, 
2008). The qualitative component also entirely answers some of the research 
questions. Figure 3.2 captures the general research design of the study. 
 
Figure 3.2: Research design 
 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation, 2011 
 
3.3.3 Data collection 
 
3.3.3.1 The qualitative component 
The qualitative phase of this study uses the strategy of phenomenological research 
strategy. By this strategy, the researcher identifies human experiences about a 
phenomenon (mitigation of agency conflict in this particular case) as described by 
participants (Creswel, 2009). This strategy normally involves studying a small number 
of subjects, and the researcher sets aside his or her own experiences in order to 
understand those of the participants in the study (Moustakas, 1994; Creswel, 2007). 
The qualitative methods used are semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, 
and review of documentary evidence. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants amongst officials of 
pension funds, National Housing Corporation, foreign property investment firms, real 
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estate consultancy firms, Tanzania Investment Centre and other government agencies 
and departments, and researchers. Most of the interviewed informants were either 
principals or agents. On the virtue of their positions, some interviewees served as both 
principals and agents. This was particularly common with some senior officials of 
pension funds, who in the course of their duties also engaged other people such as 
their in-house sub-ordinates and external contracting parties such as investment 
consultants, property management agents, sales agents, engineers, architects, 
lawyers etc. Interviews with principals were meant to capture their knowledge of the 
extent and nature of agency problems and the techniques they used to mitigate the 
problems. The interviews also sought to capture the main practical problems which 
they encountered in their bid to address agency problems given the market 
environment characterised with nascent formal market and corporate governance 
institutions, shortage of experts, absence of property investment performance 
benchmarks, etc. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Interviewees 
Respondents’ employer Category Number of interviewees 
National Social Security Fund Investor 3 
Parastatal Pensions Fund Investor 3 
Local Authorities Pension Funds Investor 3 
Public Service Pension Fund Investor 2 
National Housing Corporation Investor 4 
Intergraded Property Investments (T) Ltd Investor 3 
Mlimani City Investor 1 
CDC Investor 1 
Tanzania Investment Centre Investment facilitator 1 
MoLHHSD Land Administrator 2 
Municipal Councils Land administrator 3 
Firms providing real estate services Consultants 12 
Real estate researchers Researchers 2 
Total  40 
 
On the other hand, interviews with agents focused on the role of formal and informal 
institutions in checking agents’ behaviour and actions. The interviews further sought to 
establish agents’ specific roles in property investment activities, their motivation to 
work for their principals, the degree of discretion they have in investment decisions, the 
degree of satisfaction with the type of incentives provided to them. For agents amongst 
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real estate consultants, interviews in particular sought to find out whether agents’ 
interests were aligned with those of their principals. Interviews with the other key 
informants such as government officials, TIC officials, and researchers aimed at 
gaining more insights on real estate investment activities in Tanzania in terms of 
regulation, facilitation, and transparency. The list of interviewees is presented in Table 
3.1. 
 
Focus group discussions 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to glean data from members of pension 
funds. One of the advantages of focus group discussion method is that it enables a 
researcher to observe a large amount of interactions on a specific topic in a short time 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Focus groups are also preferred for their group dynamics 
and hence their ability to generate a wide range of data through the social interaction. 
Although the method is criticised for its focus on the availability of group members, 
rather than their representativeness, this problem had little relevance to this study 
because the participants were easily available in many places of work and they existed 
in all possible categories such as gender, age, level of education etc. Drawing 
representative samples was thus easy. 
 
According to some stands of literature, the optimum number of participants in a focus 
group may vary, but many authors recommend groups of between 6-12 participants 
(e.g. Smithson, 2008; Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Cozby, 2007; Krueger and Casey, 
2000). For this study, 4 focus group discussion sessions were conducted. Each 
session consisted of 6 participants. All sessions were moderated by the author. The 
participants were drawn out of members of various pension funds amongst employees 
of Ardhi University, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, 
Kinondoni Municipal Council, and some real estate investment firms. The information 
generated from focus group discussions was useful in partly addressing some 
research questions and in setting the ground for the survey. Some results of focus 
group discussions analysis were compared with survey analysis results. 
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Review of documentary evidence 
The range of documents common in social science research include diaries, letters, 
essays, personal notes, biographies, institutional memoranda and reports, and 
government pronouncements as in Green Papers, White Papers, Acts of Parliament 
(Jupp, 1996). To address some aspects of the research objective, both published and 
grey literature was used. The question of how real estate investment in Tanzania was 
linked with the country’s institutional environment was mainly addressed using 
documentary evidence. Some of the documents reviewed include management reports 
and annual reports of the investors covered in the study, research papers, 
dissertations, and presentations on real estate investment in Tanzania. Various 
statutes directly or indirectly affecting property investment activities were also 
reviewed. Some of the statutes reviewed include all Acts of Parliament providing for 
the establishment of the pension funds covered in this study, Tanzania Investment Act 
of 1997, Capital Markets and Securities Act of 1994, Public Corporations Act of 1992, 
and Land Act of 1999. 
 
Review of documentary evidence was also aimed at supplementing interviews and 
focus group discussions. Data on the general property market trends and financing 
was obtained through a review of various publications and reports issued by the Bank 
of Tanzania, National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania Investment Centre, Controller and 
Auditor General (CAG) reports and other government publications and reports. 
Relevant research reports, newspapers and newsletters were also used as a source of 
secondary data. The author was sometime compelled to use telephone conversation to 
cross check the accuracy of some data gleaned from various reports. Some of the 
officials called include investment managers and officers of some pension funds, NHC 
and property management firms. 
 
3.3.3.2 The quantitative component 
Survey was the main strategy of enquiry adopted. As Creswel (2009) points out, 
survey research provides a quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes or 
opinions of a population by studying a sample of the population. The survey was cross-
sectional, in that data was collected at one point in time i.e. between August and 
December 2010. Since this study test a theory and attempts to expound the limitations 
of applying a theory in some social settings, it is clear that the findings of this study will 
be relevant for all settings which share similarities with a setting obtaining in Tanzania. 
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The quantitative component of this study therefore forms a strong basis for 
generalisation of the results. 
 
Self-administered questionnaire 
Primary data collection was carried out using self-administered questionnaires. The 
distribution of the questionnaires and response is summarised in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of survey respondents and response rate 
Respondents’ details  Number of questionnaires Response 
Response 
Rate (%) 
Agents’ questionnaire:    
 Pension funds real estate/investment officials 60 41 68.3 
 National Housing Corporation real 
estate/investment officials 60 40 66.7 
 Real estate consultancy firms’ owners and 
employees 130 98 75.4 
 Foreign real estate investors’ employees 20 12 60.0 
 TIC officials and government officials (land 
officers and valuers) 15 14 93.3 
Total 285 205 71.9 
Principals’ questionnaire:    
 Pension funds senior management officials 24 11 45.8 
 National Housing Corporation real 
estate/investment officials 10 6 60.0 
 Real estate consultancy firms’ owners 25 11 44.0 
 Foreign real estate investors’ senior 
officials/representatives 8 4 50.0 
Total 67 32 47.8 
 
The strength of this method is that the interviewer is able to convince reluctant 
respondents, motivate respondent and provide additional instructions or explanation 
when needed (de Leeuw, 2008). This method was chosen to ensure high response 
rate and to minimise cases of missing data i.e. unanswered questions. The use of self-
administered questionnaire technique was also aimed at ensuring rapid completion of 
the questionnaires by respondents. The questionnaires were also pretested with a few 
potential respondents from all the categories to eliminate any ambiguities in the 
questions. There were two sets of questionnaires, one served to respondents identified 
to serve as principals, and the other served to a sample of people identified to serve as 
agents. 
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It should be noted that despite self-administering the questionnaire, still some 
respondents kept postponing filling out the questionnaire apparently due to lack of 
time, hence less than 100% response rate. As shown in Table 3.2, the problem was 
much more pronounced with principals than agents. Most of the people serving as 
principals were senior officials, and thus were busier attending meetings and other 
responsibilities. 
 
Sample and sampling technique 
Whereas probabilistic sampling techniques are not given much attention in qualitative 
studies (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Creswel, 2009), sampling models remain to be 
the basis of statistical inference, which is a key decision tool in quantitative research 
(King et al, 1994). However, statistical sampling is sometimes hindered by lack of 
uniformity in populations and problems with access to data (Punch, 2008). Cognizant 
of the importance of statistical sampling, this study notwithstanding the research 
environment whose people are not used to dealing with researchers drew its sample 
using statistical methods. Owing to difficulties in establishing the exact population size 
of the various groups of respondents, a multistage sampling design was used. 
Multistage sampling design is used when the population size cannot be determined 
(Cozby, 2007; McBurney, 1998). The different categories of people serving as 
principals or agents formed the clusters. Then, random samples were drawn for each 
cluster. The sample size for each cluster was determined by estimating the population 
of the cluster in question. 
 
3.3.4 Reliability and validity 
 
3.3.4.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the replicability of research findings if another study, using the 
same or similar method, was undertaken (Lewis and Ritchie, 2008). In qualitative 
research, reliability has been a subject of debate, with many authors disapproving the 
notion of research replication (Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Holstein and Gubrium, 
2004). Instead, it is common to find in qualitative research literature alternative words 
being used to refer to reliability and sometimes to validity. Some of such words include 
confirmability, trustworthiness, consistency, and dependability (Teddlie and 
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Tashakkori, 2009; Lewis and Ritchie, 2008; DeCuir-Gunby, 2008; Robson, 2002; 
Kvale, 1996). 
 
To ensure reliability, this study observed a number of steps. A random sampling 
technique was used to eliminate biasness in the selection of survey respondents. 
Respondents were given enough time in both interviews and surveys. Data collection 
was conducted for four months. This was done to ensure that time was sufficient to 
allow the respondents to respond to the questions without stress or hurry. Besides, all 
interviews and focus group discussions were personally administered by the author i.e. 
no research assistants were involved. This was to maintain uniformity. Methods of data 
analysis are clearly documented. In some cases, multiple methods were employed to 
check results. Interpretation of results was only based on evidence. To ensure validity, 
some more steps were considered. 
 
3.3.4.2 Validity 
Validity, on the other hand, is concerned with the extent to which a measurement 
actually measures those features the investigator wishes to measure, and provides 
information which is relevant to the questions being asked i.e. relationship between a 
variable and what it is supposed to measure or predict about the world (Martin and 
Bateson, 1986). There are three common types of validity associated with research 
namely, construct validity, internal validity and external validity (Cozby, 2007). 
Construct validity refers to the adequacy of the operational definition of variables and 
the degree to which data collection procedure truly captures the intended construct 
that is being studied (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). Whereas internal validity refers to 
the ability to draw conclusions about causal relationships from the data, external 
validity is concerned with the extent to which the results can be generalised to other 
populations and settings (Cozby, 2007). 
 
All the three components of validity mentioned above are relevant in this study. 
Accordingly, various steps were devised to ensure validity is attained. The sampling 
technique employed (multistage) ensures representativeness and unbiasness in the 
sample. The phenomenon being investigated and the setting of the investigation are 
well defined. Respondents were given sufficient time to fill out the self-administered 
questionnaires and the author was available to give clarifications whenever needed. 
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The findings of the study are based on clear methods of analysis and the findings are 
only based on the original data. Besides, this study draws on a rich theoretical and 
empirical knowledge base, and the research methods employed are those common 
with the existing literature on the subject matter. 
 
Studies on agency theory are mainly divided into two, namely those which approach 
the contracting problem in algebraic but non-empirical manner and those which are 
more descriptive but more amenable to empirical testing (Rowland, 1998). With 
increasing availability of more reliable secondary data statistical proofs have become 
common in testing various agency theory aspects in property investment activities 
(Graff and Webb, 1997; Glascock et al, 1993; Solt and Miller, 1985). Rowland (1998) 
encourages the use of survey in studies of agency conflicts. Studies using algebraic 
models are criticised for their limiting assumptions some of which are necessary to 
draw meaningful assumptions. Besides, some algebraic models are criticised for being 
unrealistic or overly prescriptive. This argument is further supported by the proponents 
of New Institutional Economics who criticise neo-classical economists for their models 
which presuppose the non-existent perfect market. As neo-institutionalism is 
increasingly gaining ground in addressing the shortcomings of the mainstream 
economics approaches, pragmatism in the choice of research methods has similarly 
increased (Chin et al et al, 2006; McGreal et al, 2002). 
 
3.3.5 Ethical considerations 
This study involves people and business activities. The interpersonal nature of this 
study and the sensitive business information that might have been accessed in the 
course of this research, imply an ethical dimension to be taken into account. Ethical 
considerations aim at ensuring that people participate voluntarily, making people’s 
comments and behaviour confidential, protecting people from harm and ensuring 
mutual trust between researcher and people studied (Silverman, 2008). In summary, 
consent, confidentiality and consequences of the research are the key ethical issues a 
researcher must consider (Kvale, 1996). This study placed equal importance on all 
ethical considerations. Access to all data used in this study was by consent from the 
relevant authorities. Formal requests were made for all data and information which 
were not public. A written assurance on information privacy and confidentiality was 
provided to all respondents who took part in the survey. The covering letter for the 
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questionnaires also clearly stated that the data would only be used for academic 
purposes and that no real names of persons or firms would be disclosed without prior 
consent of the concerned persons or authorised officers. 
 
Practically, it is relatively difficult to conduct research activities which involve asking 
people questions in Tanzania due to people not being so much used to research 
activities. Owing to many incidents of corruption and dishonesty, sometimes people 
are hesitant cooperating with researchers for fear that they may be journalists or 
government secret service agents, or even undercover officers from the Prevention 
and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB). The author, being an academic member 
of staff in the School of Real Estate Studies (SRES) at Ardhi University (ARU), enjoyed 
the already established rapport with a large section of the respondents following a 
working relationship network which had developed in the course of discharging 
consultancy assignments and research activities. Due to the fact that ARU is the only 
institution of higher learning offering real estate courses in Tanzania, most of the 
respondents were ARU graduates. Some useful contacts were also established by the 
author when conducting his Masters research which was on real estate allocations by 
pension funds in Tanzania. This rapport eased access to data and to senior officials of 
the various firms. Besides, the nature of the enquiry and type of information sought 
generally in this study were not considered to be very sensitive by the respondents, 
which reduced respondents’ resistance from taking part in the survey. 
 
3.3.6 Data analysis 
 
3.3.6.1 Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis was employed in the analysis of qualitative data which was 
collected by interviews and focus groups. A summary of the thematic analysis process 
adopted in this study is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Thematic analysis method is widely 
used for analysis of qualitative data. It involves identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns or themes within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In the present study, 
thematic analysis entailed reading all the text documented during focus group 
discussions and interviews with key informants. The exercise was aimed at identifying 
repeated patterns of meaning. In this process, various themes capturing important 
aspects about the data in relation to research questions and representing some level 
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of patterned response or meaning within the data set were identified. The various 
themes were then presented and discussed separately before a generalised pattern 
was drawn.  
 
Figure 3.3: Thematic analysis process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualization from various literature sources, 2011 
 
3.3.6.2 Descriptive and inferential statistics 
In the analysis of quantitative data, some descriptive and inferential statistical methods 
were used. Mean and standard deviation scores were used to rank all Likert scale 
answers. The answers showed respondents’ degree of agreement or satisfaction with 
some statements testing various aspects of agency conflicts. To test association of 
independence of some selected parameters, Chi-square (χ²) was used. Chi-square 
decision rule is that, at given level of significance (α) the null hypothesis is rejected if 
the calculated χ² meets or exceeds the tabled critical χ² (Field, 2005). Phi (φ) was used 
to determine the strength of the established associations whose categories were 
defined by a 2 x 2 matrix. For categories with different matrices, Cramer’s V was used. 
Cramer’s V values of less than 0.30 reflect small effect size, otherwise those between 
0.30 and 0.50 reflect medium effect size, and those more than 0.5 reflect large size 
 
 
Step 5: 
Naming themes 
 
Step 6: 
Writing 
 
Step 1: 
Familiarising with data 
 
Step 2: 
Generating intial codes 
 
Step 3: 
Searching for themes 
 
Step 4: 
Reviewing themes 
Reading and re-reading the data (from interviews and FGDs), and 
noting down initial ideas  
 
Systematically coding interesting features of the data across the 
entire data set and collating data relevant to each code  
Collating codes into potential themes and gathering all data 
relevant to each potential theme  
Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts and 
the entire data set, generating a thematic map of the analysis 
Refining the specifics of each theme and the overall story the 
analysis tells, and generating clear names and definitions for each 
theme
Selecting compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, and relating the analysis to the research questions and 
literature 
Step and Activity Activity Details 
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effect (Steinberg, 2008). The larger the effect size value the more meaningful is the 
Chi-square derived conclusion. 
 
3.4 Challenges of the study 
In the course of undertaking this study some challenges were faced. The challenges 
which may have weakened the robustness and wider applicability of some of the 
findings of the study are outlined below: 
 
(i) Some difficulties were encountered in identifying, separating and defining 
informal institutions’ attributes. Some of the variables were differently defined by 
different authors. Other attributes were, in their common usage, used loosely 
and interchangeably, which potentially caused some difficulties in distinguishing 
them. To be able to give clarification in case of any confusion, personal 
administration of the questionnaires was necessary. 
 
(ii) Low response rate of principals’ questionnaire was contributed by most of the 
respondents occupying important positions, which made them too busy to have 
spare time for interviews or filling out a questionnaire. Due to lack of time, some 
senior officials assigned their subordinates to attend the questionnaire. Other 
senior officials were apparently not comfortable being interviewed for fear of 
being quoted or misquoted. Sensitivity of the research topic (i.e. enquiring about 
one’s opportunistic behaviour) coupled with infrequency of research activities in 
the industry, also contributed to making some respondents more hesitant to 
cooperate with the researcher. Despite the low response rate, a lot of time was 
spent by the researcher calling the officials to remind them of the request to 
have an interview with them or to remind them to fill out the questionnaire. 
 
(iii) Some respondents amongst senior officials had multiple roles i.e. principal and 
agent roles. Such respondents were requested to fill out both principals’ and 
agents’ questionnaire. This may have somehow affected the type of answers 
given by some of the respondents. Additionally, filling out two questionnaires 
required more time, of which such respondents did not have. This resulted into 
further delays returning the completed questionnaire. 
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(iv) About 92% of the respondents in the survey were either graduates or 
possessed postgraduate qualifications. This sample may not be a good 
representative sample for the population of Tanzania whose level of education 
is generally low. However, the sample was quite representative of the education 
level of the people in the formal real estate sector. Most of the employees and 
agents working in the formal real estate sector were university graduates. The 
large number of educated people in the sector reflects the professional and 
specialised nature of the real estate investment activities. 
 
(v) This is a pioneering study on the agency problem in real estate investment in 
Tanzania, and perhaps the whole of Africa. As a result, respondents were not 
quite aware of the agency problem when answering the questionnaires. Most of 
them confused the term agency problem with the problems associated with real 
estate agency activities. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses the setting obtaining in Tanzania to demonstrate how a property 
investment process is linked with the institutional environment. The link is established 
by drawing on the evidence from the three main different historical periods through 
which Tanzania has passed. Specifically, the discussion is centred on the colonial 
period, the period after independence but prior to institutional reforms, and the period 
of institutional reforms. The three periods are significantly different in terms of the 
nature of the political, legal, economic and social institutions that prevailed in each of 
them. The discussion, which is mainly based on published and grey literature shows 
how the property investment market has evolved with, and mirrored, the prevailing 
institutions. 
 
4.2 Approaches to property market analysis 
There are different market analysis approaches used by researchers of property 
markets. Some of the popular approaches include the traditional or mainstream 
economics, the Neo-Marxist and, the institutional economics (Arvanitidis, 2006; van 
der Krabben and Lambooy, 1993). 
 
The traditional approaches, using neoclassical urban rent theory, are generally based 
on the assertion that a property market is structured by supply and demand of its 
products and that in the absence of information problems, competition will always lead 
to an equilibrium on the property market (Arvanitidis, 1999). The main criticism of these 
approaches is that not only do they fail to incorporate the property market mechanisms 
into their theoretical frameworks, but they also misinterpret the relationship between 
the property market and urban economy (Arvanitidis, 1999). The mainstream 
economics approaches are based on the neo-classical perfect market which 
presupposes many buyers, many sellers, homogeneous product, full information etc, 
which in reality do not exist (Evans, 1995). 
 
Neo-Marxist approaches, on the other hand, are based on the contention that urban 
settings are socially determined in their forms and processes through a dialectical 
interaction that opposes social contradictions and conflicts as trends fighting each 
4 Institutional Environment and Real Estate Investment 91 
 
 
other in an endless suppression (Castells, 1993). The main argument is that the urban 
built up environment is a product of capital accumulation. The focus is on the 
traditional urban rent theory, which is explained as a struggle between landowners and 
other capitalists for a part of the surplus value that is generated in the production 
process (van der Krabben and Lambooy, 1993). Proponents of Neo-Marxist 
approaches are also more interested in how capital flows into the built environment. 
Neo-Marxist approaches are criticised in many ways, but the most recurring criticism is 
their deterministic closed system of explanation and their lack of a cultural perspective 
(D’Arcy and Keogh, 1997). Another widely cited weakness of the Neo-Marxist 
approaches is that they regard the built environment as a framework around which 
other social processes take place rather than an integral element of them (Ball, 1986). 
Neo-Maxist and mainstream economics approaches are both criticised for their lack of 
institutional or behavioural content and their tendency to ignore many of the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of property (D’Arcy and Keogh, 1998). 
 
The institutional economics approach, on the other hand, avoids the simplistic 
explanation of the property investment market adopted in the mainstream economics 
and Neo-Marxist approaches by regarding the property market as an institution which 
can be explained alongside other institutions (Keogh and D’Arcy, 1999; Keogh and 
D’Arcy, 1994). Apart from a series of papers by Keogh and D’Arcy (i.e. Keogh and 
D’Arcy, 1994; Keogh, 1996; D’Arcy and Keogh, 1997; D’Arcy and Keogh, 1998; Keogh 
and D’Arcy, 1999; D’Arcy and Keogh, 2002; and D’Arcy, 2006), there are many other 
recent property investment market studies which have preferred institutional 
approaches to the other approaches (e.g. Viruly, 2009; Mooya and Cloete, 2007; Chin 
et al, 2006; Sim et al, 2003; Ebohon et al, 2002; McGreal et al, 2002; Walters, 2002; 
Armitage and Keogh, 1996). Considering the strength of the institutional approaches 
over the other approaches, the discussion of the Tanzania real estate investment 
market adopts the perspective of the institutional approaches. 
 
4.3 Institutional framework of real estate investment market 
Institutional environment refers to the system of formal laws, regulations and 
procedures, and informal conventions, customs and norms that broaden, mould, and 
restrain social-economic activity and behaviour (Becchetti and Kobeissi, 2009). The 
institutional environment prevailing in a particular society defines the activities and 
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actions of the members of the society in question. As Keogh and D’Arcy (1999) point 
out, the property market exists within an institutional framework defined by political, 
social, economic and legal rules and conventions by which the society in question is 
organised. The broad institutional climate frames the perceptions and expectations of 
actors in the property market. Figure 4.1 shows the connection of property investment 
with the various institutions and how those institutions are also connected to form a 
broad institutional environment. 
 
Figure 4.1: The institutional framework of real estate investment 
 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualisation, 2011 
 
Political institutions influence performance of property market through the level of 
perceived political risk, political support, and political policies. Social institutions 
determine the type and function of property. Economic institutions determine supply 
and demand, expected growth, risk and return, inflation, cost of capital etc. Legal 
institutions are linked to property market in terms of planning laws and regulations, 
property rights, enforceable contracts, taxation laws, mortgage laws etc. 
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There is a rich body of literature showing how institutions, and thus institutional 
environment, affect investment performance and economic development at large (e.g. 
Williamson, 2009; Tabellini, 2008; Junker, 2005; Ebohon et al, 2002; Asiedu, 2002; 
Henisz, 2000; de Soto, 2000). There are also many strands of property industry 
specific literature demonstrating how institutional factors influence property 
performance (Tu and Bao, 2009; Zhu, 1999). For instance, political stability and 
economic efficiency and freedom have a positive effect on property investment (Tu and 
Bao, 2009; Lim et at, 2006; Liao and Mei, 1999). 
 
4.4 Institutions related to property ownership in Tanzania 
The history of formal investment in landed property in Tanzania can be traced back to 
colonial times when formal land ownership was introduced. The formal land ownership 
was introduced during the German rule, prior to which land was owned according to 
different institutional arrangements of different tribes (Ngeregere, 2008; Josefsson and 
Aberg, 2005). By the Imperial Decree of 1895, the Germans declared all lands in 
Tanzania (then Tanganyika), whether occupied or not, to be crown land. However, 
there were some exceptions to the declaration. Private individuals who could provide 
documentary evidence that they owned land prior to the declaration were allowed to 
continue to own land. For chiefs and native communities, proof of ownership of land 
was through use and occupation of the subject land (Olenasha, 2005). Private 
individuals who formally owned land at that time were mainly foreigners who were 
engaged in plantation agriculture. 
 
After the end of World War I, Tanganyika became a Trust Territory under British 
Administration. In 1923, the British came up with Land Ordinance, which provided that 
all land was public land under the control of the Governor, and that no title to the 
occupation and use of any such lands was valid without the consent of the Governor 
(Shivji, 1998). The legislation further introduced a new system of land ownership 
known as Right of Occupancy (Larsson, 2006). Titles and interests which were created 
prior to the enactment of the Ordinance were not affected by the provisions of the 
Ordinance. The freeholds and other interests created during the German rule were not 
abolished by the British. As German settlers were leaving following the change of 
administration, they sold their freeholds to British and other foreign settlers (James, 
1971). In 1928, Land Ordinance was amended to give legal recognition to customary 
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ownership and a title of a native or a native community lawfully using or occupying land 
in accordance with native laws and customs (Ngeregere, 2008). 
 
When Tanzania achieved its independence from the British in 1961, there were four 
titles or interests in land namely, freeholds, leaseholds, granted Right of Occupancy 
and deemed Right of Occupancy. Most of the freeholds and leaseholds were issued 
during the German rule. In 1962, Government Paper No. 2 was issued to abolish 
freeholds. This left Tanzania mainly with three titles to land i.e. leaseholds, granted 
Right of Occupancy and deemed Right of Occupancy. In 1969, Government 
Leaseholds (Conversion to Rights of Occupancy) Act No. 44 was enacted. The Act 
provided for the conversion of leaseholds to Right of Occupancy. Since then, land 
ownership in Tanzania has been in the form of granted and deemed Right of 
Occupancy. It is also possible, especially for foreigners, to own land through derivative 
rights (Geho, 2009). 
 
Some colonial institutions, structures and influences could still be observed in the early 
years of independence. To get rid of such colonial elements, the government came up 
with a variety of new policies and legislation. In 1967, through Arusha Declaration, a 
major ideological shift towards socialist policies was announced. This was a 
monumental decision which had major impact on the institutional environment. The 
implementation of socialist policies inhibited private sector growth. Real property sector 
was adversely affected by the promulgation of Arusha Declaration. Enactment of 
Acquisition of Buildings Act in 1971 further paralysed growth of the property sector. 
The Act provided for, among others, the nationalisation of all private rental properties 
whose market value was above TZS 100,000 (then equivalent to US $14,000) or its 
rental value was above TZS 833.3 per month (Meredith, 2006; Okpala, 1986). Through 
Arusha Declaration, the government also prohibited public servants from, among other 
things, owning more than one house. 
 
4.5 Property sector prior to institutional reforms 
During the colonial period, property development and investment was minimal. Most of 
the land was used for sisal, tea and coffee plantations. Besides, the level of 
urbanization was very low. In 1961, the level of urbanization was only 4.8% compared 
to 25% in 2008 (Kironde, 2008; Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999). Involvement of 
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government in the housing market can also be traced back to the colonial period. For 
instance, in 1953 the British colonial government launched the African Urban Housing 
Loan Scheme which was meant to assist Africans to acquire houses in urban areas. 
Each individual was allowed to borrow up to £ 500, and the maximum repayment 
period was 20 years (Kironde, 2007; Kironde et al, 2003). In 1960, the maximum 
borrowing amount was increased to £1,000. In the same year, the British Colonial 
Government also introduced the Urban Roof Loan Scheme. The Scheme aimed at 
enabling owners of thatch-roofed houses in urban areas to replace the roof covers with 
corrugated iron sheets. All these colonial government initiatives were short-lived and 
covered only a very small section of the population. 
 
Similarly, no significant progress was made in the property sector during the post 
independence period prior to institutional reforms. The political and economic system 
during that time undermined private property rights, which discouraged private 
investors from participating in the property investment market. State owned enterprises 
(SOEs) were the only key property market players. The government, through 
parastatal organisations was, apart from direct ownership of rental houses, also 
engaged in the provision of property development finance. Most of the government’s 
initiatives were however more focused on the housing sector. 
 
Among the first major government initiatives which had significant positive impact on 
the property sector was the establishment of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) 
in 1962. One of the main functions of the Corporation was to lend, guarantee or 
provide finance to local authorities and individuals, for the construction and 
improvement of buildings and approved housing schemes (Kironde et al, 2003). NHC 
was involved in a number of housing provision schemes including Tenant Purchase 
and Slum Clearance. Under Tenant Purchase arrangement, which resulted into 2,130 
houses by 1969, NHC built and sold houses to the tenants on a hire purchase 
arrangement. Under this arrangement, tenants were required to repay the cost plus a 
5% annual interest over a period of between 15 and 25 years. Slum Clearance 
Scheme, on the other hand, intended to replace slums with modest houses. Tanzania 
spent about 3.5% of the national investment on slum clearance schemes, but the 
schemes were only able to add an average of only 400 housing units per annum 
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(Okpala, 1986). In total, only 3,667 houses were built under the schemes (Kironde et 
al, 2003). 
 
Another notable government initiative was the establishment of Tanzania Housing 
Bank (THB). This bank was established by an Act of the Parliament No. 34 of 1972 
and became operational in 1973. Among the bank’s main objectives were mobilisation 
of savings and resources for housing development, promotion of housing 
development, provision of technical and financial assistance for owner-occupied 
housing, and provision of finance for the development of commercial and industrial 
buildings. This bank, whose shareholders were the government (46.5%), National 
Insurance Corporation (30.2%) and National Provident Fund (23.3%), went through a 
period of persistent operational problems and it eventually collapsed in 1995. The 
number of housing units built using THB loans before it collapsed is approximated at 
36,000 (Kironde at al, 2003). In 1963 the government also introduced the Revolving 
Housing Loan Fund for senior civil servants, mainly to enable them to renovate, 
construct or buy houses. Borrowers of this Fund were later transferred to Tanzania 
Housing Bank (THB). Following bankruptcy of THB, the government re-introduced the 
Revolving Fund in 1995. 
 
In the early 1960s, urban housing finance in Tanzania was also provided by First 
Permanent Building Society of Zambia (then known as North Rhodesia). Although 
based in Zambia, the Society also operated in East African countries. In the wake of 
independence of East African countries, the Society stopped issuing housing finance 
which in 1963 forced East African countries in collaboration with the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) to come up with the First Permanent East Africa Ltd, 
whose headquarters were in Nairobi. In 1968, the Permanent Housing Finance 
Company (PHFC) was formed to take over the business of First Permanent East Africa 
Ltd in Tanzania, with the government of Tanzania and CDC being the shareholders. In 
1972, PHFC was nationalised on the grounds that it mainly served foreigners. 
 
The role of banks in the property sector prior to reforms 
Although commercial banks have existed since the colonial period, their contribution to 
the property market has been insignificant. The first bank was introduced in Tanzania 
in 1905. The bank, namely Deutsche-Ostafrikanische Bank, was introduced by the 
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Germans. In 1911 another German bank, namely Handelsbank fuer Ostafrika, was 
established. During the British colonial rule, three British banks, namely National & 
Grindlay Bank, Barclays Bank D.C.O. and Standard Bank, started their operations in 
the country (Mittelman, 1978). In the 1950s, other commercial banks from Pakistan, 
India and the Netherlands also came into being (Lwiza and Nwankwo, 2002; 
Mittelman, 1978). However, these banks mainly served a small group of people, 
particularly the Whites and the Indians. After independence, the government 
established more banks to serve a larger section of the population. In 1962 and 1965, 
the government established the National Co-operatives Bank and the Tanzania Bank 
of Commerce respectively. All private banks did not last long after independence. They 
were all nationalised in the wake of the Arusha Declaration. 
 
The implementation of Arusha Declaration stagnated development of the private 
commercial banking sector. From 1967, the financial sector was dominated by state 
owned banks. There were only three commercial banks namely, the National Bank of 
Commerce (NBC), the Co-operative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB) and the 
People's Bank of Zanzibar (PBZ) (Lwiza and Nwankwo, 2002). Two development 
banks namely, Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) and Tanzania Development Finance 
Limited (TDFL), and an assortment of small special purpose banking and non-banking 
financial institutions like Tanzania Post Savings Bank, Tanzania Housing Bank (THB), 
National Insurance Corporation (NIC), National Provident Fund (NPF), Parastatal 
Pensions Fund (PPF) and a hire purchase company known as Diamond Jubilee 
Investment Trust were also established during the socialist regime (IDA and URT, 
1995). 
 
4.6 Institutional reforms 
Between the 1970s and the early 1980s, Tanzania persistently experienced serious 
economic problems. The Annual GDP growth rate declined from 5.19% in the 1970s to 
1.2% in the early 1980s (Kumssa and Mbeche, 2004). During the economic hardship, 
socialist policies became very unpopular. By early 1980s, Tanzania was the world's 
second poorest country (in GDP per capita terms) and it was clear that its problems 
were largely related to poor policies and structural weaknesses (ESRF, 2003). 
Tanzania-Uganda war (1978-1979) also contributed significantly to the economic 
hardship. In the mid 1980s, political leadership was left with no more options except to 
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start building market economy institutions (Goran, 1999). Tanzania needed to reform 
its institutions to respond to the prevailing investors’ needs and social, political, and 
economical realities of the time (Ngowi, 2005). 
 
Since the mid 1980s, Tanzania has been implementing institutional reform 
programmes. Legislation has been the main instrument of the reforms. For instance, 
reforms of political institutions involved changing rules and regulations governing 
political institutions. Political institutions consist of government and non-government 
organisations, as well as rules and norms which govern the political system (Offe, 
2006). Changing the rules and regulations governing political institutions may therefore 
entail changing constitutions, statutes, customs, administrative regulations, or even 
international agreements (Bagce, 2002). Political reforms in Tanzania entailed, among 
other things, adopting a multi-party democracy system. Political reforms also entailed 
significantly changing most of the institutions which were established during the 
socialist regime. 
 
During the reforms many pieces of legislation have been enacted and others 
significantly amended. Even the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania has 
been amended. This process was necessary to pave way for the formation and smooth 
operation of market economy institutions. It is unarguable that an environment with 
stable legal institutions is an essential prerequisite for sustainable economic 
development (Berkowitz et al, 2005; Decker et al, 2005; Beck and Levine, 2004). A 
legal system of any given society underpins the institutions that govern both market 
and non-market interactions. It determines the distribution of economic, social and 
political rights and obligations affecting both economic and non-economic relationships 
(Decker et al, 2005). 
 
Legal institutions shape the regulation of market practices and the delivery of public 
services, and hence the opportunities people have to take part in economic activity. 
The law and finance theory holds that, in countries where legal systems enforce 
private property rights, support private contractual arrangements, and protect the legal 
right of investors, savers are more willing to finance firms and financial markets flourish 
(Beck and Levine, 2004). These institutions also provide mechanisms to mediate 
conflicts, resolve disputes, and sustain peace and order. High quality institutions also 
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assure foreign investors that they can enforce contracts using legal institutions in the 
subject country (Berkowitz et al, 2005). In contrast, legal institutions that neither 
support private property rights nor facilitate private contracting inhibit corporate finance 
and stunt financial development. 
 
In the course of reforming legal institutions, some sections of courts of law were 
introduced. For instance, a Land Division of the High Court was established to 
expedite determination of land related disputes. Similarly, in order to expedite 
resolution of business deputes, a Commercial Court Division of the High Court was 
also established (PwC, 2008a; Bwana, 2006). As Berkowitz et al (2005) note, 
globalisation and increasing international flow of goods and capital have created a 
sense that the importance of individual nation’s law and law enforcement institutions is 
declining. In Tanzania it has now become common to find national legal institutions 
being supplemented or sometimes even substituted by international legal institutions. 
For instance, some foreign investment activities are partly regulated by international 
institutions and conventions. Over the last two decades, Tanzania has ratified many 
international conventions (Nyanduga and Manning, 2006). Tanzania Investment Act 
No. 26, which was enacted in 1997, provides a guarantee against investment 
nationalisation and expropriation. Section 23 and 24 of the Act also provides for 
settlement of disputes using the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) which is a World Bank affiliated body of which Tanzania is a member. 
Tanzania is also a member of the World Bank Foreign Investment Insurance wing i.e. 
Multilateral Investment Guarantees Agency (MIGA). 
 
The Tanzania Investment Act of 1997 also culminated in the establishment of the 
Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC). According to section 6(a) of the Act, some of the 
main functions of TIC include promoting, coordinating and facilitating investment 
process in the country. TIC is a one-stop investment facilitation agency in the sense 
that it is designed to provide all the necessary services for investors without having to 
go through the normal bureaucratic procedures (PwC, 2008a). TIC serves both local 
and foreign investors and performs all liaison work for the investor from enquiries to 
project start up. The presence of TIC has significantly reduced the time required to 
formalise business entities. Besides, businesses having Certificates of Incentives from 
TIC are entitled to special benefits. One of these benefits is a 0% import duty on 
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project capital goods, computers and computer accessories (Mnali, 2008). However, 
TIC deals only with all enterprises whose minimum capital investment is US $ 300,000 
for foreign investors and US $ 100,000 for local investors. 
 
In the process of reforms, a number of other institutions have also been established to 
promote private sector investment activities. For instance, in 2001 the Tanzania 
National Business Council (TNBC) was established. The Council provides a forum for 
public-private sector dialogue to improve business environment in the country (Sitta, 
2005). Its membership is 50% public and 50% private with the President of the United 
Republic of Tanzania being the chairperson. TNBC vice chairperson is also a 
chairperson of Tanzania Private Sector Foundation. The Council addresses investment 
issues affecting domestic and foreign investors through respective round table 
meetings. In these meetings which are also attended by cabinet ministers, service 
delivery by the government is called to account. In 2002, another institution namely 
Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) was established. One of the 
main functions of BEST is to reduce unnecessary burden on businesses by eliminating 
as many procedural and administrative barriers as possible and to improve the quality 
of services provided by the government in the private sector including commercial 
disputes resolution (Sitta, 2005). BEST programme has also facilitated the preparation 
of the Valuation and Valuers Registration Bill and the Real Estate Agents Bill. The 
Valuation and Valuers Registration Bill was expected to be tabled before Parliament 
during the 2011/2012 financial year. 
 
Establishment of capital market institutions is another important outcome of the 
institutional reforms. In an effort towards promoting capital markets, the Capital 
Markets and Securities Act was enacted in 1994. The Act led to the establishment of 
Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA), which is responsible for overseeing 
the operation of capital markets in the country. CMSA oversaw the establishment of 
Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) in 1996. By 31 December 2010, 15 companies 
with a total market capitalisation of US $ 3.37 billion, 76 treasury bonds with an 
outstanding amount of US $ 957.4 million and six corporate bonds with an outstanding 
amount of $ 64.9 million were listed. Of the listed 15 companies, five were in the 
banking and investment sector, three were in the commercial services sector while the 
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remaining seven were in the industrial and allied services sector (World Finance, 
2011). 
 
Prior to the establishment of CMSA and DSE, Tanzania had no financial markets, 
other than the market of government bonds and treasury bills which were primarily 
issued to one state owned insurance company (i.e. NIC), two pension funds (i.e. NPF 
and PPF) and savings banks (IDA and URT, 1995). A number of companies have 
already benefited from these capital markets reforms by either going public or getting 
listed at DSE. All reputable companies have enjoyed oversubscription in their Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs). Similarly, all of the DSE-listed corporate bonds have enjoyed 
oversubscription at the time of their listing (Fumbuka, 2008; Kibola, 2008; CMSA, 
2006). Through these capital market institutions, the government has also been able to 
transfer ownership of some key state owned enterprises to the general members of the 
public (World Finance, 2011). 
 
The existence of capital market institutions, coupled with the enactment of the Public 
Corporations Act No. 2 of 1992 which liberalised investment policies for parastatal 
organisations, broadened the investment spectrum for both small and institutional 
investors. Pension funds and other institutional investors who formerly used to invest 
largely in government securities are now able to venture into many other investment 
media (Mpogole, 2006). Under-subscription of treasury bonds over the recent years is 
due to the growing interest by institutional investors in real property (Ndissi, 2003). The 
real property sector has however not significantly capitalised on these capital markets 
institutions, in terms of using them to raise capital through IPOs and bond issues. 
Currently, there are no public real property companies in Tanzania nor are there any 
open-ended or closed-ended property funds. A plan by the Unit Trust of Tanzania 
(UTT) to establish a public Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) has been temporarily 
shelved. 
 
The enactment of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act in 1991 was monumental 
towards the liberalisation of the banking sector in Tanzania. The Act provided a legal 
framework which permitted major changes in the financial and banking sector, notably, 
the entry of private banks into the market (Wangwe and Lwakatare, 2004). As a result 
of this legislation, private banks were established and since then the number of 
102                                                                  4 Institutional Environment and Real Estate Investment 
banking institutions and banking activities have increased significantly. By February 
2010, there were already more than 40 banking institutions with more than 400 
branches all over the country (BoT, 2010). The effect of financial sector reform can 
also be seen in the growing number of micro-credit institutions which mainly serve 
people with limited access to large commercial banks. 
 
In the wake of the reforms, state owned banks have also been restructured. For 
instance, the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) was split into three entities namely, 
NBC (1997) Limited, National Microfinance Bank (NMB) and NBC Holding Corporation. 
The government sold 55% of its shares in NBC (1997) Limited to ABSA Group Ltd. of 
South Africa and 15% to the International Finance Corporation (IFC). In 2005 the 
government sold 49% of its shares in NMB to a consortium of investors led by Rabbo 
Bank of the Netherlands. The government in 2008 further sold 21% of its shares in 
NMB to the general public which thus made NMB a public company. During the initial 
public offering (IPO), NMB shares were oversubscribed by more than 200% (Daily 
News, dated 17 October 2008). The government also in 1996 restructured the Co-
operative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB) and came up with CDRB Bank 
Limited. Currently, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) holds 30% 
of CRDB Bank shares, 37% shares are held by members of the general public and the 
remaining 33% shares are shared amongst institutional investors. NMB and CRDB 
Bank are both listed at DSE. 
 
4.7 Impact of institutional reforms on the general economy 
Reform of political and legal institutions, which have mainly been effected by 
introducing new policies and legislation or amending the existing ones, has spurred 
changes in other institutions. Over the reform period, many private business 
organisations comprising both production and service firms have been established. 
Similarly, many policies, laws, regulations have been introduced to manage social and 
economic relations arising in the course of doing business. Social institutions have also 
been changing with the change in the political, economic and legal environment. Most 
of the laws enacted have been tailored to reflect the prevailing social institutions. As 
many authors (e.g. Williamson, 2009; Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005; 
Axelrod, 1997; North, 1994) insist, laws which take into account the good social and 
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moral norms, traditions and conventions of the society in question are more successful 
in their implementation. 
 
Institutional reforms have significantly improved governance, democracy and the 
economy. According to UNCTAD (2007), Tanzania is one of the countries whose 
economic reform programme has been very successful. The World Bank also 
acknowledges that Tanzania is one of the exemplary countries in Africa which have 
achieved relative success with the reform programmes (Lwiza and Nwankwo, 2002). 
Many institutions have been established and others significantly reformed to promote 
private sector investment activities. Many private businesses across all sectors of the 
economy have been established. The broader results of the reforms can be clearly 
seen in the changing trends of economic indicators, emergence and growth of different 
firms and markets. Some of the positive economic indicators recorded during the 
reforms period include steady GDP growth and FDI flow, declining inflation rate, 
increasing bank lending, and declining interest rate. (See Fig. 4.2) 
 
Figure 4.2: Trend of GDP growth and FDI flow from 1992 to 2010 
 
-
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
-
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
5.0 
6.0 
7.0 
8.0 
9.0 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
FD
I (
$ 
'0
00
,0
00
)
G
DP
 G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e 
(%
)
Year
GDP growth rate Annual FDI 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using various reports, 2011 
 
104                                                                  4 Institutional Environment and Real Estate Investment 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the period of institutional reforms has witnessed steady trends 
in both GDP and FDI flow. Over the last 10 years Tanzania’s GDP has been growing 
at an average annual rate of about 6% (MFEA, 2008). Over the same period FDIs 
have also increased by an average annual rate of about 20%. Between 1989 and 1998 
Tanzania recorded a 1,610% net increase in FDI, a rate which was one of the highest 
in Africa (Asiedu, 2002). The mining sector and privatisation of state owned enterprises 
are some of the areas that have attracted most of the FDIs (TIC, 2006). Similarly, 
during the early years of economic reforms, the annual inflation rate was very high, 
averaging 25%. As institutional reforms gained ground in the mid 1990s, inflation was 
significantly reduced until it stabilised at below 5% for some years before rising again 
in the late 2000s, mainly due to the global financial crisis and the hiking oil prices. The 
inflation trend is summarised in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: Trend of inflation from 1985 to 2010 
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Source: Author’s compilation using various Bank of Tanzania Economic Bulletins, 2011 
 
Many commercial banks have until very recently, been heavily investing in risk-free 
government securities which commanded high yield. The yield for treasury securities 
has most of the time exceeded the prevailing inflation rate, which made investment in 
such securities indeed risk free (Mpogole, 2006; Kongela, 2005). Such a lucrative 
business in treasury securities curtailed bank credit to private sector borrowers. 
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Besides, owing to a small number of lending institutions and the existence of high loan 
non-payment risk, lending rates in Tanzania have generally been very high (see Figure 
4.5). Cognizant of this problem, the government has from time to time reviewed its 
monetary policy to motivate commercial banks to increase their lending to the private 
sector (See Fig. 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: Trend of banks’ deposit and lending from 1993 to 2009 
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As shown in Figure 4.4, bank lending between 1993 and 2009 increased markedly. It is 
however also clear that, banks kept a significant amount of money without lending. 
Banks in Tanzania are allowed to lend up to 80% of the deposits, but over the period 
they only lent about 46%. This may suggest their assessment of lending risk. The 
lending rates have been very high, which has kept many potential borrowers out. High 
lending rates may have also increased incidents of defaulters. In the wake of growing 
commercial banking operations and improving business environment coupled with 
monetary policy controls, lending rates have slightly been decreasing (see Fig 4.5 next 
page). 
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Figure 4.5: Trend of bank lending-deposit rates spread from 2000 to 2011 
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Figure 4.5 shows a slightly falling trend of both lending and deposit rates between 
January 2000 and April 2011. Availability of credit and the declining trend of lending 
rates is one of the positive outcomes of institutional reforms. Although the lending-
deposit rate spread has not significantly changed, it is likely that with time and more 
reforms, the spread will finally significantly decrease. The high spread has been 
maintained to compensate for the perceived risks associated with bank lending in 
Tanzania (Mchechu, 2007). Another positive sign is that the trend of lending and 
deposit rates has over the same period largely mirrored that of inflation rate (compare 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5). 
 
4.8 Impact of institutional reforms on the real estate sector 
 
4.8.1 Increase in the property stock and performance 
Institutional reforms have had significant impact on the property investment sector. 
One of the positive impacts of the reforms on the property sector can easily be seen in 
the increase in the stock of modern buildings. In the wake of institutional reforms, 
demand for property across all sectors has increased significantly. This is mainly due 
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to growth in economic and administrative activity, urbanisation, and changing 
consumers’ taste in favour of modern residential and commercial accommodation 
(Kusiluka, 2008a). Similarly, the growing number of foreign investors and foreigners’ 
activities in the country has increased demand for prime office, residential and 
recreational properties. The yield of prime properties across all sectors has been 
relatively high over the recent years. For instance between 2007 and 2010, average 
returns for prime office, retail, industrial and residential properties was 10.8%, 11.8%, 
13.3% and 10.3% respectively (Knight Frank, 2011, 2009, & 2007). 
 
4.8.2 Legislation change and other initiatives 
Many investment opportunities have been created, property rights have been 
significantly improved and real property has become one of the attractive business 
sectors (Ndissi, 2003). The environment for international investors has been greatly 
improved through tax incentives, investment guarantees against nationalisation, 
expropriation and sudden changes in tax rates. During the reform period, property 
investment and ownership legislation has been significantly changed to respond to 
investors’ needs. 
 
Apart from the enactment of Tanzania Investment Act which addresses matters related 
to investment in general, there are many other pieces of legislation which have been 
particularly enacted to address real property related issues. Land Act and Village Land 
Act, both of 1999, are the two core pieces of legislation governing land ownership in 
Tanzania. Some of the important developments brought about by the two pieces of 
land legislation include the legal recognition of the monetary value of land. Prior to the 
enactment of these pieces of legislation, land in Tanzania was officially regarded to 
have no monetary value unless it had some improvements on it. 
 
Unit Titles Act, Mortgage Finance (Special Provisions) Act, and Financial Leasing Act, 
all enacted in 2008 are other key statutes which are paramount in promoting the real 
property investment sector. The Unit Titles Act has made it possible for people to have 
separate title deeds for different units in multiple-unit buildings such as blocks of flats, 
housing estates etc. It is now possible for one to buy, lease or mortgage a flat within a 
block of flats or a house within a plot with many housing units. Under this arrangement, 
developers can much more easily sell properties. The Financial Leasing Act, on the 
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other hand, has paved way for developers to obtain plant and equipment which are 
always needed during the construction phase of property development business. The 
new mortgage legislation has allayed fears amongst lenders, especially commercial 
banks which had reservations with the previous mortgage related legislation, especially 
on foreclosure issues (Sanga, 2004; Kironde et al, 2003). With the Mortgage Finance 
(Special Provisions) Act in place, more banks are likely to open windows for mortgage 
lending. Valuation and Valuers Registration Act and Real Estate Agents Act are other 
new pieces of legislation which are in the final stages of enactment. 
 
All these real property related pieces of legislation are mainly meant to improve 
performance in the real property sector in terms of increasing the number of 
transactions in landed property, controlling professional practice, creation and 
administration of multiple interests in property, increasing security to investors and 
consumers, and simplifying access into the property market by investors (Kusiluka, 
2008b). Apart from enacting new laws, some laws which were considered to be 
impediment to investment in real property have been repealed altogether. The Rent 
Restriction Act of 1984 and Land Ordinance Cap. 113 of 1923 are some of the laws 
which have been repealed. Repealing of the rent control legislation was another key 
decision. Landlords have now regained powers over their property, and observations 
show that tenants have now fewer excuses for delaying or defaulting rent payment 
(Kusiluka, 2009). 
 
There are many other completed and ongoing reform activities aimed at improving 
property rights, increasing efficiency in land delivery and administration process, and 
resolving land related conflicts. For instance, cognizant of the drawbacks associated 
with ill-defined property rights, the government came up with Property and Business 
Formalisation Programme, popularly known in Swahili as Mpango wa Kurasimisha 
Rasilimali na Biashara Tanzania (MKURABITA). The main purpose of the programme 
is to empower the poor majority of the population by improving access to formal 
financial markets and other services through formalisation of property rights and 
businesses (Pedersen, 2010). Out of the estimated 400,000 unregistered properties in 
Dar es Salaam, 220,000 properties were identified and documented during Phase I of 
MKURABITA (MoLHHSD, 2008). Completion of Phase I of MKURABITA enabled 
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owners of the identified properties to apply for residential licences from their local 
authorities. 
 
During this study, the government was also in the process of developing a 
comprehensive legislation on compensation. Issues of compensation, which mainly 
result from compulsory land acquisition carried out by the government, have for many 
years been among the main sources of land disputes in Tanzania (Kusiluka et al, 
2011). A move towards a comprehensive compensation piece of legislation is therefore 
aimed at minimising disputes which are prevalent in land acquisition incidents. During 
this study, reforms of systems in the office of the Commissioner for Lands were also 
underway. The reforms are aimed at addressing inefficiency, bureaucracy and 
corruption which are the problems that have for a long time been associated with land 
delivery and administration in Tanzania. One of the steps is to delegate and 
decentralise some of the Commissioner’s functions. In the process, Assistant 
Commissioners for different zonal offices were appointed. 
 
Reforms in the land sector also entailed strengthening of land dispute settlement 
machinery. In 2002, the Courts (Land Disputes Settlements) Act No. 2, which is the 
main legislation dealing with resolution of land disputes was enacted. According to 
Section 3(2) of the Act, courts that have jurisdiction to determine land disputes include: 
Village Council, Ward Tribunal, District Land and Housing Tribunal, High Court (Land 
Division) and, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. Despite being overwhelmed with 
pending cases, these courts have already resolved many land disputes (Kusiluka et al, 
2011). 
 
4.8.3 Improved access to finance 
Liberalisation of the business of banking institutions has increased availability of credit 
to property investors, among others (Mchechu, 2007; Sanga, 2004). Over the past few 
years, some banks have started issuing mortgage finance products. Commercial Bank 
of Africa, Azania Bank, Stanbic Bank and the International Commercial Bank are some 
of the banks offering mortgages. These are however very small banks and are unable 
to fulfil the demand for mortgage. Shortage of housing units is estimated at about 3 
million, which requires US $200 billion (Mchechu, 2008). Following the amendment of 
mortgage provisions of the Land Act and the enactment of Mortgage Finance (Special 
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Provisions) Act, more commercial banks are contemplating introducing mortgage 
products. Many commercial banks have now started lending money to people with 
permanent employment. Such loans are amortised through employees’ monthly salary 
deductions. This form of lending is also increasingly becoming a source of finance for 
homes. The reforms, which have enjoyed the support of international financial 
institutions, have also opened up possibilities for credit from international lenders 
(Kongela, 2005). 
 
During the final stages of this study, a mortgage finance institution namely, Tanzania 
Mortgage Refinance Company Limited (TMRC) was formed. The purpose of this 
institution is to support banks in mortgage lending by refinancing their mortgage 
portfolios. TMRC would operate as a private institution drawing a majority of its 
shareholders from commercial banks. CRDB Bank, National Microfinance Bank 
(NMB), Exim Bank, Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), Dar es Salaam Community Bank 
(DCB), and Azania Bank were the first shareholders. The initial lending by TMRC 
would come from a US $30 million loan from the World Bank. TMRC is expected to 
attract more banks into mortgage origination. 
 
4.8.4 Entry of new investors 
Another monumental decision, which has had major impact on property investment 
market, was the enactment of Public Corporations Act No. 2 of 1992. The legislation 
gave the administrators of parastatal organisations powers and freedom to make 
investment decisions for their respective organisations. As a consequence of this Act, 
parastatal organisations which formerly used to invest heavily in government securities 
have significantly increased their portfolio allocations to real property (Mpogole, 2006; 
Kongela, 2005; Geho, 2001). Pension funds have assumed a leading role in the 
property investment market. Other investors comprising both local and foreign 
companies are also fast emerging in the market. Even the National Housing 
Corporation (NHC), which is still a state owned enterprise, has increased its 
commercial operations. In recent years, faces and skylines of some large urban 
centres have noticeably changed with mushrooming modern buildings. 
 
4 Institutional Environment and Real Estate Investment 111 
 
 
4.8.5 Pension funds 
As a result of institutional reforms, assets of pension funds have over the recent years 
been steadily increasing. International Monetary Fund (2010) notes that pension fund 
assets grew exponentially over the last 3 years and accounted for 10% of GDP or 20% 
of total financial sector assets. The last two decades of reforms have witnessed 
pension funds make noticeable impact on the property market in Tanzania (Mpogole, 
2006; Kongela, 2005). These institutional investors are now regarded as prime 
‘property market movers’ (Geho, 2001). Following the enactment of the Public 
Corporations Act in 1992, pension funds massively embarked on property investment 
(Mpogole, 2006; Geho 2001). Over the past 15 years, pension funds’ portfolio 
allocations to real property have averaged above 20% (Kusiluka, 2008b; Kongela, 
2005). NSSF and PPF started investing in property much earlier than the other 
pension funds. Figure 4.6 summarises property allocations of the two pension funds. 
 
Figure 4.6: Trend of NSSF and PPF property investment between 1995 and 2010 
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Source: Author’s compilation using NSSF and PPF Audited Financial statements, 2011 
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NSSF real estate investment 
Currently, NSSF owns the largest share of real estate investments held by pension 
funds in Tanzania. By June 2010, the Fund’s total investment in real estate was 
estimated at TZS 200 billion. Some of the major real estate investments held by NSSF 
by June 2010 include Benjamin William Mkapa Tower with an estimated investment 
value of TZS 37.4 billion, Waterfront Building with estimated value of TZS 23.1 billion, 
and Mwanza Commercial Complex with an estimated value of TZS 14.6 billion. During 
this study, NSSF was also in the process of constructing affordable houses at Mtoni 
Kijichi in Dar es Salaam. By June 2010, the project was estimated to cost about TZS 6 
billion. NSSF also holds some indirect real estate investment through some private 
equities. As shown in Table 4.2, NSSF wholly owns Hifadhi-EPZ Properties valued at 
TZS 47.3 billion, 35% shares in Ubungo Plaza Ltd, 35% in Pension Properties Ltd, and 
35% in Azania Bancorp Ltd. 
 
Table 4.1: Selected real estate projects undertaken by NSSF 
Project description Amount 
invested 
(TZS billion) 
Year of 
completion 
Mandela Institute of Science and Technology (PPL) 38.72 2011* 
University of Dodoma Phase II 177.00 2011* 
University of Dodoma Phase II 100.90 2008 
Business Park for small traders (for 5,000 traders) 12.14 2008 
Police Houses (for 240 families)  20.00 2008 
TPDF Houses (for 248 families) 21.54 2008 
Government Houses Kijitonyama (for 200 families) 13.70 2006 
Kinyerezi low cost housing 2,110 2006 
Bunge Hall (PPL) 10.70 2005 
EX-Tazara Hospital (THI) 2.00 2005 
Mabibo Hostels (for 4,000 UDSM students) 16.40 2002 
252 Government Houses (CDA Dodoma) 2.40 1992 
Source: www.nssf.or.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=140&Itemid=225, Accessed 
22 March 2011 
 
*2011 is only expected completion date 
 
Until June 2010, NSSF had spent about TZS 178.8 billion to finance the construction of 
buildings of the University of Dodoma. This was treated as a loan to the government to 
which the University belongs. Besides, during this study NSSF was, through Pension 
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Properties Ltd, on the verge of spending TZS 38.7 billion to finance the construction of 
some of Mandela Institute of Science and Technology buildings in Arusha. The Fund 
also had advanced debt securities to Azania Bank Ltd. NSSF financial statements for 
the years ending June 2008/09 and June 2007/08 show balances of TZS 8.1 billion 
and TZS 5 billion debt securities advanced to Azania Bank for the respective years. 
The Fund also advanced TZS 10.2 billion to Pension Properties Ltd in debt securities. 
Table 4.1 summarises a selection of major real estate projects undertaken by NSSF. 
 
PPF real estate investment 
PPF started significant investment in real estate in 1995. This is mainly accounted for 
by the investible fund size and liberalisation of public corporations’ investment policies. 
As depicted in Figure 4.6, real estate allocations in the Fund’s portfolio grew sharply 
since 1995 and peaked at 70% in 1999. This was mainly due to the capitalisation of 
large real estate projects namely, PPF House, PPF Tower and Kijenge Residential 
Estate. The real estate percentage of the Fund’s portfolio started declining from 2000 
as there was no large single project commissioned since then. Over the years, the 
Fund has been constantly monitoring the size of real estate investment portfolio. From 
about TZS 6 billion in 1995, the Fund’s direct real estate investment portfolio had 
grown to about TZS 86 billion in 2009. Most of the Fund’s property investments are 
located in Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Mwanza cities. PPF has mainly invested in 
commercial and residential sectors, with little investment in hotels. 
 
PPF also holds indirect property investment through its shares in some private 
companies. The Fund holds 25% of the common shares of Pension Properties Ltd, 
46% of International House Properties Ltd, and 50% of PPF/NHC IPS Building Co. Ltd. 
PPF, along with NSSF and PSPF, also holds 35% shares in Azania Bank Ltd which is 
one of the few banks in Tanzania issuing mortgages. Like the other pension funds, 
PPF was during this study also involved in the financing of the construction of various 
buildings for the University of Dodoma. 
 
PSPF real estate investment 
PSPF, unlike NSSF and PPF, started investing in real estate relatively late. The first 
remarkable real estate investment was acquired when the pension fund purchased 
35% shares in Ubungo Plaza Ltd (UPL) by paying TZS 9.8 billion. PSPF also 
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purchased 36% of shares in International House Properties Ltd, in which TZS 4.9 
billion were paid. In 2005, the Fund purchased all shares of Quality Plaza Ltd by 
paying TZS 36 billion. PSPF also holds 30% shares in Pension Properties Ltd, which is 
the company that financed the construction of the modern parliament hall in Dodoma. 
Until June 2010, these were the main equity indirect real estate investments held by 
PSPF. The 2010 and 2009 Fund’s financial statements, show that all unlisted equities 
held by the Fund were in real estate private equities. Investment in unlisted equities 
accounted for 9.2%, 7.4% and 7.6% of the Fund’s investment portfolio for the years 
2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively. Besides, the Fund had until June 2010 spent about 
TZS 107 billion financing the construction of buildings for the University of Dodoma. 
This amount accounted for 40.7% of the Fund’s total investment in loans. 
 
During the time of this study, PSPF was also in the final stages of the completion of 
one the largest commercial properties in Dar es Salaam City. At the same time, the 
Fund was also contemplating constructing another large commercial property also in 
Dar es Salaam City. Plans were also underway to embark on a large affordable 
housing project which would see such houses constructed in Dar es Salaam, and other 
urban centres. These would be the first large direct real property investment to be 
owned by the Fund. 
 
LAPF real estate investment 
Like PSPF, LAPF started investing in real estate relatively late. Prior to 2006, the Fund 
operated as provident fund. Compared to the other three pension funds, LAPF is the 
smallest in terms of the size of its investment portfolio. Millennium Towers is the 
largest real estate investment owned by the Fund. This investment, then valued at TZS 
21.2 billion, was capitalised in 2005. LAPF also owns a number of residential 
properties in Dodoma Municipality but their values are insignificant compared to Fund’s 
investment portfolio. During this study, the construction of Millennium Towers Phase II 
was underway. Upon completion, the property will have significant effect on the Fund’s 
real estate investment portfolio holding. At the same period, the Fund was also 
engaged in the financing of the construction of Mwanza Shopping Complex in Mwanza 
City and modernisation of Msamvu Bus Terminal in Morogoro Municipality. LAPF also 
holds 10% shares in Pension Properties Ltd. Similarly, during this study LAPF was like 
other pension funds also engaged in the financing of the construction of buildings for 
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the University of Dodoma. During the same time, the Fund was also financing a TZS 
39.8 billion building project for Hombolo Local Government Institute. Apart from having 
shares in Pension Properties Ltd, LAPF also advanced debt instrument to the 
company. 
 
Table 4.2: Pension funds’ real estate related private equity holdings 
 NSSF PPF PSPF LAPF 
International House Properties Ltd. - 46% 36% - 
Ubungo Plaza Ltd. 35% - 35% - 
Pension Properties Ltd. 35% 25% 30% 10% 
PPF/NHC IPS Building Co Ltd. - 50% - - 
Azania Bank Ltd.* 40% 35% 14% - 
Quality Plaza Ltd. - - 100% - 
Hifadhi-EPZ Properties Ltd. 100% - - - 
Source: Compiled using various reports, 2011 
 
*Apart from other banking operations, Azania Bank is one of the few banks in Tanzania issuing 
mortgages. 
 
It is evident from Table 4.2 that all pension funds have invested in some forms of 
indirect real estate investment vehicles. The table only shows equity investment. As 
seen in the foregoing discussion, all pension funds also have debt instruments linked 
to real estate projects. Most of the debt instruments are associated with government 
borrowing. 
 
4.8.6 National Housing Corporation 
Apart from pension funds, National Housing Corporation (NHC) is another large real 
estate investor in Tanzania. From its establishment in 1962 until 1989, NHC managed 
to build 16,039 housing units (Bamanyisa, 2007; Kironde et al, 2003). In 1990 the 
government transferred to NHC all properties which were held by the Registrar of 
Buildings (RoB). Properties held by RoB were those nationalised in 1971 in the course 
of implementing socialist policies. 
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Figure 4.7: Trend of NHC investment income from 1991 to 2007 
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Source: Compiled from Various NHC Annual Reports, 2011 
 
As shown in Figure 4.7, despite rent control, NHC has been able to maintain a positive 
trend of its income over the reform period. It is also evident that over the same period 
annual income from its real estate investment has grown remarkably. The rental 
income has generally been rising by an annual average of more than 20% since 1992. 
Despite the steady rental income growth in absolute terms, this average annual rise 
i.e. TZS 1.4 billion, is small for funding new meaningful investment operations. Under 
the new management which came in 2010, NHC had become more aggressive in 
collecting rent and starting up new projects. According to the interviews with one of 
NHC senior officials, the plan in 2010 was to collect more than TZS 40 billion. 
 
4.8.7 Foreign investors 
Similarly, over the recent years Tanzania has witnessed the entry of foreign property 
investors and prospects for more foreign investors are high. Some of the large foreign 
real estate investors currently in Tanzania include Integrated Property Investments 
Limited (UK), CDC (UK), Island View (Botswana), African National Congress (South 
Africa), Aga Khan Foundation (UK) and a number of small investors from Middle East, 
India and China and some African countries (Kusiluka, 2008a). Some foreign investors 
who are contemplating setting up their investment in Tanzania include Rutley Capital’s 
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East African Real Estate Fund and African Real Estate Company (Schulte and 
Rothenberger, 2010; Rossiter, 2007). 
 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the three categories of investors i.e. 
pension funds, NHC and some foreign investors are the current real estate market 
drivers in Tanzania. Table 4.3 shows value estimate of direct real estate investment 
held by some of these investors. 
 
Table 4.3: Direct real estate investment holding by selected investors 
Investor Name 
Direct real estate 
allocation (TZS. million) 
Percentage of direct real 
estate allocation of the 
entire portfolio 
National Housing Corporation 1,500,000* 100% 
National Social Security Fund 200,441 19.5% 
Parastatal Pensions Fund 85,915 16.5% 
Public Service Pensions Fund 16,510** 2.4% 
Local Authorities Pension Fund 21,390** 10.3% 
Mlimani City 37,500*** 100% 
Integrated Property Investments Ltd. (IPI) 7,500*** 100% 
Source: Various Reports, 2011 
 
Note: 
*This is only a value estimate given during the interview in 2010. NHC books of accounts for the year ending June 
2007 show a different value i.e. TZS. 211 billion. 
 
** At the time of this study, PSPF and LAPF had large real estate construction work-in-progress projects. After 
commissioning of these projects, the amount invested in real estate will significantly increase. 
 
***Value estimates reported are only for the capitalised projects. Mlimani City and IPI had during this 
study some real estate work-in-progress. IPI plan was to invest US $ 500 million. During the finalisation 
of this study, Mlimani City was in the final process of being sold to another investor at an estimated price 
of US$ 77 million. 
 
As shown in Table 4.3, whereas NHC had almost everything allocated to direct real 
estate investment, the average allocation to direct real estate by pension funds was 
12.2% with NSSF recording the highest allocation i.e. 19.5% and PSPF the lowest i.e. 
2.4%. It is also clear that pension funds’ involvement in real estate market was far 
more than the direct allocations shown in Table 4.3. PSPF had, for instance, about 
more than TZS 50 billion invested in equities in private real estate equity companies. 
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Pension funds were also noted to be heavily involved in financing government projects 
such as construction of government employees’ housing and buildings for institutional 
uses. The four pension funds had, for instance, between 2006 and 2011 spent billions 
of money financing the construction of Dodoma University buildings, Hombolo Local 
Government Institute, and Mandela Institute of Science and Technology. NHC, on the 
other hand, had also embarked on a very ambitious housing construction programme, 
which was aimed at constructing about 3,000 housing units each year for the next five 
years, commencing 2010. Foreign investors were also during this study engaged in 
large projects whose completion would see such investors play a key role in the 
country’s market. 
 
4.9 Institutional phases and the property sector in Tanzania 
The preceding sections have provided an account of the Tanzania institutional 
environment over the three different periods. The sections have shown how the 
property investment sector has evolved over time. Figure 4.8 below briefly illustrates 
the three main epochs through which the property investment sector has evolved. 
 
Figure 4.8: Evolution of the Tanzania real estate investment market 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualisation, 2011 
 
Figure 4.8 provides a contextualised version of Figure 4.1. It is a brief summary of how 
institutional environment of the time dictated the growth of the property sector. It is 
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clear from the illustration that little growth was recorded during the colonial period. 
Prior to the colonial time, urban life was insignificant. Land was mainly used for 
subsistence agriculture, animal grazing and other livelihood activities. Land ownership 
was mainly along chiefdom, tribal or clan lines. Formalisation of land ownership started 
during the colonial period when the formal law according to which people started 
owning land was introduced. Similarly, during the colonial period, urbanisation was still 
very low and land was mainly used for plantation agriculture and other traditional uses 
that were in place prior to colonialism. However, it was during the colonial period when 
many modern large urban centres were established. Property development in urban 
centres during the colonial period was minimal and was mainly dominated by 
government properties and foreigners’ residences. The institutional framework during 
the colonial period was meant to serve the interests of colonial masters. The 
government did not support property investment ownership by the natives. Besides, Tanzania 
(then Tanganyika) being a trust territory after the Word War I discouraged the British 
and other foreigners from establishing long term investments for fear of losing them 
after the country attained independence. Development of urban property was one of 
the sectors that were negatively affected by this attitude. 
 
After achieving independence in 1961, new institutions providing opportunities to all 
people including the natives, were introduced. Market economy policies and structures 
were kept for only a few years after independence before a major ideological shift 
towards socialism was announced in 1967. All major means of the economy were 
placed under the direct control of the state. Most of the urban private properties were 
nationalised. The political and legal system during that period discouraged private 
property ownership. Foreign investors fled the country and local investors kept a low 
profile. The state became the only key player in the real property sector, which 
significantly retarded growth of the property sector. The property sector was dominated 
by government buildings and buildings belonging to state owned enterprises. Although 
the growth of the private property investment sector retarded during the socialist 
regime, the government initiatives had a significant impact on the overall growth of the 
property sector compared to the period prior to independence. The growth of the 
property sector recorded during the socialist regime can therefore mainly be attributed 
to the direct government’s initiatives towards property supply, especially in the housing 
sector. 
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It was not until the institutional reform period that property investment regained ground. 
The institutional reforms, which mainly entailed introducing market economy 
institutions and structures, have created a better investment environment for private 
investors. Over this period, growth of private investment sector has been remarkable. 
Many economic indicators have changed favourably, implying positive results of the 
reforms. Real property sector has also substantially benefited from the reforms. The 
reforms have attracted a wide range of property investors ranging from large 
institutional investors to foreign investors. The level of activity in the property sector 
has significantly increased. Firms providing professional services such as property 
agency, management and valuation have also increased markedly over the reform 
period owing to the increase in property development and investment activities. 
Reforms are still ongoing, more institutions (laws, regulations, rules etc.) are needed to 
realise the full potential of the market. Some of the areas requiring attention of the 
institutional reforms in order to improve the real property investment sector are outlined 
in the next section. 
 
4.10 Aspects requiring further institutional reforms 
 
4.10.1 Indirect property investment vehicles 
In order to realise the full potential of the property investment market, more institutions 
are required. So far the reforms have not been able to adequately address the problem 
of limited access by a large majority of common members of the public to property 
investment market. The property investment sector is still primarily dominated by large 
institutional investors and foreign investors. Capital intensiveness of real estate 
investment coupled with the absence of securitised investment vehicles market 
exclude small investors. Legislation, regulations and organisations to cater for indirect 
property investment vehicles such as REITs and mutual property funds are required. 
Existence of an active indirect property investment market would enable many 
investors ranging from small private investors to institutional investors, both local and 
foreign, to participate in real estate investment. Increasing the number of participants 
in the property market by introducing more affordable and inclusive forms of property 
investment will significantly address the problem of large capital sum associated with 
direct property investment. Oversubscription to IPOs is an indication of the presence of 
a large pool of funds that could be tapped. 
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4.10.2 Databank and property investment performance measures 
In the absence of some important property market institutions such as investment 
property databank, the property market is still shrouded in secrecy and market 
imperfections. Many property transactions go unrecorded, which makes it difficult for 
investors and other stakeholders to make informed decisions about the property 
investment market. In the absence of an investment property data bank and 
investment analysis regulations, the credibility and reliability of various investment 
reports produced by investors, professionals and consultants is low. Furthermore, in 
the absence of credible investment performance benchmarks and robust performance 
measurement techniques, observations show that institutional property investors in 
Tanzania mainly use return on investment (ROI) to measure property investment 
performance (Mpogole, 2006). ROI is only a partial measure of returns and is rather 
rudimentary. The measure is thus widely considered not to be suitable for property 
investment. Total returns (TR) measures are instead regarded to be more ideal. 
 
4.10.3 Dollarisation of the prime property investment market 
During the institutional reforms period, the local currency (TZS) has depreciated 
alarmingly against major foreign currencies. When the reforms were introduced, the 
local currency was relatively very strong. For instance, in 1985 the exchange rate 
between TZS and US $ was about TZS 18 for US $ 1, but in 2010 the exchange had 
shot to about TZS 1,500 for US $ 1, implying a 8,233% depreciation over only 25 
years. Depreciation in the local currency has resulted in the dollarisation of the prime 
property market sector. Rents and prices in the sector are normally quoted in US 
Dollars, although actual payment may be done in local currency based on the ruling 
exchange rate on the date of payment. Rental contracts based on US Dollar rent have 
adverse effect on tenants whose income streams are normally in the local currency. 
Local currency depreciation has always meant rising rent for such tenants. 
Dollarisation has also affected other sectors of the economy. International Monetary 
Fund (2010) also reports that Tanzania remains relatively highly dollarised country, 
with 30 percent of deposits and 30 percent of loans denominated in foreign currency. It 
is thus clear that new institutions (laws, regulations, rules etc.) are required to ensure 
that pricing in the property investment market sector is based on the local currency. 
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4.10.4 Corruption and property rights issues 
Despite the accomplishments recorded over the reform period, corruption is still rife in 
Tanzania. According to the 2009 Corruption Index released by Transparency 
International, Tanzania ranks 126 out of 180 countries with a score of 2.6. Real 
property is one of the sectors which are very vulnerable to corruption. The formal 
process of acquiring land is still time consuming, highly bureaucratic and sometimes 
attracts corruption. According to IFC (2009) one needs 328 days to complete 22 
necessary procedural stages involved in starting up a construction project in Tanzania. 
There are also issues of private property rights that still require further action. 
Investors, especially foreign investors still perceive Tanzania and Africa as a whole as 
a risky investment destination owing to insecurity of property rights (Rothenberger, 
2010; Lim et al, 2006). 
 
4.11 Chapter summary 
The three institutional phases experienced by Tanzania have clearly demonstrated 
how the property investment process is dependently connected to the prevailing 
institutional environment of the market setting in question. The level of property sector 
development in Tanzania over the three periods reflected and mirrored the prevailing 
institutional environment. The period prior to independence was characterised by 
colonial institutions and structures which did not support the majority of people, 
especially the natives, to take part in the investment activities. During that period, most 
of the formal institutions including the government sector were at their infant stages of 
development and the level of urbanisation was also still very low. 
 
The period after independence, prior to institutional reforms, was predominantly 
characterised by socialist institutions. The state controlled all major means of the 
economy thereby sidelining the private sector. Besides, during the socialist regime, a 
large number of private urban rental properties were nationalised. The state was the 
only key player in the property market sector. Most of the government initiatives in the 
property sector during this period were however mainly aimed at addressing the 
housing problem. Socialist policies significantly inhibited private property rights, which 
paralysed property sector growth. Persistent economic hardship experienced during 
the socialist period forced the government to switch back to market economy policies. 
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In the mid 1980s, the government started implementing institutional reforms, which 
marked the new institutional phase. During the period, many policies, laws, regulations 
and rules were changed to support market economy structures. The reforms have 
attracted many private investors including foreign investors. The government has 
significantly withdrawn itself from commercial activities by privatising more than 300 of 
its state-owned enterprises, which has significantly reduced government’s active role in 
commercial activities. Such a move has further catalysed growth in the private 
investment sector. The property sector has substantially benefited from the reforms 
which have attracted pension funds and other institutional investors into the property 
sector. Foreign property investors are also gradually entering the property market. 
Some commercial banks have started issuing finance for property development. 
Institutional reforms are still underway; there are still many aspects requiring the 
attention of the reforms. More institutions, in terms of policies, laws, rules and 
regulations are required in order to address such issues as corruption, poorly 
developed indirect property investment vehicles market, use of rudimentary investment 
performance measures and dollarisation of the prime property market etc. 
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5 Forms, Catalysts and Mitigation of Agency Problems 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of agency conflicts in real estate investment 
activities in Tanzania. The discussion demonstrates how agency conflicts arise in the 
real estate investment process and how investors deal with the conflicts. This chapter 
also partly shows how the prevailing informal institutions discourage the opportunistic 
behaviour of agents. The discussion is based on data elicited from semi-structured 
interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The semi-structured interviews were 
held with key informants selected from firms and institutions which play a key role in 
real estate investment in Tanzania. FGDs participants were selected amongst 
members of pension funds which are engaged in real estate investment. The data 
gleaned from the interviews is presented and discussed separately from that collected 
from FGDs. Agency problems faced by foreign investors in addition to those faced by 
all investors are presented and discussed last in the chapter. Matters requiring further 
treatment are identified and given further consideration along with survey results in 
chapter 6. 
 
5.2 Complexity of agency relationships network 
The central issue in the principal-agent relationship is how to get the agent to act in the 
best interest of the principal when the agent has informational advantage over the 
principal and has different interests than the principal (Rebernik and Bradac, 2006). 
Whereas employers, contractors and owners are the typical principals in many 
business undertakings, employees, sub-contractors and managers are the typical 
agents. For the purpose of this study, agents are divided into two categories, namely 
employees in the real estate investment activities and external contracting parties such 
as property managers, estate agents, building contractors, government agencies, etc. 
Figure 5.1 captures the scenario of this study. 
 
This study covers employees of both real estate investors and real estate service 
contractors. Investors (company shareholders and pension funds’ members) form the 
first category of principals. Depending on their roles, some investors’ employees, 
especially senior officials, also serve as principals of their subordinates and the 
external contracting parties. External contracting parties’ and their employees are 
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naturally agents of investors, although they also could have multiple levels of agency 
relationships. Agency contracting with external contracting parties in Tanzania is 
governed by the provisions of Part X (sections 134 to 189) of the Law of Contract Act 
of 1961. 
 
Figure 5.1: Different levels of agency relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualisation, 2011 
 
A network of agency relationships also exists within the external contracting parties’ 
set-ups. Most of these contracting parties usually exist as firms, mainly in the form of 
limited liability companies or partnerships, having owners and employees. The owners 
of the firms are automatically the principals and the employees are agents. Depending 
on the size of the firm, just like in any other organisation, a network of agency 
relationship exists between seniority ranks. Figure 5.1 shows the various levels of 
agency relationship and the resulting agency cost implication. The identified agency 
levels show the potential sources of agency problems and the cumulative effect of the 
problems. 
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All the principals shown in the diagram have to apply some remedies of agency 
conflicts to deal with the problem. Unfortunately such remedies, namely incentives, up-
front communication, evaluation and monitoring, cannot control for all possible 
slippage between the goals of the principal and agent. The ultimate agency costs i.e. 
monitoring by the principal, absent bonding by the agent, and residual loss arising out 
of a network of agency relationships in real estate are ultimately borne by the investor 
(Gibler and Black, 2004; Cieleback, 2004). 
 
5.3 Selection and composition of interviewees 
Several semi-structured interviews were held with key informants in the real estate 
industry in Tanzania. The aim was to understand the forms and catalysts of agency 
problems in the real estate investment activities. The interviews also sought to 
understand the mechanism used by the real estate investors in dealing with agency 
conflicts. Using the interviews, it was also possible to assess the effectiveness of 
institutional approaches in mitigating agency problems. A total of 40 key informants 
from various firms and institutions which play a key role in the real estate investment 
sector in Tanzania were interviewed. Most of the interviewees were drawn from 
amongst officials of pension funds, NHC and real estate consultancy firms. 
 
Interviewees from the four pension funds and NHC comprised both members of the 
management and the ordinary members of staff. All of these investors used both in-
house staff and outsourced experts to execute their real estate investment activities. 
Outsourcing of experts was necessitated by lack of qualified or sufficient number of in-
house staff. It was noted that, despite heavily investing in real estate, all pension funds 
had a very small number of employees with specialised4 training in real estate 
investment. NHC on the other hand was, apart from the central and local government, 
the single largest employer of real estate graduates in Tanzania. However, the 
Corporation still outsourced experts for some of its investment activities. 
 
Mlimani City, Integrated Property Investments (Tanzania) Ltd, CDC (formerly known as 
Commonwealth Development Corporation), and African National Congress (ANC) 
were the foreign real estate investors whose officials were interviewed. CDC was the 
owner of Aman Place Building and Barclays House, and ANC was the owners of 50 
                                            
4 Staff with specialised real estate training refers to employees who at the time of this study possessed 
at least a university degree in real estate investment related fields 
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Mirambo building. Whereas Mlimani City and Integrated Property Investments 
(Tanzania) Ltd. mostly used in-house staff to carry out most of their investment 
activities, CDC and ANC outsourced experts for most of the investment activities. For 
instance, all CDC and ANC investment properties in Tanzania were managed by 
Knight Frank (T) Ltd. 
 
Owing to the fact that all real estate investors covered in this study engaged private 
consultancy firms and individuals in executing some of their investment activities, this 
study also entailed interviewing real estate consultant firms’ officials. Other people who 
were considered to be key informants for the purpose of this study were also 
interviewed. Such people comprised a TIC official, land officers, government valuers, 
and researchers. The analysis of the interviews is presented and discussed under 
thematic sections 5.4 to 5.6 below. 
 
5.4 Forms of agency problems 
During the interviews, various forms of agency problems were mentioned by the 
various interviewees. The interviewees were asked to describe the forms of agency 
problems which were common at their workplaces or in the agency relationship in 
which they were involved. Table 5.1 summarises the different forms of agency 
problems described by the interviewees. 
 
Table 5.1: Forms of agency problems in real estate investment 
Form of agency problem No. of interviewees 
who cited the form of 
agency problem 
Percentage of the total 
(28 interviewees) 
Imperfect commitment 12 42.9 
Graft 10 35.7 
Diverting clients to competitors 7 25.0 
Unreported short period lettings 5 17.9 
Late banking or submission of cash receipts 10 35.7 
Currency exchange rate manipulation 5 17.9 
Conflict of interest 5 17.9 
Abuse or misuse of discretionary powers 10 35.7 
Theft 15 53.6 
Cheating 21 75.0 
Disclosure of confidential information 13 46.4 
Shirking 26 92.9 
Carelessness 20 71.4 
Overpricing of goods and services 22 78.6 
Source: Field interviews, 2011 
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A total of 28 individuals comprising real estate investors and consultants answered this 
question. A discussion of each of the forms of agency problems as recorded during the 
interviews which are presented in Table 5.1 is presented in sub-sections 5.4.1 to 
5.4.14 below. 
 
5.4.1 Imperfect commitment 
Imperfect commitment on the part of the principals was noted to be one of the common 
problems in many agency relationships. The problem entailed the principals reneging 
on their contractual duties and obligations. This tendency was more common in 
aspects which were not expressly provided for in the contracts. The problem was 
further aggravated by agency contracts being silent on remedies for interference from 
principals. It was noted from the interviews that some employers did not always fulfil 
their obligations to their employees, which resulted into frustration of employees. Some 
of the problems which were mentioned by the interviewees include late payment of 
agency fee or salaries, paying agents less amounts than the amounts previously 
agreed on, and delaying and sometimes rejecting reimbursing agents the money which 
they spent attending to some emergency cases related to their contractual activities. 
 
It was also reported that it was normal for some principals to interfere with their agents’ 
duties. For instance, all property managers interviewed complained that the tenant 
selection process was prone to principals’ or employers’ interference. They reported 
that, it was common for landlords or their official representatives to recommend some 
tenants to property managers and when the property managers expressed doubts 
about the credibility of some of such tenants, the landlords or senior officers would 
insist that they take them. During the interviews it was also reported that some senior 
officials of some of the parastatals covered in this study forced property managers to 
allocate rental space for their private firms or friends. To some extent, such actions of 
the senior officials undermined their moral authority to question the performance of 
property managers. 
 
5.4.2 Graft 
Some employees were reported to be deceptive to their employers and in some 
occasions they demanded bribes from sub-contractors. For instance, in an interview 
with a property manager who was then in-charge of one of the largest commercial 
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buildings owned by some pension funds, two cases involving unfaithful building 
caretakers were reported. In the first incident, the building caretaker grossly overstated 
the quantity of water supplied daily to the building. This was only possible because it 
was difficult to cross-check owing to the fact that water was constantly being 
consumed in the building. In the other incident, another building caretaker was secretly 
recorded in a telephone conversation threatening a service provider that unless he was 
given some money (bribe) he would not authorise service provider’s payment which 
was already due. According to the property manager, the service provider could no 
longer tolerate such frequent caretaker’s demands. He decided to report the matter to 
the property manager. 
 
Cases of corrupt employees were also frequently mentioned in the interviews with 
NHC officials. It was apparent that some NHC officials took bribes from tenants and 
prospective tenants prior to processing their various requests. Such a practice seemed 
to be common knowledge, but no significant actions were taken by NHC management. 
Even some senior government officials were reported complaining about malpractices 
within NHC. For instance, the Permanent Secretary of MoLHHSD was quoted by Daily 
News (dated 24 June 2010) acknowledging pervasiveness of corruption within NHC by 
saying that: 
 
…this is the leading corrupt institution…. workers take advantage to either sell or use the 
property of the public for their own interests …the public obviously knows that when it 
comes to NHC houses, it is all about corruption. 
 
Commenting on the statement made by the Permanent Secretary, The Guardian 
(dated 27 June 2010) in its editorial also added that: 
 
We are aware that in some places like Mwanza, Dar es Salaam and Arusha, tenants pay 
between TZS 10 million and TZS 100 million just to acquire a three-bedroom house for rent 
or business premises. The billions generated from these dubious transactions are pocketed 
by the unscrupulous tenants and their counterparts in the NHC. These dubious transactions 
have been going on, amongst whose notorious perpetrators are tenants of Asian origin who 
have converted the NHC into their personal property. Today, renting a National Housing 
Corporation house is a daunting task especially if you choose to go the right way, but for 
those who pursue the bribery route, the mission is accomplished in a blink of an eye. 
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5.4.3 Diverting clients to competitors or their own firms 
The problem of diverting clients to competitors seemed to be a common practice by 
some agents. This was frequently mentioned by the interviewees amongst property 
managers and investors. The problem involved unfaithful employees who referred 
company’s clients to other companies from which they apparently received secret 
payments. This problem was reported to occur when clients were looking for office 
space to rent and houses to buy. Existence of this problem was a clear indication that 
some employees did not abide by their job contracts nor did they observe the code of 
conduct. 
 
5.4.4 Unreported short-period lettings 
Some agents were reported to have secretly rented properties without reporting to their 
principals. Such cases were reported to be more likely to happen with residential 
properties in which the agents or employees let houses or office space to short-time 
tenants, typically one month, without reporting to their head offices. The money 
collected from such term lettings was pocketed by the unfaithful agents or employees. 
In these arrangements, the agents or employees involved required such tenants to pay 
them only in cash. This problem was reported in the interviews with both real estate 
investors and real estate managing firms. 
 
5.4.5 Late banking or submission of cash receipts 
Incidents of delaying the banking of cash collected from tenants by the officials in 
charge of the task were mentioned by the property managers and investors 
interviewed. It was revealed that some unfaithful officials held for some time the money 
collected and used it for private purposes or deposited it in their private bank accounts 
in order to earn some interest. This was only possible because some tenants paid their 
rent in cash. Cases of non-submission or late submission of cash were also reported to 
be common in valuation jobs. In such cases, some unfaithful valuers working for 
private firms did not submit or submitted late the money collected from their clients. 
This resulted into such valuers being terminated from service or their valuation firms 
being suspended from carrying out contracted services with some reputable clients, 
especially banks. One of the interviewees reported that his firms had sacked 3 valuers 
for such behaviour. The same interviewee also reported that Barclays Bank had 
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suspended some valuation firms on similar grounds and on property value inflation 
allegations. 
 
5.4.6 Currency exchange rate manipulation 
In many prime commercial buildings rent was quoted in US Dollars but tenants were 
not obliged to make actual payment in Dollars. It was acceptable for tenants to pay an 
equivalent amount of shillings based on the exchange rate prevailing on the payment 
date. It was revealed in the interviews with property managers and investors that some 
unfaithful officials in charge of rent collection played with exchange rates. Such officials 
kept the cash collected for some days until the exchange rate was favourable to them 
so that they could change the money received in US Dollars to Tanzania Shillings or 
vice versa. They kept the exchange gain and remitted the balance. In their reports to 
their principals or employers, they altered the dates the money was collected from 
tenants. This problem was not only limited to rent; it was also reported to exist in 
property sale transactions. 
 
5.4.7 Conflict of interest by employees 
It was reported during the interviews that some property employees involved in 
property management and agency were secretly running their own businesses which 
were similar to those of their employers. This resulted into conflicts of interest since it 
was possible for the employees to compete for clients with their employers. It was 
clear that the employees involved in such conflicts of interest were aware that they 
breached their employment contracts. It was therefore very difficult to notice them 
because they tried to hide their ownership of such firms. Interviewees amongst 
property managers cited poor compensation and lack of job security to be some of the 
main reasons for this problem. 
 
5.4.8 Abuse and misuse of discretionary powers 
Some officials entrusted with powers to make decisions on behalf of their principals or 
employers sometimes apparently abused their powers. This was reported to be 
common with senior officials of public institutions. Capitalising on the difficulty in 
detecting some of their malicious actions or omissions, some unfaithful employees 
apparently made decisions which they would not have made if the business had been 
their own. Exemplifying the problem, some interviewees cited some actions of senior 
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officials of pension funds and NHC. All the in-house real estate professionals 
employed by pension funds who were interviewed, complained that they were 
marginalised or sidelined in the real estate investment decision making process. 
Despite not having adequate expertise in real estate investment, members of the top 
management of those pension funds were reported not to be very keen in utilising the 
in-house experts for key real estate investment decisions. The in-house real estate 
staff members of pension funds also complained that even when consulted, their 
advice was rarely taken seriously by the top management. Failure to fully utilise the in-
house real estate experts in investment decisions apparently resulted into sub-optimal 
investment decisions. 
 
It was however also reported by some of the interviewees that, sometimes members of 
the management of pension funds did not involve the in-house real estate staff 
because they were also apparently under pressure to take investment ideas imposed 
by those above them e.g. Board of Trustees, the government and politicians. 
Investment ideas imposed from higher authorities were unlikely to undergo a rigorous 
investment appraisal process. Members of the top management teams only ratified 
those decisions. Real estate investment resulting from investment ideas imposed from 
higher authorities only by sheer luck ended up as good investments. Pension funds 
and NHC managements were frequently cited by some interviewees to be more prone 
to orders from politicians. 
 
5.4.9 Theft 
Cases of agents stealing assets of their principals were common in many activities. In 
real estate activities theft was reportedly more common with money, building materials 
and other tangible assets. Control of money theft was however much easier compared 
to that of building materials and other tangible assets. It was common for officials 
involved in the building construction projects to steal some building materials 
especially those materials whose quantity could not be easily ascertained by simply 
looking at the completed building. It was revealed from the interviews with investors 
and property managers that, the building materials which were highly susceptible to 
this kind of theft were cement, gravel, bricks/blocks, and reinforcing steel. With these 
materials, it was practically difficult to establish the exact amount actually used when 
the building was handed over to the owner. Theft was also noted to be common with 
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equipment and equipment parts. Theft of such items was reported to be mostly done 
by building caretakers and technicians. 
 
5.4.10 Cheating 
Cheating was reported to be common when employees (of both consultancy firms and 
investors) were required to produce evidence showing how money advanced to them 
was spent. From the interviews with property managers and investors, several 
cheating were reported. For instance, it was reportedly normal for officials to present 
forged receipts and invoices. Sometimes, officials lied to have spent money for some 
activity or that they had spent their own money to perform some activities while they 
actually had not. Owing to the nature of the responsibilities, engineers, foremen, 
building caretakers and building managers were the ones most associated with these 
problems. For instance, it was reported that it was common for building caretakers or 
managers to exaggerate facts while reporting on defects in buildings or equipment 
(power generators, water pumps, vehicles, air conditioners, fire extinguishers etc.) so 
that they could be advanced more money to correct the defects. Sometimes building 
caretakers, managers or procurement personnel asked suppliers to overstate the 
amount of money in their invoices. 
 
5.4.11 Disclosure of confidential information 
Some employees and agents purposely used employer’s or principal’s confidential 
information for personal gains or just carelessly. From the interviews with both 
investors’ officials and senior officials from consultancy firms, this problem was 
reported to be particularly common with officials involved in tender preparation and 
evaluation. Such officials normally gave inside information to the bidders of their 
choice. These officials in return were paid for the information. Sometimes such officials 
gave insider information to their relatives who were among the bidders. It was also 
possible for some officials to award jobs to firms in which they had undisclosed 
(conflict of) interests. Sometimes employees or agents disclosed confidential 
information to friends in normal conversations by giving the ‘don’t quote me’ disclaimer. 
Such problems in tender management in parastatal organisations were also reported 
by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG, 2011). 
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5.4.12 Shirking 
Shirking was noted to be the most common form of agency problem in real estate 
investment activities. Every interviewee amongst people who executed their duties as 
principals complained about some of their agents, employees or subordinates being 
lazy or not showing full commitment to their duties (shirking). This problem mainly took 
the form of spending unnecessarily long time to perform simple tasks, late coming to 
places of work and early leaving from places of work, taking unnecessarily long time 
for lunches and other breaks, applying of unnecessary leaves of absence or exemption 
from duties (EDs). The problem was however reported to be more common with 
employees and was particularly a serious problem with junior staff members. 
 
5.4.13 Carelessness 
Carelessness was one of the problems mentioned by all interviewees amongst 
investors and consultants. This problem was noted to be mainly observable in the 
misuse of principal’s assets and unprofessional treatment of customers/clients. This 
problem was noted to be very common with employees or agents whose job contracts 
were for a short term or approaching expiry. Knowing that after a short time they would 
no longer benefit from the job, they apparently did not care much about their principal’s 
or employer’s assets or clients. Vehicles, furniture and equipment were some of the 
assets that were subject to misuse and abuse by agents. It was also reported that 
some property managing agents whose non-renewable contracts were about to expire, 
did not care about any events (problems or benefits) occurring subsequent to their 
contracts. For instance, some of such agents were not interested in negotiating for 
long term leases with tenants. Other agents postponed solving tenants’ problems, 
buying time for their contracts to expire. Some agents were reported to make 
unrealistic promises to tenants knowing that at the time of their fulfilment they would no 
longer be in charge. 
 
5.4.14 Overpricing of goods and services 
From the interviews with both investors and consultants, it was noted that overpricing 
of purchases was also very common. The problem also accompanied the purchase of 
poor quality goods and services. These problems were reported to be common with 
both investors’ employees and external contracting parties such as property managing 
agents and building contractors and their employees. Some unfaithful employees who 
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were somehow involved in the procurement process made secret agreements with 
suppliers of goods and services to overprice their goods and services. The excess 
money was either all taken by these officials or was shared with the suppliers. A 
replica of the problem was also reported to be common with unfaithful employees of 
the property managing agents and building contractors. 
 
5.5 Catalysts of agency problems 
Whereas the cause of agency conflicts is information asymmetry that exists between 
the principal and agent, the extent of the problem differs from one place to another or 
from one time to another depending on the prevailing circumstances and measures in 
place to mitigate the problem. During the interviews, each interviewee was asked to 
identify catalysts of agency problems which were common at their workplaces or in 
other agency relationships in which they were involved. Table 5.2 summarises the 
identified catalysts of agency problems. 
 
Table 5.2: Catalysts of agency problems in real estate investment 
Catalyst of agency problem No. of interviewees 
who cited the catalyst 
of agency problems 
Percentage of the 
total (32 
interviewees) 
Loopholes in some laws 14 43.8 
Society condoning illegally acquired wealth 15 46.9 
Competition with peers 22 68.8 
Financial pressure 17 53.1 
Greed 25 78.1 
Weak controls and monitoring difficulties 13 40.6 
Ineffectiveness of the existing formal institutions 12 37.5 
Compliance with workplace norms and culture 12 37.5 
Stiff competition for jobs 11 34.4 
Feeling of unfair treatment 9 28.1 
Bounded rationality 9 28.1 
Uncertainty in the social security system 9 28.1 
Weak agent monitoring systems 8 25.0 
Exclusion of agents in decision making 8 25.0 
Low or absence of salaries 8 25.0 
Agent selection process 7 21.9 
Agency contracts being prepared by agents 6 18.8 
Mode of agent remuneration 6 18.8 
Multi-phase projects 5 15.6 
Source: Field Interviews, 2011 
 
A total of 32 individuals comprising real estate investors, consultants and employees 
answered this question. A discussion of each of the catalysts of agency problems as 
recorded during the interviews which are presented in the Table 5.2 is presented in 
sub-sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.19 below. 
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5.5.1 Loopholes in some laws 
Some agency problems were reported to be mainly motivated by both implicit and 
explicit provisions in the various laws, creating a room for agents to pursue 
opportunism. This was particularly common with parastatal organisations, whose 
statutes gave a lot of powers to the government officials and politicians or gave their 
executives discretionary powers on some sensitive matters. About 44% of the 
interviewees cited weaknesses in the provisions of various statutes to be one of the 
catalysts of agency problems. The author also made a detailed review of some of the 
statutes. Several loopholes were identified. Table 5.3 summarises the main loopholes 
for opportunism observable in the various pieces of legislation of the parastatal 
organisations relevant to this study.  
 
Table 5.3: Loopholes for agency conflicts in parastatals’ legislation 
Name of 
organisation Legislation and loopholes for agency conflicts 
 
National Social 
Security Fund 
(NSSF) 
 
 
NSSF was established by the National Social Security Fund Act No. 28 of 
1997. The extracts below highlight some of the provisions touching on 
agency relationship and loopholes for agency conflicts. 
 
 One of the duties of the Board of Trustees is to protect, safeguard 
and promote the interest of the insured persons (Section 56b). This 
shows the agency role of the Board. 
 
 The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed by the President of 
the United Republic of Tanzania and other Board members shall be 
appointed by the Minister responsible for social security affairs. The 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry responsible for social security 
shall also be a Board member (Section 53, First Schedule 1). This 
shows the immense powers the government enjoys over pension 
funds, and thus the potential for pursuit of opportunism by 
politicians. 
 
 The Director General shall be appointed by the President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania (Section 4(2)). This practice has a 
potential of attenuating Board’s supervisory effectiveness as the 
Board is not the one appointing the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
 Benefits rates shall be reviewed from time to time and adjusted in 
line with actuarial valuation of the Fund (Section 48). This provision 
gives a room for the government to manipulate benefits. It also 
creates uncertainty in the actual amount of benefits a member 
should expect upon retirement. 
 
 The Minister shall give the Board various directions (Section 60). 
This shows immense powers vested in the Minister and 
government, which creates a room for pursuit of opportunism. It also 
allows the Minister to interfere in Board’s decisions such as Board’s 
decisions (as per section 62) to invest the money in economically 
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Name of 
organisation Legislation and loopholes for agency conflicts 
and commercially viable ventures. 
 
 The Minister shall have powers to make regulations on various 
aspects of the Act (Section 89). The provision shows immense 
powers vested in the Minister and government, which creates a 
room for pursuit of opportunism. 
 
 In case of Fund’s inability to meet its liability, the benefits are to be 
paid from the Consolidated Fund (Section 64). This shows 
government’s commitment to members of pension funds, which is 
however doubted by some members following reneging tendencies 
of the government. 
 
 
 
Parastatal Pensions 
Fund (PPF) 
 
PPF was established by Parastatal Pensions Act No. 14 of 1978, and 
Parastatal Pensions (Amendments) Act No. 25 of 2001. The extracts below 
highlight some of the provisions touching on agency relationship and 
loopholes for agency conflicts. 
 
 The Board of Trustees shall hold assets of the Fund as trustees of 
the insured persons i.e. members of the Fund (Section 12). One of 
the duties of the Board shall be to protect, safeguard and promote 
the interest of the member (Section 19b). This shows the agency 
role of the Board. 
 
 Permanent Secretary in the Ministry for Finance shall be the 
chairperson of the Board of Trustees and other members (between 
4 and 8 members) shall be appointed by the Minister (Section 17, 
First Schedule). This shows the immense powers the government 
enjoys over pension funds, and thus the potential for pursuit of 
opportunism by politicians. 
 
 The Board shall have powers to employ consultants, agents and 
contractors (Section 13(d)). The Board shall also have powers to 
delegate some of its duties (Section 21). This shows powers of the 
Board to create sub-agents, resulting into a complex agency 
relationship network. 
 
 The Minister shall have powers to amend, vary or replace all or any 
provisions of the First Schedule of the Act (Section 17(4)) and to 
make regulations (Section 51). This shows immense powers vested 
in the Minister and government, which creates a room for pursuit of 
opportunism. 
 
 Subject to the approval of the Minister, the Board shall invest 
surplus money in viable venture (Section13). Such a provision 
creates a room for politically motivated decisions. 
 
 The Minister may give the Board various directions (Section 23). 
This provision also shows immense powers vested in the Minister 
and government, which creates a room for pursuit of opportunism. 
 
 In case of Fund’s inability to meet its liability, the benefits are to be 
paid from the Consolidated Fund (Section 52 as per Amendment 
Act No. 25 of 2001). The provision shows government’s 
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Name of 
organisation Legislation and loopholes for agency conflicts 
commitment to members of pension funds, which is however 
doubted by some members following reneging tendencies of the 
government. 
 
 
Public Service 
Pensions Fund 
(PSPF) 
 
PSPF was established by the Public Service Retirement Benefits Act No. 2 
of 1999. The extracts below highlight some of the provisions touching on 
agency relationship and loopholes for agency conflicts. 
 
 The Board of Trustees shall hold assets of the Fund as trustees of 
the members of the Fund (Section 35). This shows the agency role 
of the Board. 
 
 The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry for Finance shall be the 
Chairperson of the Board of Trustees and other Board members 
shall be: Permanent Secretary in the Ministry responsible for civil 
service, Attorney General, Governor of the Central Bank of 
Tanzania, Treasury Registrar, Secretary General of Tanzania Union 
of Government and Health Employees (TUGHE) and other 3 
members shall be appointed by the Minister (Section 52). This 
shows the immense powers the government enjoys over pension 
funds. The provision also shows heavy presence of government 
officials in the Board to ensure that government’s interests are 
protected. 
 
 The Director General shall be appointed by the President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania (Section 34(1)). This has a potential of 
attenuating Board’s supervisory effectiveness as it is not the one 
appointing the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
 The Board meeting quorum shall be chairperson and any other four 
members. The presence of more than four government officials in 
the Board creates a possibility for government representatives alone 
to make key decisions. 
 
 The Board shall have powers to appoint its officer and employees 
(Section 34(2)). The Board shall have powers to delegate some of 
its duties (Section 55). This shows powers of the Board to create 
sub-agents, resulting into a complex agency relationship network. 
 
 Board members allowances shall be determined by the Minister 
upon recommendation of the Board (Section 53(3)). This gives room 
for Board members to overpay themselves. 
 
 The Minister shall have powers to make regulations on various 
aspects of the Act (Section 36). This shows immense powers vested 
in the Minister and government, which creates room for pursuit of 
opportunism. 
 
 The Minister may give the Board various directions (Section 62). 
Similarly, this shows immense powers vested in the Minister and 
government, which creates room for pursuit of opportunism. 
 
 In case of Fund’s inability to meet its liability, the benefits are to be 
paid from the Consolidated Fund (Section 46). This shows 
government’s commitment to members of pension funds, which is 
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Name of 
organisation Legislation and loopholes for agency conflicts 
however doubted by some members following reneging tendencies 
of the government. 
 
 
Local Authorities 
Pension Fund 
(LAPF) 
 
LAPF was established by the Local Authorities Pensions Funds Act No. 9 of 
2006. The extracts below highlight some of the provisions touching on 
agency relationship and loopholes for agency conflicts. 
 
 The Board of Trustees shall hold assets of the Fund as trustees of 
the insured persons i.e. members of the Fund (Section 12). One of 
the Board’s functions shall be to protect, safeguard and promote the 
affairs of the members of the Fund (Section 11b). These provisions 
assign the Board an agency role. 
 
 Permanent Secretary in the Ministry responsible for Local 
Government shall be the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees. 
Other Board members shall be: Permanent Secretary in the Ministry 
of Finance, Attorney General and 7 other members appointed by the 
Minister responsible for local governments (Section 10, First 
Schedule). 
 
 The Director General shall be appointed by the President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania (Section 8). This has a potential of 
attenuating Board’s supervisory effectiveness as it is not the one 
appointing the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
 Board allowances shall be determined by the Minister upon 
recommendation of the Board (First Schedule 1(2)). This gives room 
for the Board members to overpay themselves. 
 
 The Board shall have powers to employ consultants, agents and 
contractors (Section 13(d)). The Board shall have powers to 
delegate some of its duties (Section 14). This shows powers of the 
Board to create sub-agents, resulting into a complex agency 
relationship network. 
 
 If the Board is unable to meet its liability to its members, the benefits 
shall be paid from the Consolidated Fund (Section 53). This shows 
government’s commitment to members of pension funds, which is 
however doubted by some members following reneging tendencies 
of the government. 
 
 Subject to the approval of the Minister, the Board shall invest the 
money in any economically and commercially viable venture 
(Section 48). Such a provision deprives the Board of its powers to 
make decisions, and creates room for politically motivated 
decisions. 
 
 The Minister shall make regulations related to the Act (Section 81). 
This shows immense powers vested in the Minister and 
government, which creates room for pursuit of opportunism 
 
 
Social Security 
Regulatory Authority 
(SSRA) 
 
SSRA was established by the Social Security (Regulatory Authority) Act No. 
8 of 2008. The extracts below highlight some of the provisions touching on 
agency relationship and loopholes for agency conflicts. 
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Name of 
organisation Legislation and loopholes for agency conflicts 
 
 In 2010 SSRA was established by the President of the United 
Republic of Tanzania by appointing the Chairperson of the Board 
and the Chief Executive Officer and the Minister appointing other 
Board members. SSRA is meant to supervise pension funds. 
Viewed differently, SSRA adds another agency level which has the 
potential for agency problems, and hence more agency costs to be 
borne by pension funds’ members. 
 
 The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed by the President of 
the United Republic of Tanzania (Section 7). Other Board members 
shall be: Treasury Registrar, Labour Commissioner, and other five 
members who shall be appointed by the Minister responsible for 
social security affairs (Section 7). This shows additional government 
powers over pension funds. 
 
 The Director General shall be appointed by the President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania (Section 7). This potentially presents a 
problem to the Board supervisory role as it is not responsible for the 
appointment of the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
 There shall be a Social Security Tribunal whose members shall be 
appointed by the Minister responsible for social security affairs 
(Section 43). This provision yet shows immense government powers 
over pension funds.  
 
 There is overlapping of functions of SSRA and those of the Central 
Bank of Tanzania (BoT). For instance, section 48 of SSRA Act 
provides that BoT shall have powers in issuing investment 
guidelines and monitoring to ensure compliance with the guidelines. 
Under the same section, the Act also provides that BoT shall prevail 
on all financial matters. The Act, however, in Section 59, provides 
that in case of conflict in the laws, SSRA shall prevail. As a result of 
such conflicts, International Monetary Fund (2010) recommends 
amendment of SSRA Act to clarify the roles and functions of the 
different institutions. 
 
 
National Housing 
Corporation (NHC) 
 
NHC was established by the National Housing Corporation Act No. 2 of 
1990. The provision below shows loopholes for agency conflicts. 
 
 The Chairperson of the Board shall be appointed by the President of 
the United Republic of Tanzania (Section 5(2)). Other Board 
members are appointed by Minister responsible for housing matters 
(Section 5(2)). The Director General shall also be appointed by the 
Minister (Section 18). This has a potential of attenuating Board’s 
supervisory effectiveness as it is not the one appointing the Chief 
Executive Officer. 
 
 
It is evident from the highlights in Table 5.3 that the government and politicians have 
immense powers to dictate terms in the decisions made by pension funds managers. 
The law gives the government excessive powers to interfere in the operations of 
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pension funds. Despite having the exclusive right of enacting laws, the government 
also has powers to appoint almost all key executives of pension funds and other 
parastatal organisations. For instance, the President of the United Republic of 
Tanzania appoints both Chairpersons of Board of Trustees and the Chief Executive 
Officers of pension funds. This practice undermines the effectiveness of Boards of 
Trustees in supervising the CEOs because they are not appointed by the respective 
Boards. This situation was also noted by the Controller and Auditor General, who 
advised that all members of the management of parastatal organisations should be 
appointed by the Boards of Trustees (CAG, 2011). The CAG also noted delays in 
appointing executives whenever their positions for some reasons fell vacant. Their 
positions are for a long time occupied by acting officials. This may be due to many 
duties being concentrated in the President. 
 
Another major problem noted was imperfect commitment by the government. Although 
it is expressly provided in every pension fund statute that the government shall take 
the responsibility of paying members dues in case their respective pension funds are 
unable to meet the liability, fresh memories from how the government had handled the 
issue5 of employees of the former East African Community (EAC) cast doubts as to 
whether the government would really honour its commitment with the local pension 
funds should they become unable to pay their members’ dues. Cases of reneging by 
the government are also reported by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). The 
2009/2010 CAG Report on the Audit of Public Authorities and other Bodies, for 
instance, shows how the government had been delaying paying PSPF debt amounting 
to TZS 58 billion (CAG, 2011). Government reneging tendency was also noted in the 
delayed disbursement of funds to PSPF to pay for Fund’s current in-service members’ 
benefits accruing prior to 1 July 1999 for the Fund’s, which were to be funded by the 
government. Such government’s behaviour jeopardised the solvency of the Fund. 
 
The highlighted weaknesses in the existing laws also serve as evidence of 
weaknesses in corporate governance institutions. For a detailed discussion on 
corporate governance refer to subsection 2.8.2 of chapter 2. Many of the agency 
                                            
5 Since 1977, the Government of Tanzania has been in a dispute with the former employees of the 
former East African Community regarding their terminal benefits. During this study, there was a civil 
case at the High Court of Tanzania with respect to the matter. Several times, the former employees 
have used demonstrations to increase pressure on the Government and the Court to yield to their 
demands. 
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conflicts existing in the investment activities of pension funds and NHC could be 
addressed by applying corporate governance principles. 
 
5.5.2 Society condoning illegally acquired wealth 
About 47% of the interviewees expressed their concern that moral decay was 
increasingly becoming a serious problem in Tanzania. The interviewees cited several 
examples suggesting an upsurge in immorality in the society. For instance, they 
noticed that unlike during the socialist era, the society had become less strict on illicit 
ways through which some members of the society obtained wealth. Following 
liberalisation of the economy, some individuals have been acquiring wealth quickly 
through less transparent means. Some evils such as corruption, embezzlement of 
employers’ funds, forgery, theft (especially of public assets) and tax evasion were 
gradually being institutionalised and implicitly being condoned by the society. Rich 
people, no matter how they obtained their wealth, were increasingly being considered 
as icons of the society and worthy of emulation by others. Some interviewees argued 
that, the respect the people with wealth received from the society motivated some poor 
members of the society to pursue immoral means of acquiring wealth. Such a situation 
suggests failure of informal institutions in addressing vices. In such a society it is likely 
to find people with opportunistic behaviour. Many authors (e.g. URT and PCCB, 2009; 
PwC, 2008b; Sitta, 2005; Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002; The Report of the 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry against Corruption, 1996) report on the 
institutionalisation of corruption and other social vices in Tanzania. It was clear from 
the interviews that what was happening in the society had also apparently affected 
people in the real estate sector. 
 
5.5.3 Competition with peers 
Competition for wealth and material possessions was cited by 68.8% of the 
interviewees to be one of the main reasons for opportunistic habits. It was reported 
that some employees found themselves in competition for wealth or material 
possessions with peers within the organisation or those in other organisations. Desire 
to own cars, houses and other valuable items just like their former school or university 
mates was cited to be the main reason for such employees getting involved in 
opportunistic behaviour at their places of work. This problem was more commonly 
associated with relatively new employees, especially young employees, whose 
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salaries were relatively low. A comparatively high standard of living compared to ones 
salary is reported by Niehoff and Paul (2000) as one of the signs indicating that the 
employee may be involved in embezzlement. Some interviewees amongst real estate 
investors and consultants wondered how some of their junior employees these days 
were able to own and run cars given their modest salaries. Some pointed out that 
some of such employees were overburdened with debts from banks, employers and 
colleagues. 
 
5.5.4 Financial pressure 
About 53% of the interviewees mentioned financial pressure to be one of the factors 
that force employees or agents into undesirable behaviour. This problem was 
reportedly common with people of all age and gender, although it was noted to be 
more common with lowly paid employees. This observation concurs with the one 
reported by Niehoff and Paul (2000) who note that employees prone to engage in theft 
are generally young and face economic pressure. Some of the common causes of 
financial pressure reported during the interviews include extended families demands, 
indebtedness, premarital/extramarital relationships, lump sum annual rent bills etc. 
Normally, all employed members of poor families in Tanzania are expected, apart from 
providing for their own families, to take care of their parents, pay school fees for their 
brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces and sometimes also give financial support to their 
grandparents, uncles and aunts. 
 
This placed heavy responsibility on such family members and sometimes enticed 
some employees into dishonesty at their workplaces. In trying to fulfil some of these 
responsibilities, some employees were forced to borrow from banks, micro-credit 
institutions, friends etc. This resulted into indebtedness, which consequently enticed 
some of the employees into opportunistic tendencies. Demands associated with 
premarital or extramarital relationships were also cited as one of the causes of 
financial pressure to some employees or agents. Lump sum annual housing rent 
demand notes were also reported to be one of the causes for frustration, especially for 
the young and lowly paid employees. 
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5.5.5 Greed 
It was pointed out by 78.1% of the interviewees that some agents or employees were 
involved in opportunistic tendencies because of greed. Such people were not in 
financial difficulties but their desire was to see that they accumulated more wealth 
regardless of whether or not their actions meant pursuit of dishonest means of 
acquiring of wealth. The problem of greed could not be associated with one group of 
employees or agents; it was reportedly observable in people of all age groups, gender, 
education, income status, and marital status. However, greed is more associated with 
highly paid individuals. Greed is also cited in URT and PCCB (2009) and Warioba 
Commission Report (1996)6 to be the main cause of grand corruption in the public 
sector in Tanzania. 
 
5.5.6 Weak controls and difficulties in monitoring 
While some companies had weak controls for some activities, other activities were also 
difficult to monitor, which tempted some employees or agents to engage in some 
undesirable activities. Such cases were reported to be common with agents or 
employees who were in charge of purchases, renting, and property sales. In case of 
purchases, agents or employees were reported to collude with suppliers to overprice 
their goods or services. For the case of renting, agents or employees rented houses 
but delayed reporting to their principals or employers. This was purposely done and 
entailed a secret arrangement between the agent or employee and the tenant. The 
tenant in turn paid the agent or employee some money (less than normal rent) for the 
unreported period. This was noted to be common with small office space and short 
term residential renting. 
 
5.5.7 Ineffectiveness of the existing formal institutions 
Despite the on-going institutional reforms in Tanzania, the effectiveness of many of the 
newly introduced institutions is still a question of debate. It was agreeable by 37.5% of 
the interviewees amongst investors, consultants and employees that respect for, and 
compliance with, state enforced laws was still a problem in the society. This was 
observable in people from all social classes and status. Politically and economically 
influential people in the society were apparently regarded to be above the law. This 
has sometimes rendered law enforcement less effective. Under this situation, the use 
                                            
6 Warioba Commission Report refers to the Report of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry against 
Corruption which was released in December, 1996. 
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of formal institutions such as legislation and corporate governance institutions in 
mitigating agency problems in real estate investment activities has equally not always 
been effective. Although many laws, rules and regulations addressing agency conflicts 
were in place, the problem was still pervasive. This experience observed in Tanzania 
is supported by observations made by Williamson (2009) and Tabellini (2008), who 
affirm that newly introduced formal institutions take time to be internalised in the 
society. 
 
Another situation involved tenants illegally creating sub-leases. In some cases, this 
also was reported to involve employees or agents of the landlords. This practice was 
more pronounced with NHC properties. Most of NHC properties were located in prime 
areas but their rent was very low compared to market rent. For that reason, it was very 
difficult to get accommodation in those properties because no tenant was willing to 
release a space even when they no longer needed the space. Instead, some NHC 
tenants who were no longer in need of space, or those who wanted to make ‘profit 
rent’, decided to sub-let the space without following stipulated procedures. Owing to 
the mutual benefit nature of the subleases, both tenants and sub-tenants were not 
motivated to share such information with the main landlord i.e. NHC. It was noted 
during the interview with one NHC official that in some cases, NHC officials who 
became aware of such arrangements were bribed by the tenants so that they would 
not report the matter to the higher authorities, or take appropriate actions. 
 
Weakness in controls has widely been reported to be one of the main causes of losses 
in business entities. Poor internal control systems often provide employees with 
opportunity to steal. Many theorists believe that most people will steal if given a chance 
(Niehoff and Paul, 2000). Approximately 75% of all employees in USA, for instance, 
have reportedly stolen from their employers on at least one occasion, and that many 
engage in theft as a regular part of their workplace behaviour (Niehoff and Paul, 2000). 
NHC, like many other parastatal organisations, has for a long time been known to have 
relatively weak internal controls. This might partly explain why an organisation with 
assets worth about TZS 1,500 billion only collects less than TZS 40 billion (i.e. 3% of 
the value) rent annually. 
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It was also evident from the interviews with NHC officials that some of the 
Corporation’s external contracting parties showed opportunistic behaviour. NHC 
Director General was also quoted by The Daily News (dated 29 March 2011) reporting 
to the Parliamentary committee that one company that had signed a contract to 
manage some NHC housing units in upscale Masaki and Oysterbay suburbs in Dar es 
Salaam profiteered from tenants instead. He revealed that the company would charge 
a tenant US $ 52,000 per month and remit to NHC only US $ 15,000, thereby making 
US $ 624,000 per annum and remitting to NHC only US $ 180,000. 
 
Government institutions were some of the major rent defaulters in NHC properties, 
which apparently made the rent arrears recovery exercise much more complicated. For 
instance, out of TZS 5.7 billion rent arrears balance in February 2011, TZS 1.4 billion 
(about 25%) was due from tenants amongst various government institutions (Daily 
News, 29 March 2011). Such a huge rent arrears balance from the government 
institutions suggests difficulties in dealing with some government institutions some of 
whose officials may be seniors or appointing authorities of the NHC executives. This 
case and many other cases show that government is one the opportunistic agents in 
NHC operations. 
 
5.5.8 Compliance with workplace norms and culture 
It was reported by 37.5% of the interviewees that some employees learnt bad habits 
from their peers or even from experienced co-workers. Such groups at place of work 
had long established norms which condoned undesirable behaviour such as forgery, 
cheating, theft etc. Sometimes, such undesirable informal institutions were reported to 
be so powerful that they could even threaten the wellbeing of good employees. Earlier 
research has also revealed that group enforced sanctions on employees who stray 
from norms are seen as more influential than any threat of sanctions from 
management (Hollinger and Clark, 1983). The perpetrators may sabotage the work of 
good employees so that they can be fired or rated as poor performers by employers. 
 
Many other authors have reported the influence of norms on employees’ behaviour. 
For instance, Greenberg (1997) notes that one of the main factors influencing theft at 
workplace is group norms that condone, encourage, or fail to discourage such 
behaviour. Informal norms have a stronger influence on employee theft than formal 
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rules and regulations (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997). Niehoff and Paul (2000) also 
note that, depending on the strength of the group norms, new employees may not only 
feel encouraged to, but compelled to steal. 
 
5.5.9 Stiff competition for jobs and desperation 
Jobs for real estate consultants and employment vacancies for real estate graduates 
and professionals were still relatively scarce and competitive in Tanzania, which 
stiffened competition for the jobs. In order to increase their chances of winning the 
jobs, it was reported in the interviews with real estate investors and consultants that 
during job tendering or job interviews some agents or job applicants overstated their 
qualifications or capacity to perform the job. Some interviewees also pointed out that 
job applications were normally accompanied with very cosmetic curricula vitae of the 
applicants. It was also learnt that some agents or job applicants were so desperate for 
jobs and were willing to risk lying about their real qualifications and suitability for the 
jobs when applying for them. The agency problems experienced in this situation were 
mainly those of adverse selection nature. 
 
5.5.10 Feeling of unfair treatment 
Perception of unfair treatment was mentioned to be one of the reasons for employees 
or agents getting involved in actions that resulted into agency problems. Many 
interviewees amongst employees cited low remuneration in lucrative projects to be one 
of sources of employees’ discontent. For instance, an employee of one of the 
consultancy firms, whose employment contract was one of those unwritten (refer to 
subsection 5.5.15), was quoted during the interview complaining that: 
 
I was involved in a key role in a project which earned my employer more than TZS 400 
million but I was only paid TZS 2.4 million. This has been very demoralising and has 
catalysed my hatred towards him. 
 
Preferential treatment of employees or agents was also mentioned to be another 
reason for involvement in behaviour that led to agency problems. Inequitable treatment 
of employees has been previously reported as one of the major causes of employees’ 
deviant behaviour. Greenberg (1997) comments that, when a resource allocation 
decision is implemented inconsistently across employees or is based on inaccurate or 
biased information, an employee’s sense of procedural injustice is stirred. In coping 
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with such frustrations and to compensate for the unfairness, an employee may strike 
back at the organisation (employer) by engaging in theft at workplace (Giacalone and 
Greenberg, 1997). 
 
5.5.11 Bounded rationality 
Analysis of interviews also shows that 28.1% of the interviewees acknowledged the 
fact that sometimes agents or employees were inevitably placed in some 
circumstances which led them to make sub-optimal decisions. This situation can be 
best explained using the bounded rationality concept. Bounded rationality is a school 
of thought about decision making that developed from dissatisfaction with the 
“comprehensively rational” economic and decision theory models of choice 
(Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Bounded rationality, as opposed to perfect rationality, 
asserts that decision makers are intendedly rational; that is, they are goal-oriented and 
adaptive, but because of human cognitive and emotional architecture, they sometimes 
fail, occasionally in important decisions (Jones, 1999). The concept takes into 
consideration that decision makers have to work under three unavoidable constraints 
namely, limited and often unreliable information regarding possible alternatives and 
their consequences, limited capacity of human mind to evaluate and process the 
information that is available, and limited amount of time to make a decision. Under 
such circumstances, even individuals who intend to make rational choices are, in 
complex situations, bound to make only satisfying, rather than maximising or 
optimising choices. 
 
5.5.12 Uncertainty in the social security system 
Lack of a comprehensive social security system was frequently mentioned during the 
interviews to be one of the reasons for people engaging in opportunistic activities. 
Although all employees in the formal sector in Tanzania were compelled by the law to 
be members of pension funds, it was noted that not all employers remitted pension 
contributions for their employees. Besides, some employees did not even have formal 
employment contracts, which gave room for employers not to remit monthly 
contributions to pension funds for such employees. Above all, despite the pension 
funds receiving 20% of employee’s gross salary every month, the employee was not 
guaranteed certainty of proportional income upon retirement or any eventuality that 
would result into one losing a job. During this study, NSSF was the pension fund that 
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was paying the highest minimum monthly pension annuity, which was TZS. 85,000. 
Given the constantly rising cost of living, this amount was too low to support a 
pensioner’s life. 
 
Members of pension funds in Tanzania had been in a constant struggle to ensure that 
the pension sum they are paid or entitled to, reflects their salaries and price levels. The 
current social security system in Tanzania does not provide any guarantee of secure 
life after retirement or loss of job for some reasons. Laws governing pension funds are 
subject to change any time at the wish of the government in power. Such uncertainties 
associated with social security system, force employees to resort to other alternatives 
of securing their future. 
 
It was also noted that many small employers (real estate consultants) did not have 
health insurance cover for their employees. Such employees were under pressure to 
ensure that they always had some money to be able to pay for medical services 
whenever they (or their dependants) were sick or needed medical attention. This 
problem was exacerbated by lack of a comprehensive health insurance system in the 
country. The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) covered only a small section of 
the population and was still not very popular amongst employees in the emerging 
private sector. Under such circumstances, one could rule out the possibility of 
employees getting involved in incidents that led to agency problems. 
 
5.5.13 Weak agent monitoring systems 
Some employers, especially those in the public sector were noted to have a weak 
agents or employees monitoring system. Employees were loosely supervised, which 
allowed some of their undesirable behaviour to go unnoticed. Besides, most of the 
interviewed employers in this category admitted not having objective performance 
evaluation system for their employees, which resulted into employees’ shirking 
behaviour (laziness), carelessness and underperformance. Lack of strict monitoring 
and performance evaluation in the public organisations can be associated with less 
emphasis on performance requirement imposed on the managers of those 
organisations. This can be supported by the assertion made by participants of focus 
group discussions (for analysis of FGDs, see section 5.7) that the appointment and 
monitoring system of senior pension funds’ officials was fraught with the problem of 
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favouritism. The monitoring weakness in these organisations had originated from the 
topmost level and infiltrated the levels of the organisation structure through the lowest 
level. 
 
5.5.14 Exclusion of agents in decision making 
Cases of principals or employers not consulting agents or employees when making 
some decisions were also reported to be common. Interviewees amongst agents and 
employees showed that sometimes employees felt that they were being marginalised 
by their principals or employers or bosses. One of the scenarios cited was that of some 
pension funds’ top managements not consulting in-house real estate specialists when 
making key decisions or sometimes ignoring their professional advice. 
 
A similar scenario was reported by the interviewees amongst property managers that 
some landlords interfered with agents’ duties. This was particularly common in the 
selection of sub-agents, mainly service providers. Such landlords instructed their 
agents to engage certain service providers. According to the interviewees, most of the 
sub-agents selected by landlords were arrogant and did not regard the main agents 
(property managing agents) as their principals. Such an attitude undermined the role of 
the main agents and rendered the supervision of sub-agents ineffective. The two 
scenarios reported above are likely to demoralise agents or employees, and could 
attract laziness (shirking), carelessness and lack of maximum commitment for the job. 
Such actions by principals or employers may even motivate agents or employees to be 
involved in sabotage. 
 
5.5.15 Low or absence of salaries 
Low salaries and sometimes lack of salaries at all were reported to be some of the 
main reasons for employees’ involvement in opportunistic tendencies and other 
undesirable behaviour. Low salaries were also cited by Mbele (2009) to be one of the 
main reasons for some employees in the real estate sector in Tanzania to engage in 
corrupt practices. Like in many other employment sectors, employees in the real estate 
sector were paid salaries which were not index-adjusted. It was clear from the survey 
(see chapter 6 for detailed discussion) that the amount of salary they received was not 
even enough to cover basic needs such as decent accommodation, food, transport, 
medical services, utilities, providing for extended families etc. From the enquiry of 12 
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real estate consultancy firms based in Dar es Salaam, it was established that the 
average net salary paid to a graduate employee was about TZS 300,000. This amount 
was generally considered by the interviewees to be inadequate to finance all basic 
needs. 
It was also reported that some employers did not pay their employees regular salaries. 
This was noted to be common with employers amongst small real estate consultancy 
firms. Normally, such employers did not have written employment contracts with their 
employees, instead there was an oral agreement or promise that payments would be 
job-based. Even with such oral terms, it was not always easy to ascertain the exact 
amount one would receive. Such employees were uncertain regarding the amount, 
regularity and security of income. It was also revealed that some consultancy firms 
paid their staff, especially valuers, on job basis. It was established from the interviews 
with some consultancy firms’ officials that for small jobs, valuers were normally paid 
about 20% of the valuation fee. It was however noted that, clients normally paid their 
fees in instalments and sometimes very late, which kept the valuers in income 
uncertainty. 
 
It was noted to be common practice for most landlords in Tanzania to demand lump 
sum payment of annual rent in advance. It was established from some interviewees 
and from author’s further enquiries that annual expenditure on accommodation for a 
normal employee in Dar es Salaam was relatively high (ranging from TZS. 2,400,000 
to 3,600,000). Quite a significant portion of one’s income was thus spent on housing. 
Rents tended to decline towards the suburbs but commuting or fuel costs and traffic 
congestion seemed to offset the difference. Another common complaint from the 
interviewees was the high inflation rate which constantly eroded the purchasing power. 
It was noted that although some employers reviewed salaries on annual basis, the 
salary increase did not mirror the inflation rate. Under such circumstances, chances of 
employees getting involved in incidents that led to agency problems were increased. 
 
5.5.16 Agent selection process 
Due to high competition for jobs, some agents were sometimes tempted to cheat. It 
was pointed out in the interviews that often job bid proposals were written to impress 
tender evaluators. With such proposals it was sometimes possible to get tender 
evaluators deceived and end up selecting incompetent consultants, while rejecting 
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competent consultants. Real estate investors (principals) sometimes engaged 
consultants (agents) to select agents. This was common with jobs that required 
specialised expertise. This automatically increased investors’ exposure to agency 
problem. It was pointed out in the interviews that having incompetent tender evaluation 
personnel often resulted into rejecting good agents and awarding jobs to less 
competent agents. It was also mentioned that selection of less competent agents was 
sometimes motivated by corrupt behaviour of members of tender evaluation teams. 
 
Agency fee was noted to be a tricky subject when selecting suppliers of real estate 
services amongst bidders. Some bidders quoted very low fees, tempting principals to 
pick them. Agents selected on very low fee basis were reported to have difficulties 
delivering quality services or goods. During this study, property management fee for 
commercial properties ranged between 1.8% and 3.5% of the rent collected. Some 
interviewees who had considerable experience in property management warned that a 
fee of below 2% was too low for profitable and efficient discharge of property 
management duties. This concern was raised in connection with their observations 
regarding some ‘desperate’ agents who would quote very low fees just to win jobs, 
without considering the impact on service delivery. It was also noted that whereas 
some agents charged letting and re-letting fees, others did not. Letting and re-letting 
fees were based on a percentage of annual rent. Other agents demanded to be paid a 
fee equivalent to one month rent. It was also established from the interviewees that, 
management fee for residential properties was slightly higher and would go as high as 
7% of the rent collected. Lack of uniformity in the activities of property managing 
agents was apparently caused by the absence of a special institution to regulate the 
business. 
 
Fees charged by other professionals providing some real estate services are regulated 
by some institutions. For instance, fees for professional architects and quantity 
surveyors are stipulated in the Architects and Quantity Surveyors (Registration) Act, 
2010. Section 51(1) of the Act provides that: 
 
Every architect, quantity surveyor and every firm shall be bound by the scale of fee, 
prescribed by the Board notwithstanding any provision in any other law, regulations or by-
laws of the authority, association, institute, society or organization to which he is a member. 
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Engineers Registration Board (ERB) also stipulates and regulates professional fees 
charged by individual engineers and firms. Fees charged by other contractors in the 
real estate sector were often determined by market forces, contractors’ reputation, 
quality of services, etc. Foreign consultancy firms normally charged higher fees than 
local firms. Large and well established firms or individual consultants also normally 
charged higher fees than firms or individuals with less experience. 
 
5.5.17 Agency contracts being prepared by agents 
It was revealed in the interviews with property managing agents that agents were 
sometimes requested by their principals (investors or their representatives) to prepare 
agency contracts. This was especially reported to be common with some pension 
funds. The main reason for this was that some principals did not have adequate 
knowledge of property management related activities. Besides, owing to the infancy of 
the real estate investment market, there were no many lawyers in the market 
specialising in real estate management issues. Leaving the duty of agency contract 
drafting to the agent, apparently provided an opportunity for agents to create loopholes 
in the contracts. 
Defending the practice of requesting agents to prepare agency contracts, the Director 
General of one of the pension funds stated that: 
 
‘‘I do not see any risk in letting the agent prepare the agency contract as long as the 
principal had opportunity to read the contract before signing it.’’ 
 
This defence given by the Director General did not however allay all the fears in the 
practice because it remained doubtful as to whether such principals (investors) 
possessed the necessary expertise in real estate management matters to ensure 
completeness of the agency contracts in addressing agency problems. 
 
5.5.18 Mode of agent remuneration 
The fee charged by agents in real estate activities in Tanzania were either 
predetermined fixed amount commissions or percentages of rent collected or capital 
value (in case of property sale agency). Both modes of agent remuneration potentially 
attracted agency problems. It was reported (though by only 18.8% of the interviewees) 
that the problem with some agents whose fees were fixed amounts was that they 
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apparently did not put maximum effort in discharging their duties apparently because 
they would not be rewarded for additional efforts, at least in the short run. 
 
On the other hand, some of the agents whose fees were pegged on the amount of rent 
collected were reported to have sometimes used unprofessional methods of collecting 
rent. Incidents of use of excessive force in collecting rent from defaulters or evicting 
the defaulters were also reported, especially with auctioneers. Some landlords, e.g. 
NHC and NSSF, sometimes engaged auctioneers to collect rent from rent defaulters. 
The auctioneers were sometimes also instructed to evict tenants who failed to pay due 
rent. Some of the auctioneers were reported to have behaved unprofessionally or used 
excessive force, which sometimes culminated into civil or criminal matters. It was 
noted from the interviews with real estate investors’ officials that some of the 
employees of the investors were also reported to mishandle tenant eviction exercises. 
Incidents of employees being personally prosecuted or sued for unprofessional 
handling of tenants’ eviction or rent collection exercises were noted with some NHC 
employees. 
 
5.5.19 Multi-phase projects 
It was noted to be common in Tanzania for real estate investors to engage the same 
agent(s) in different phases of the same project. For instance, there were high chances 
for the agent who carried out the feasibility study of the project to later on be engaged 
in the marketing or management of the same project. Although the agents would be 
the same, each phase of the project constituted a different engagement. Such a 
practice was reported to have sometimes motivated opportunistic agents to give 
investors advice that would likely create another opportunity for them in future, without 
paying maximum attention to the investor’s interest. One of the interviewees 
representing a foreign real estate investor blamed one local consultant for having 
assured the investor of the possibilities of raising finance from local institutional 
investors, which motivated the investor to embark on one project. To the contrary, due 
to difficulties in raising funds from the earlier on proposed local institutional investors, 
the project ended up stalling for a long time. 
 
Such opportunistic behaviour by consultants was also cited (though by only 15.6% of 
the interviewees) to be one of the reasons for some large real estate projects stalling 
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or late completion. Some of the projects which were cited by the interviewees to have 
been adversely affected by such actions of agents include Mlimani City (a US $ 80 
million project) and Bahari Beach (a US $ 500 million project). Two of the interviewees 
also blamed consultants for delays in the completion of the 23-storey Benjamin Mkapa 
Tower whose construction cost was estimated to be more than TZS 35 billion. After 
spending TZS 15.7 billion, the building project stalled for some years until it was 
politically (by then Prime Minister) rescued by forcing the project owners (NHC and 
TPDC) to hand it over to NSSF (Mpogole, 2006). The problem of dishonesty and 
incompetence of agents and other facilitators in the real estate business in Tanzania 
has also previously been reported by Miller III and Shlman (1999). 
 
5.6 Techniques of mitigating agency problems 
During the interviews, all individuals who were performing their duties as principals or 
employers were asked to name and explain the techniques they used in dealing with 
various agency problems. A total of 28 individuals comprising real estate investors and 
consultants answered this question. As summarised in Table 5.4, the interviewees 
revealed several techniques which they apply to mitigate agency problems. 
 
Table 5.4: Techniques of mitigating agency problems 
Technique of mitigating agency problems No. of 
interviewees 
using the 
technique 
Percentage of 
the total (28 
interviewees) 
Career goal assessment 14 50.0 
Salary needs assessment 21 75.0 
Use of referees’ reports 23 82.1 
Use of training institutions to identify potential employees 17 60.7 
Verification of documents 12 42.9 
Use of probationary periods 19 67.9 
Use of term job contract 8 28.6 
Assessment of other attributes 28 100 
Salaries and other incentives 20 71.4 
Professional treatment of employees 8 28.6 
Use of code of conduct 13 46.4 
Regular reporting of work progress 17 60.7 
Surprise visits and checks 15 53.6 
Use of measuring and surveillance equipment 6 21.4 
Use of financial management software 1 3.6 
Regular communication with sub-contractors 4 14.3 
Making payments through banks 22 78.6 
Regular shifting of staff between working stations 19 67.9 
Source: Field interviews, 2011 
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Dealing with agency problems in the real estate investment activities of the selected 
firms entailed two stages. The first stage was during the recruitment of employees or 
agents. The problems at this stage were those of adverse selection nature. The 
second stage was during job execution. This stage involved mainly dealing with moral 
hazard problems. A discussion of each of the techniques used to mitigate the agency 
problems as recorded during the interviews which are presented in the table above is 
presented in sub-sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 below. 
 
5.6.1 Techniques applied during recruitment 
As aforementioned, steps taken at this stage were aimed at checking adverse 
selection problems. The steps outlined below are those which were noted to be 
normally applied by principals or employers, as elicited from the interviews with 
investors and consultants. It is important to note however that not all the techniques 
were applied by each principal. 
 
5.6.1.1 Career goal assessment 
Applicants for different jobs in real estate related activities were normally asked to 
provide a brief statement of their career goals. The employer or the recruitment officer 
normally assessed the career goals of every applicant to see whether or not the 
applicant would be able to achieve the goals without causing any harm to the 
employer. Assessment of careers goal was also done when interviewing the employee. 
This technique was noted to be mostly applied by private investors and some 
consultancy firms. The technique was also noted to be applied by private staff 
recruitment firms such as Deloitte and Touché, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and 
Young, KPMG and some local human resource consultancy firms. These firms were 
increasingly being engaged by parastatal organisations when recruiting staff for senior 
positions. 
 
5.6.1.2 Salary needs assessment 
Employers also normally required job applicants to indicate their salary expectations. 
Job applicants were sometimes also required to state the salary they were getting in 
their current jobs. The employer then compared the job applicant’s salary expectations 
with the market salary for the job in question and the qualifications of the applicant. 
The job applicant’s salary expectations were also compared with employer’s ability to 
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pay. Such an assessment enabled employers to determine whether or not and how the 
job applicant’s expectations would be met. 
 
5.6.1.3 Use of referee’s reports 
When applying for jobs, applicants were normally required to give names and contact 
details of their referees. Employers or recruitment officers then asked the referees to 
give their reports (oral or written) regarding the suitability of the applicants for the jobs 
applied. Sometimes referees were also asked questions about applicant’s general 
behaviour and personal conduct. In some cases, employers sought advice or 
professional opinion from other people who had good knowledge of the applicants. 
Such people were normally not those recommended by the applicants. This was done 
to eliminate the risk associated with relying on recommendations from referees picked 
by the applicants, most of whom would be individuals having good relationship with the 
job applicants and thus unlikely to comment negatively on the applicants. 
 
Referees reports and other enquiries about job applicants made by employers prior to 
awarding job contracts were meant to find out whether the job applicants had 
outstanding formal and informal qualities suitable for the jobs. Interviewees amongst 
employers indicated to be mainly interested in social and intellectual qualities of the job 
applicants. The criteria used by principals in real estate investment activities in 
Tanzania are similar to those suggested in some literature. Greaver (1998), for 
instance, points out that the information principals normally collect during recruitment 
include agent’s financial situation, reputation, strengths, cooperation with clients, 
superior performance, management capabilities, and commitment to continuous 
improvement, transition experience, trust, security and confidentiality, positive attitude, 
good cultural fit, flexibility, cost-consciousness, willingness to share cutting edge 
knowledge, and shared approach to problem solving. This list captures both formal and 
informal aspects of the agent. 
 
5.6.1.4 Use of training institutions to identify potential employees 
Some employers normally requested university departments’ heads or individual 
academic staff members to identify or recommend good final year students for job 
interviews. In their requests, the employers normally described to the university 
departments’ heads or to individual academic staff members the nature of the job and 
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the kind of people they liked to employ. The practice of contacting university 
academicians to recommend job candidates was reported to be common with 
employers in the private sectors i.e. private real estate investors and consultant firms 
in this respect. Pension funds and NHC were forced to strictly abide by public 
procurement procedures, which insisted transparency in, among others, the 
recruitment exercise of all public institutions. 
 
5.6.1.5 Verification of documents 
Cheating, by job applicants, was reported to be a serious problem. This was especially 
very common with applicants for junior job positions. Several forms of cheating were 
reported. For instance, some applicants indicated to have completed their studies 
while they had actually not. This case was reported to be common with final year 
university students who got supplementary examinations in their final examinations. 
Some of such students would not disclose to their employers that they did not 
complete their studies. Other jobs’ applicants submitted forged transcripts of results 
and certificates. It was also reported to be common for job applicant among fresh real 
estate graduates to write in their CVs that they were members of several professional 
bodies such as TIVEA, NCPS and AfRES, while they were not. To address the 
problem, all third party documents submitted by job applicants were verified by 
contacting the issuing authorities. For instance, to cross-check the authenticity of 
academic certificates and results transcripts, copies of such documents were normally 
faxed to the respective learning institutions. A similar procedure applied for certificates 
issued by professional bodies. 
 
5.6.1.6 Use of probationary period 
Many employers normally gave a probationary period to their new employees. The 
length of the probation normally depended on the sensitivity or seniority of the job 
position in question. It was generally noted that senior job positions had longer periods 
of probation compared to junior job positions. If the employee did not satisfy the 
employer during probation, the employment contract was terminated immediately or 
upon expiry of probationary period. From employers’ experience as noted during 
interviews, employees were very keen not to show their weaknesses when they were 
on probation, but after they confirmed some of them changed significantly. Employers 
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who were interviewed also complained that under the current labour laws, it was very 
difficult to terminate employment contracts. 
 
5.6.1.7 Use of term job contract 
It was also noted during the interviews that two opposing approaches seemed to be 
adopted by different employers. Some employers were in favour of permanent 
employment contracts for their employees while others preferred using short-term 
renewable employment contracts. Those who used permanent contracts argued that 
such contracts gave job security to employees, which motivated them to have long 
term work plans which were good for the continuity of the company. On the other hand, 
those who were in favour of short-term renewable employment contracts argued that 
such contracts motivated employees to work hard to increase their chances of their 
contracts being renewed upon expiry of their current contracts. Observations among 
large real estate investors indicated that contractual employment was gaining 
popularity. Most of the senior job positions were offered on contract basis. Contracts 
varied from two to four years for many employers. All management positions in 
pension funds and NHC were on contract basis. The Controller and Auditor General 
(CAG) also recommends the use performance contracts for employees of Public 
Authorities (CAG, 2011). 
 
5.6.1.8 Assessment of other attributes 
Employers also considered some attributes while assessing job applicants. Such 
attributes were those widely associated with the shaping of the behaviour of human 
beings. The main attributes covered during the interviews were age, gender, marital 
status and education. Another attribute which unexpectedly came up during interviews 
was spirituality or religiousness. Interviewees amongst investors and consultants had 
different opinions regarding the importance of each of the attributes in constraining the 
behaviour of employees or agents. The difference in opinions implied that not all 
employers applied all the attributes listed when recruiting employees. The attributes 
and details of interviewees’ responses are presented in Table 5.5. The five social 
attributes presented in the table are also given further treatment in chapter 6. 
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Table 5.5: Importance of social attributes when selecting agents 
Social attribute Interviewees’ opinion 
 Important Not important 
Age 23 82% 5 18% 
Gender 8 29% 20 71% 
Marital status 13 46% 15 54% 
Level of education 10 36% 18 64% 
Spirituality 24 86% 4 14% 
Source: Field interviews, 2011 
 
A total of 28 employers interviewed amongst real estate investors and consultants 
were requested to indicate the degree of importance they placed on each of the five 
attributes in dealing with employees’ opportunistic behaviour. As can be seen in Table 
5.5, it was generally agreeable amongst interviewees that age was an important factor 
in determining employee’s behaviour. 82% of the 28 interviewees considered 
employee’s age to be important in dealing with agency problems, while 5 interviewees 
thought it was not important. The five interviewees who stated that age was ‘not 
important’ in determining agent’s opportunistic behaviour insisted that they had 
experienced opportunistic behaviour in people of different age groups. One interviewee 
amongst employers had this to say about aged employees: 
 
Aged employees, especially those approaching retirement are generally less motivated 
to engage in opportunistic tendencies. Such employees are risk averse ... they are 
much more worried about the certainty of their retirement benefits and reputation, and 
thus tend to be more loyal to employers. We have been using such aged employees in 
sensitive activities such as petty cash management and confidential document keeping. 
 
71% of the interviewees however considered one’s gender to be ‘not important’ in 
mitigating agency problems. It was established during the interviews that employers 
did not particularly place much weight on the gender of the agent or job applicant for 
professional jobs. They insisted that one’s gender did not determine his or her job 
performance. Even those who thought gender was important when recruiting new 
employees or agents also indicated that the gender consideration was only applicable 
to very specific jobs which were traditionally known to be done by people of one sex 
such as secretarial work for female staff and security for male staff. 
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Employers were almost equally divided on the importance of marital status. Whereas 
some interviewees considered one’s marital status to be an important factor in shaping 
one’s behaviour, others were opposed. The main argument for those who considered 
marital status to be not important was based on real life experience of cases of 
opportunistic behaviour involving both married and not married individuals. On 
education, 64% of the interviewees indicated that one’s level of education was not 
important in determining his or her behaviour with respect to involvement in agency 
problems. However, there were other interviewees who thought that education was 
important in dealing with opportunistic tendencies, although they were divided on 
whether the level of education had a direct or inverse relationship with one’s 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
86% of the interviewees considered one’s spirituality to be important in dealing with 
agency problems. The importance of this attribute may have been contributed to by the 
fact that religion is still one of the important and active cultural aspects of the society in 
Tanzania. Spirituality in this context did not refer to one’s religion such as Christianity, 
Islam etc, rather it referred to one’s level of devotion and commitment to his or her 
religion teachings. Many cited spirituality to be a key factor when looking for 
trustworthy people. The few respondents who considered one’s religiousness to be 
‘not important’ were concerned about difficulties in certainly determining one’s 
religiousness and having a guarantee that the person would remain as such all the 
time. They also cited cases of people who pretended to be religious only to pursue 
some hidden agendas. 
 
5.6.2 Techniques applied during job execution 
Most of the agency problems encountered during job execution were of moral hazard 
or post-contract nature. In addressing the problems of this nature, employers and other 
principals used several different techniques, as outlined below. Similarly, different 
principals applied different techniques depending on the circumstances. 
 
5.6.2.1 Salary and incentives 
Salary and other monetary incentives comprised a key component of employment 
contracts. Salary and other incentives were widely regarded by employers as the most 
important determinants of employees’ performance. The general belief amongst 
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interviewees was that to a great extent employees’ performance varied directly with the 
amount of salary. 77% of the employers interviewed indicated to be keen to ensure 
that they paid their employees competitive salaries and other incentives. The type of 
incentives varied from performance bonuses to other forms of allowances. Some 
employers also covered transport, housing, training, medical, communication and other 
expenses for some or all of their employees. The amount of salary and other monetary 
incentives was however dependent on the volume of business transacted by the 
respective company. Large companies had better pay packages for their employee 
compared to small consultancy firms some of which did not even guarantee monthly 
pay to their employees. 23% of the employers interviewed admitted not to pay their 
employees competitive salaries, citing small size and poor performance of their firms. 
NHC and pension funds also accepted paid leaves of absence for their employees to 
enable them pursue further studies. In some cases these employers also paid tuition 
fees and other costs related to their employees’ studies. Employees were also 
financially supported to attend professional conferences, seminars, workshops and 
other training events. Other employers paid for their employees all membership fees to 
professional bodies such as TIVEA, AfRES, NCPS, AQSRB, ERB, etc. 
 
5.6.2.2 Professional treatment of employees 
To ensure that employees were always highly motivated and felt that they were 
respected, employers indicated that they observed professional treatment of their 
employees. It seemed to be a common belief amongst many interviewees that 
motivated and respected employees had a feeling of owing their employers equal 
respect. Such a feeling apparently translated into employee’s better performance. 
Employers tried to refrain from actions that would demoralise their employees. Some 
interviewees acknowledged though that success in this aspect was mainly a function of 
the behaviour and attitude of the firms’ top management. This argument was based on 
the belief that the behaviour and attitude of a company’s CEO towards employees set 
a tone for other senior managers in the firm. Some exceptions were also reported. 
Some interviewees revealed that some employers mistreated their employees, 
especially junior employees. Female employees were also cited to be more prone to 
abuse by some unprofessional male employers. 
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5.6.2.3 Use of codes of conduct 
46.4% of the interviewees mentioned codes of conduct as one of the tools used to deal 
with agency problems. Employees were normally required to conduct themselves in 
accordance with the codes of conduct and ethics. Issues related to agency conflicts 
were among many issues covered in companies’ codes of conduct. It was however 
noted that some employers, especially small local real estate consultancy firms, did not 
have codes of conduct for their employees. Even in such cases employees expected 
to conduct themselves ethically and professionally. Interviewees believed that 
companies had established social norms with which employees were identified. 
Despite acknowledging the effectiveness of norms in shaping people behaviour, 
interviewees also clearly indicated that enforcement of organisations’ norms was rather 
arbitrary. 
 
5.6.2.4 Regular reporting 
It was noted from the interviews that most employers and principals demanded that all 
employees in real estate related activities regularly submit (normally daily) job reports 
to their immediate supervisors. Such reports were then reviewed to check for any 
abnormalities. In case exceptions were noted, further inquiries or investigations were 
immediately made. This practice was noted to be more common with private property 
management and estate agency firms. Interviewees from the pension funds and NHC 
seemed to be less keen on this aspect, especially on daily reporting schedules and 
follow ups. 
 
5.6.2.5 Surprise visits and checks 
Some interviewees also reported that for some activities employers or supervisors 
sometimes made surprise visits to sites or offices of their subordinates. The purpose of 
this was twofold, i.e. first, to ensure that the employees were at their places of work all 
the time they were expected to do so, and second to create fear in the employees that 
if they acted contrary to what was expected of them, chances of being noticed were 
high. Surprise verification of assets was another common techniques used. This was 
common for matters involving cash and assets that could easily be misused or moved 
from one place to another. This technique was mainly applied to staff keeping petty 
cash, those collecting cash rent from tenants, and those responsible for stores. 
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5.6.2.6 Use of measuring and surveillance equipment 
To protect equipment and materials from theft, abuse and vandalism, water and fuel 
metres and CCTVs were installed in some buildings. For instance, following the earlier 
reported cheating by building caretakers in one of the buildings, meters were installed 
in the water reservoirs. The use of CCTV was becoming more and more common in 
many modern commercial buildings. The cameras were placed in all areas that were 
considered to be sensitive. Large initial capital requirement and technical demands 
associated with the use of sophisticated equipment were noted to be a stumbling block 
for many employers. Besides, some investors owned a large number of buildings, 
which made it difficult to use advanced technology in many of the buildings. 
 
5.6.2.7 Use of financial management software 
It was noted that, in the course of improving monitoring of agents’ activities, some 
investors used some special computer software to perform some activities. A case of 
use of software was reported in property management activities involving some foreign 
investors and property managers. According to one of the property managers 
interviewed, the software used by his company was provided by the investor who was 
based abroad. With that software, the investor was able to track many entries done by 
the property manager. With the use of such software, noticing of unusual entries was 
easier. 
 
5.6.2.8 Regular communication with sub-contractors 
It was also reported during the interviews with investors and property managers that, in 
order to ensure that sub-contracted service providers were professionally treated by 
the employees who work with them on daily basis, head offices maintained regular 
contacts with sub-contractors. Sub-contractors were also encouraged to report all of 
their problems with employer’s staff to the headquarters. This addressed the problem 
of building managers or caretakers demanding bribes from service providers or 
colluding with them to provide low-priced sub-standard services. 
 
5.6.2.9 Making all payments through bank 
To avoid the behaviour of some unfaithful employees delaying to bank the money 
collected from tenants or property buyers in order to make some gain out of the money 
(through interest income, exchange rate gain or some other transactions), tenants or 
5 Forms, Catalysts and Mitigation of Agency Problems 165 
 
 
property buyers were required to make their payments through employers’ bank 
account. However, this requirement was not always fully complied with by small 
tenants and bad tenants. It was still necessary for property managers to frequently 
follow up, which sometimes entailed physically calling such tenants’ offices to collect 
rent. 
 
5.6.2.10 Frequent shifting of staff between different working stations 
Employers sometimes made sudden changes of work stations for their employees. 
This was to ensure that staff did not have long established relationship with clients or 
sub-contractors. Such relationship sometimes resulted into cheating and forgery. 
Shifting of staff between work stations also helped to discover problems before they 
got worse. Knowing that one may at any time be replaced by another employee, one 
would not be motivated to engage in undesirable habits for fear that one’s successor 
would notice and report the matter to the higher authorities. This technique also 
minimised incidents of unreported property lettings or rent collections. During this 
study, NHC transferred many of its staff members to new work stations. Other staff 
members were given new responsibilities altogether. 
 
During the interviews, 4 interviewees amongst real estate investors also reported 
incidents of some of their employees hesitating or even declining to take their annual 
leaves for fear that in their absence, some of their unknown weaknesses or evils would 
be uncovered. Employee’s tendency to refuse taking vacations, rejecting promotion, 
and working overtime voluntarily are reported by Niehoff and Paul (2000) as signals of 
employee’s involvement in embezzlement at their places of work. 
 
5.7 Analysis of Focus Group Discussions 
 
5.7.1 Details of participants 
A total of 24 individuals participated in FGDs. The participants were drawn amongst 
members of four pension funds, namely NSSF, PPF, PSPF and LAPF. Four different 
FGD sessions were held with each session having six participants. Gender and age 
were given important consideration when selecting the participants. 29% of the 
participants were female, the rest were male. This reflected gender (im)balance in the 
formal employment in Tanzania. It is estimated that 4% of women and 10% of men are 
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in the formal employment in Tanzania (IFC, 2007). Agewise, 12.5% of the participants 
were aged 30 years or less, 55% were aged between 31 and 40 years, 20% were 
aged between 41 and 50 years and 12.5% were aged 51 years or above. All 
participants had real estate educational or practical background. The participants were 
therefore well knowledgeable of the Tanzania real estate market. For the purpose of 
this discussion, the four different groups which participated in FGDs are referred to as 
Group I, Group II, Group III and Group IV. 
 
5.7.2 Participants’ view on general pension funds’ operations 
There was a clear direct relationship between age and awareness of pension funds 
activities. It was noticeable from FGDs that the lower the age of the participant the less 
was his/her interest in the activities of pension funds. Young participants generally 
indicated that they were less interested in what pension funds were doing. To the 
contrary, participants approaching retirement age were more aware of pension funds 
activities and strongly disapproved most of the types of investments activities 
undertaken by pension funds. 
 
It was however clear many FGDs participants, regardless of their age, had little 
comprehension of what pension funds were and how they were supposed to operate. 
This was noted through direct confession by some of the participants. Little knowledge 
of pension funds was also observed through the type of answers and suggestions that 
were given by some participants. Some participants even regarded their monthly 
contributions to pension fund as similar to payroll taxes and charges. Others were 
more interested in the supplementary benefits that some pension funds were offering 
than the final pension package. 
 
Unpredictability of the final pension package was another reason for the little interest in 
pension funds’ matters shown by FGDs participants. Legislation risk was stated to be 
one of the main reasons why participants did not see pension savings in Tanzania as 
money to be relied upon. The participants complained that the government enjoyed the 
discretion of changing any piece of legislation, including those of pension funds. In a 
country like Tanzania, which has weak trade unions and infant political and democratic 
institutions, some changes in such legislation may not always be in the interest of the 
majority. Participants referred to past changes in the pension formula as an example of 
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little control that they (members) had on their funds. Participants in Group I and Group 
II cited a dispute (which was on-going during this study) between public universities’ 
employees and PPF as one example of pension funds in Tanzania not serving the 
interest of their members. In this dispute, employees of public universities were mainly 
demanding a change in the PPF pension formula to improve the pension package so 
that it would be at least equal to what was offered by other pension funds. 
 
Some participants in Group I and Group II insisted that they were only members of 
pension funds because it is mandatory for all employees in the formal sector in 
Tanzania to be members of one of the public pension funds. They expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the current set-up of pension funds. Some of the participants said 
that they preferred a ‘life insurance like pension scheme’ which gives the insured 
person greater certainty of the final sum of money or other benefits one gets on a due 
date. All participants also wondered why pension funds used different pension formula 
despite all of them being under the government. The use of different pension formula 
resulted into different pension packages for people having similar jobs. This resulted 
into many conflicts between members and administrators of pension funds and the 
government. Some participants said that they did not see the logic of having many 
pension funds which were all under the government instead of having only one 
scheme. The feelings of the FGD participants were similar to those of the Chairperson 
of Social Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA), who was quoted by one of local daily 
newspapers (The Guardian, 17 February, 2011) also wondering why pension funds 
used different formulae: 
 
…two people of the same profession get employment on the same date, but because 
circumstances may make them join different social security funds, they end up getting 
different packages because their respective pension funds report to different ministries…… 
We will work extra hard to see that all Tanzanians benefit from the funds by, among other 
things, advising the respective ministers correctly on all policies and operations of the social 
security sector. 
 
From the general FGDs participants’ view of pension funds and their operations, it was 
clear that there were agency conflicts between members of pension funds and the 
government. The government’s role in pension funds’ supervision was basically meant 
to protect the interest of pension funds’ members from abuse of their savings by 
managers of pension funds. In performing its role, the government was inevitably 
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taking the role of an agent. In some occasions the government, through politicians, 
abused its powers and pursued its own or politicians’ interests. One of the examples of 
questionable priorities set by pension funds cited by FGDs participants was the 
involvement of pension funds in the multi-billion shilling Dodoma University project. 
About 92% of the participants regarded the project as an example of the (mis)use of 
pension funds in pursuing political interests. The participants were of the opinion that 
the billions spent for the construction of Dodoma University would have been used to 
construct affordable housing for members. 
 
Many problems in the administration of pension funds in Tanzania have already been 
reported by other observers. Assad and Selemani (2003) report for instance, that 
NSSF and PPF did not comply significantly with their own asset allocation and 
investment policies and their portfolios of assets were heavily biased towards 
government securities and real estate. They also noted that the levels of administration 
costs for the two pension funds were significantly high in comparison with international 
benchmarks. Concerns over high administrative costs of pension funds were also 
mentioned by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, who was quoted by 
The Guardian (dated 24 March 2011) pointing out that the average of 12% 
management cost within the social security organs in Tanzania was more than twice 
the recommended 5% standard in the world. Such observations may also suggest 
existence of agency problems in the operations of pension funds. 
 
5.7.3 Specific views on real estate investment activities 
Apart from getting a general view over pension funds from FGDs participants, further 
questions specifically focusing on agency problems in the real estate investment 
activities of pension funds were asked to the participants. Although most of the 
answers given by the participants in the different groups were identical, there were 
some minor differences in some aspects which are worthy reporting. 
 
5.7.3.1 Satisfaction with investment decisions 
As members of the various pension funds, FGD participants were requested to indicate 
their level of satisfaction with the way investment decisions were made by their 
respective pension funds. There was some consistency in the reaction to this question 
across all the four groups. Participants aged 51 years and above were much more 
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interested in this question and were of the opinion that investment decisions made by 
administrators of pension funds did not reflect the needs of the members. All 
participants in this age group unanimously agreed that they were extremely dissatisfied 
with most of the investment decisions taken by pension funds. The answers for all age 
groups are summarised in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6: Members satisfaction with investment decisions 
Level of Satisfaction 
Percentage of 
Respondents Age Group 
Very satisfied 0% - 
Satisfied 12.5% 30 years or less 
Not satisfied 25% Between 41 and 50 years 
Extremely dissatisfied 12.5% 51 years and above 
No opinion 50% Between 31 and 40 years 
Source: Focus Group Discussions, 2011 
 
Some participants also complained that the government and politicians had too much 
influence on the investment decisions taken by pension funds. This particular concern 
raised by the FGD participants was shared by the Chairman of the Board of Social 
Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA), who also cited politicians’ interference in 
pension funds’ investment decisions as one of the challenges that pension funds face. 
The SSRA Board Chairman noted that, interference by politicians at times did not take 
into consideration the viability of the proposed investment projects (The Guardian, 24 
March 2011; Daily News, 23 March 2011). This problem was also reported by the 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Public Corporations Accounts Committee (POAC) to be 
a common problem in many parastatal organisations. The POAC Chairman was 
quoted by The Guardian (dated 25 March 2011) complaining that many parastatals 
work on instructions from ministers instead of laid down guidelines and procedures, 
ending in avoidable financial and other losses. 
 
Some of the FGD participants also complained that the government treated pension 
funds’ money as money meant to be used to finance projects with wider public and 
political interest, thereby disregarding the direct interest of the owners of the money i.e. 
pension fund members. The participants expressed their concern about the general 
misconception by majority of the members of the public that pension funds were state 
owned enterprises. Principally, pension funds in Tanzania entirely existed on 
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members’ contributions and investment income. Apart from contributing as employer, 
the government did not make any other financial contribution to pension funds. The 
government though acted as members’ guarantor, by carrying a responsibility to pay 
members’ terminal benefits in case their resective pension funds became insolvent. 
FGD participants were doubtful as to whether the government would indeed honour 
such a commitment, citing long outstanding similar claims by the former East Africa 
Community employees. The first East African Community (EAC) collapsed in 1977, but 
its Tanzanian employees had until the time of writing this book not been paid some of 
their terminal benefits. 
 
5.7.3.2 Representation in the investment decisions 
Considering the fact that pension funds were organisations responsible for taking care 
of their members’ wealth, FGDs participants who were also members of pension funds 
were asked to give their opinion on their level of satisfaction with the way they were 
represented in the decisions regarding the investment of their money in their 
respective pension funds. Participants were required to debate and agree on one 
answer out of five possible answers i.e. not satisfied at all, not satisfied, satisfied, very 
satisfied, extremely satisfied. 17% of the participants indicated to be ‘not satisfied at 
all’, 9% said that they were ‘satisfied’, and the remaining 74% indicated that they were 
‘not satisfied’. However, after further debate, they all reached consensus that there 
were ‘not satisfied’ with their representation in the decisions made by pension funds. 
Despite the Boards of Trustees of the pension funds having members representing 
employees, all participants of FGDs were not aware of their representatives. 
 
All participants also complained that they were not involved in the appointment of their 
representatives. Apart from the chairpersons of pension funds’ Boards of Trustees who 
were appointed by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, other Board 
members were appointed by the Ministers of the ministries under which the respective 
pension funds operated. Participants challenged this appointment system arguing that 
Ministers, also being agents and politicians, were not free from opportunistic behaviour 
of other human beings. They noted that, the problem was even worsened by the 
prevalence of weak good governance institutions in Tanzania. Participants were of the 
general view that favouritism was common in most of the appointments. Participants’ 
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worries may also be supported by the observations made by the Warioba Commission 
about parastatal organisations, which stated that: 
 
… They offer chairmanships of Boards of parastatals through favouritism and without 
considering professional knowledge, ability and national interest and they have interfered in 
executive decisions… 
 
Recently the government established a Social Security Regulatory Authority, (SSRA) 
which is meant to regulate the operations of pension funds to ensure that members’ 
interests are safeguarded. In the course of appointing SSRA Board members, an 
interesting incident was reported by a local newspaper (The Citizen, 20 January, 2011) 
which quoted some source complaining that: 
 
…the newly formed board of directors of the Social Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA) 
has been appointed in violation of the legal requirements and procedures as stipulated in 
the SSRA Act and its regulations. Some members of the board, according to reliable 
sources, were reportedly handpicked by the minister for Labour, Employment and Youth 
Development without following the due process of appointment…..the then minister for 
Labour, Employment and Youth Development did manipulate the whole process of 
appointment to serve his personal interest by appointing those people... 
 
FGD participants also considered Board membership to be a lucrative opportunity, 
regarding the good allowances and other benefits to which Board members are 
entitled. They also complained that there was no clear arrangement in place to ensure 
that members give their ideas to, and get feedback from, their representatives. 
 
5.7.3.3 Satisfaction with real estate investment decisions 
Focusing on real estate investment activities, FGD participants were required to 
indicate the level of their satisfaction on how real estate investment decisions were 
taken. Whereas 25% of the participants said that they were ‘not satisfied at all’, 75% of 
the participants said that they were just ‘not satisfied’. After some debate, all 
participants reached a consensus that they were ‘not satisfied’ with the real estate 
investment decision process. Again, the age factor echoed in this discussion, with the 
younger participants not being very keen on the details of how pension funds made 
investment decisions. However, the consensus of all participants was that they were 
not satisfied with how real estate investment decisions were made. The participants 
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were particularly suspicious that some real estate investment projects were undertaken 
because pension funds’ officials or politicians had personal interest in them. Some 
examples of suspicious real estate investment projects cited by participants were EPZ 
Industrial Park and Quality Plaza which were controversially acquired from Quality 
Group by NSSF and PSPF respectively. The controversy in the acquisition of the cited 
projects was also widely covered by some sections of the local media. The main 
allegation behind the acquisitions was that the value of the properties was grossly 
overstated compared to their construction cost (Mpogole, 2006). 
 
It also emerged from the FGDs that large pension funds’ allocations to prime 
commercial and residential properties did not reflect the actual needs of their 
members. 75% of the participants were of the opinion that pension funds should have 
directed more of their investible funds into providing affordable housing to their 
members. The main argument for this position was that there was no guarantee that 
the monetary returns generated by those prime commercial and residential properties 
held by pension funds would improve their pension benefits. Some participants 
associated large (multi-billion) commercial real estate with corruption and swindling of 
money by pension fund officials. They insisted that such multi-billion real estate 
projects were preferred by pension funds officials because they enabled them to 
embezzle funds without being easily noticed. 
 
Sharing their experience, the participants insisted that many pensioners die very early 
because of miserable life after retirement. Participants considered a house to be the 
single most significant asset any household would wish to own, but unfortunately it was 
the most difficult thing to realise given the absence of mortgage finance in Tanzania. 
Although some pension funds had embarked on affordable housing schemes, 
participants complained that most of the houses were not sold to the intended people 
i.e. low income members. They accused pension funds’ officials of preferential 
treatment in the allocation of houses. They also pointed out members’ inability to meet 
sale conditions as another main problem associated with affordable housing projects 
undertaken by pension funds. 
 
Despite the general disapproval of the investment decision process, most of the 
participants also seemed to be fascinated by the state-of-the-art commercial buildings 
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owned by their pension funds. It was clear that real estate investment still commanded 
psychic appeal to the participants. Besides, there was a common consensus that real 
estate was a good investment medium not only for pension funds but also for other 
institutional investors. This indicated that pension fund members were only unhappy 
with the lack of transparency in the investment process and not in the investment 
vehicle itself. 
 
5.7.3.4 Extent and forms of agency problems in real estate investment 
FGDs participants were required to give an assessment of the seriousness of agency 
problems in a pension funds set up in Tanzania by agreeing to one answer out of the 
five options given to choose i.e. not serious at all, not serious, serious, very serious, 
extremely serious. 37.5% of the participants said that the problem was ‘extremely 
serious’, 45.8% were of the opinion that the problem was ‘very serious’, and the 
remaining 16.7% indicated that the problem was just ‘serious’. After some further 
debate, the consensus was that the problem was ‘very serious’. Besides, the 
participants also pointed out that real estate investment was one of the most 
vulnerable activities to agency problems. 
Again, the participants cited some large real estate projects which were acquired by 
NSSF and PSPF in 2004. The cited projects included the acquisition of Quality Plaza 
and Quality Industrial Park by PSPF and NSSF respectively from Quality Group Ltd. 
PSPF and NSSF had paid TZS 36 billion and TZS 47 billion for the respective 
acquisitions. The FGD participants were of the opinion that the value of the buildings 
was grossly overstated. The participants also showed their suspicion of some political 
force behind the acquisitions. 
 
These acquisitions were also widely reported and criticised in the local print media. 
The matter was also discussed in the parliament. In protest to the acquisition, one of 
the prominent businessmen (Reginald Mengi), issued a public statement which also 
appeared in one of the local newspapers (The African, 10th April 2006). A section of 
the statement stated that: 
 
After reading Thisday’s and Kulikoni’s reporting on the NSSF/Quality Group 
business deals, what emerges is a war between Quality Group and the poor 
workers of Tanzania who fasten their belts for several years, most of them 
becoming so weak in the process to later discover that what remains to fasten 
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is their backbones while others are loosening their belts. Every month they 
contribute to the social security fund from their monthly salaries, but now they 
are not sure NSSF is going to be able to pay their pensions on retirement 
because according to available information, the fund has paid Quality Group 
over 47.0 billion shillings (US $ 47.0 mil.), which amount is, by any standard, 
very big. 
 
Counter statements were issued by NSSF and PSPF management. A section of NSSF 
statement which appeared in the local daily newspaper (The Citizen, 3rd April 2006) 
stated that: 
 
…NSSF wishes to assure its members and the general public that investment 
policies and procedures of NSSF are followed with care, professional 
competence and integrity in all projects including the purchase of Quality 
Industrial Park. NSSF avails itself of this opportunity to request its members to 
understand this issue and to once again reassure them that their money is 
safe and that members will get their benefits as stipulated in the NSSF Act. 
 
A section of PSPF counter statement, which appeared in the same local daily 
newspaper (The Citizen, 3rd April 2006), opposing reports of irregularities in the 
acquisition of Quality Plaza stated that: 
 
PSPF made a decision to acquire the Quality Plaza during March 2005. The 
Fund made this decision basing on the following factors: The Fund’s plan to 
diversify its portfolio into real estate investments, and the fact that the building 
was completed at the time of selling. Apart from other conditions, the Fund 
demanded 100% occupancy as a major condition, to facilitate immediate rental 
income after purchase. … considering the results of the investment analysis 
made which showed that the investment was financially viable, the Board of 
Trustees agreed with the Management recommendations to purchase the 
building at the negotiated price of TZS 36.0 billion. 
 
Despite having happened five years ago, this matter resurfaced in FGDs. Participants 
insisted that the decision to acquire these properties did not reflect good investment 
decisions by pension funds. It was also learnt that the properties did not have good 
performance. Quality Plaza was, for instance, in December 2010 reported to have 
outstanding rent from one of anchor tenants amounting to TZS 5 billion (The Guardian, 
5 Forms, Catalysts and Mitigation of Agency Problems 175 
 
 
25, December 2010). The defaulting tenant had been occupying one third of the 
building and was the same legal person who sold the building to PSPF. 
 
Just as the interviewees, FGDs participants also cited two categories of agency 
problems which they considered to be common in the pension funds real estate 
investment activities. The two categories were adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Specific examples of the two categories of agency problems as cited by 
FGDs participants are presented below. 
 
5.7.3.5 Adverse selection problems 
It was pointed out that such problems occurred at the stage of agent recruitment. 
Participants insisted that it was common for agents to cheat about their real 
qualifications or competence when applying for jobs, which resulted into less than 
expected job performance and delays in job completion. This problem was 
experienced during the recruitment of both employees and external contracting parties 
(both private individuals and firms) such as property managers, valuers, building 
contractors, service providers etc. Participants pointed out that it was common for 
external contracting parties to overstate their qualifications and capacities when 
tendering for jobs. It was also noted that due to high competition for jobs, sometimes 
suppliers especially property managing agents, service providers and valuers, quoted 
unrealistically low fees in order to outbid their competitors. After such suppliers were 
finally awarded the job, their performance was poor. 
 
5.7.3.6 Moral hazard problems 
The moral hazard problems which emerged during FGDs were identical to those 
reported during semi-structured interviews. Two more different problems were over-
emphasised by FGD participants. These were corruption and overpayment of officials. 
 
Corruption in suppliers’ selection process was reported to be more common with public 
institutions. When procuring goods and services, all government units and parastatal 
organisations in Tanzania were obliged to comply with the Public Procurement Act No. 
21 of 2004. The Act, among other things, provides for a competitive procurement 
process. Pension funds, being parastatal organisations, often announce tenders 
inviting suppliers of various goods and services to submit their bids. Owing to the 
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complexity and capital intensiveness, real estate projects attract many service and 
goods suppliers which increased exposure to corruption. FGDs participants 
complained that some procurement officials, apparently demanded bribes from 
bidders. 
 
On the other hand, the problem of overpayments and misuse of funds was associated 
with higher-than-market salaries that were paid to senior officials of some pension 
funds. The participants complained that the officials were also entitled to many other 
benefits such as expensive vehicles or transport allowances. Such senior officials were 
also entitled to gratuity which was paid upon expiry of their contracts. Participants in 
Group I and Group II cited an example of PPF Directors who they said were paid a 
gratuity of TZS 1.2 billion at the end of their contracts (5 years) in 2007 despite the 
Board’s decision to renew their contracts. The amount paid was considered by 
participants to be too high compared to the pension paid to members. The issue of 
PPF Directors’ payments has also been a subject of public discussion. In April 2011, 
the Parliamentary Public Corporations Accounts Committee also questioned the 
payment and requested the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) to investigate 
gratuity and endowment benefits paid to five Directors (POAC Report, 2011). Among 
other allowances that senior officials were said to be paid was the sitting allowance for 
meetings held during normal working hours. The participants considered payment of 
such allowance as misuse of funds. 
 
5.7.4 Remedies of agency conflicts 
FGDs participants did not seem to have control of the agency problem existing 
between them and the whole system of pension funds. This left them without much to 
do in terms of mitigating the problem. When requested to suggest remedies for agency 
problems in real estate investment, they suggested similar techniques which were 
already applied by some investors i.e. those reported by the various interviewees. 
They also suggested some additional remedies which in their view were not applied in 
the pension funds real estate investment activities. The proposed remedies are 
outlined below: 
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5.7.4.1 Revising the senior officials’ employment process 
This was to ensure that competent and honest people were given investment 
management responsibilities. Appropriate education and good performance record 
were proposed to be considered when recruiting investment personnel. Participants 
further recommended that reputable independent international recruitment firms should 
be contracted to recruit officials for senior positions. The main argument given for this 
suggestion was that it would minimise incidents of favouritism and nepotism in the 
recruitment process. 
 
5.7.4.2 Regular reporting of investment decisions and performance 
Participants insisted on the need to make investment decisions and performance 
reports available to members for scrutiny. They criticised the current practice of using 
annual reports which were too abstract and lacked details. Detailed investment 
performance reports would enhance transparency in the investment activities of 
pension funds. They also pointed out that the annual members meeting was also not 
attended to by many members. 
 
5.7.4.3 Use of contemporary performance measurements 
According to the participants, adoption of contemporary investment measurement 
techniques would facilitate the gauging of performance of investment and investment 
managers. The problem with the current practice of measuring performance of real 
estate investment, was that it was based on rudimentary performance measurement 
techniques. Return on Investment (ROI) was the method in use. The problem with ROI 
was that it was not a total return measure i.e. it only considered income while capital 
return (growth) was ignored. Besides, there was no uniformity in the way ROI was 
computed amongst different real estate investors in Tanzania. The difference was 
mainly on how Capital Employed value was obtained. Whereas some investors used 
historical cost to determine Capital Employed, others used current value (as per the 
most recent valuation report). Even those who used current value, the valuation dates 
of their property investment differed. The frequency of property valuation was not 
uniform amongst investors. Besides, valuation (in)accuracy was another point of 
concern. 
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5.7.4.4 Revisiting the role of government in pension funds 
Participants insisted that pension funds should be allowed to operate as private 
organisations, which would give members more powers on how their funds should be 
managed. Under such arrangement, members would then be able to closely monitor 
the actions of the Boards of Directors and the Managements of their respective 
pension funds. This would eliminate one level of agency relationship i.e. Members-
Government. In the existing pension fund set up in Tanzania, and considering the 
weak governance and democratic institutions, the members-government level 
generates a lot of agency costs (See Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2: Revised levels of agency relationship in pension funds 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualisation of FGD ideas, 2011 
 
Figure 5.2 shows a revised version of levels of agency relationships in pension funds 
set up. The diagram can be compared with Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3. Revisiting the role 
of the government in pension funds eliminates one level of agency relationship, which 
significantly cuts down agency costs. 
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5.7.4.5 Comments on the importance of other social attributes 
To determine the importance of social institutions and other human being attitude, 
FGD participants were asked to give their opinions on the importance of five attributes 
introduced to them. The five attributes were age, gender, marital status, education, and 
spirituality (religiousness). Participants were asked to debate each attribute and reach 
an agreement which would be regarded as a group opinion. Table 5.7 summarises the 
results of the participants’ opinions according to their groups. 
 
As summarised in Table 5.7, it is clear that the opinions reached by the various groups 
on the various attributes were identical. These FGDs results, together with those from 
the semi-structured interviews, were further tested in the survey, whose results are 
discussed in chapter 6. 
 
Table 5.7: Importance of social attributes when selecting agents 
 Opinion 
Attribute GROUP I GROUP II GROUP III GROUP IV 
Age Important Important Important Important 
Gender Not important Not important Not important Not important 
Marital status Important Important Important Important 
Education Important Important Important Important 
Spirituality Important Important Important Important 
Source: Focus Group Discussions, 2011 
 
5.8 Examples of pension funds’ sub-optimal real estate investment decisions 
Some of the cases suggesting decision makers’ opportunism in pension funds’ real 
estate investments have also been reported by other observers. In the interview with 
researchers, it was noted that although it was difficult to isolate the effects of agency 
problem in real estate investment activities, evidence of opportunistic tendencies was 
observable. There are some examples of sub-optimal investment decisions involving 
major projects which were given by researchers during the interviews. Most of the 
examples were also already widely documented in the existing literature. Table 5.8 
provides a list of some of the major real estate investment projects and other related 
activities that demonstrate sub-optimal decisions apparently motivated by opportunism 
of decision makers. 
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Table 5.8: Examples of sub-optimal real estate investment projects 
Name of 
investment/activity Project/activity details and the associated problems 
 
Hifadhi-EPZ 
Warehouses 
 
 
The warehouses were acquired by NSSF for a total of US $ 47.0 million from 
Quality Group Ltd. The purchase was claimed to be highly overpriced and of 
dubious profitability and attracted considerable criticism from the public 
(Danevad, 2008). This investment project was also identified by the 
Controller and Auditor General (CAG) as one of uneconomical investments 
carried out by the pension fund (CAG, 2009). 
 
Quality Plaza 
 
The property was, like Hifadhi-EPZ warehouses, acquired by PSPF also from 
Quality Group Ltd for a total of US $ 36 million. The purchase was similarly 
claimed to be highly overpriced and of dubious profitability and also attracted 
wide skepticism from the public (Danevad, 2008). 
 
Besides, the seller of the property remained one of the anchor tenants in the 
building despite not having good rent payment record. It was reported, for 
instance, by The Guardian (dated 15 December 2010) that by December 
2010, the tenant had an outstanding rent amounting TZS 5 billion, which 
forced PSPF to take legal action in a bid to recover the rent. 
 
 
NSSF Executive 
Apartments at ADA 
Estate 
 
The Controller and Auditor General also noted that NSSF Board of Trustees, 
contrary to section 30 (d) of the Public Procurement Act of 2004, approved 
the sale of the apartments for TZS 8.5 billion. The approval (or disapproval) 
was supposed to have been done by the Tender Board. Besides, Seven 
Anchors Properties Company Ltd, the company which bought the 
apartments, was only registered three weeks before the announcement to 
sell the apartments was made, casting doubts as to whether the company 
was specifically formed to undertake this particular transaction (CAG, 2009). 
According to the report, the timing of the payments for the property breached 
the sale contract. Some terms of sale contracts were also not complied with 
by the buyer. Given these circumstances, one cannot rule out the possibility 
of inside-dealing by Board Members or some pressure on the Board from 
higher authorities. 
 
Oasis Club 
 
The sale of Oasis Club (property) by NSSF did not follow procedures and 
was handled without adequate care. According to CAG (2009), the buyer of 
the property (priced at TZS 600 million) was obtained without stipulated 
competitive tendering procedures (as per section 59 of the Public 
Procurement Act of 2004) and the sale contract was vague, resulting into 
imperfect commitment by the buyer. It was reported that the sale offer was 
made in 2004 but the sale agreement was signed in 2007. Besides, the 
contract required that the buyer pays the agreed sum within 7 days after the 
transfer of property to the name of the buyer was completed. Until 2008 the 
transfer had not been completed, implying that no payment was made. 
Despite the lapse of time, the sale price remained the same. 
 
 
Ubungo Plaza Ltd 
(UPL) 
 
NSSF and PSPF each invested about TZS 9.8 billion in a joint venture 
investment (UPL). The project was originally conceived by National 
Insurance Corporation (NIC). NSSF and PSPF came into the joint venture in 
a bid to rescue the project which had stalled due to financial difficulties NIC 
was facing. 
 
According to the CAG (2009), the pension funds had not received any 
dividend from this investment, which in the opinion of CAG was one of 
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Name of 
investment/activity Project/activity details and the associated problems 
uneconomical investments held by the pension funds. For the year ending 
2009/2010, UPL had rent arrears amounting to TZS 396.7 million (CAG, 
2011). Besides, being a separate legal entity, Ubungo Plaza Ltd pays 
corporate taxes, which exposes the pension funds (shareholders) to double 
taxation. 
 
 
William Benjamin 
Mkapa Pension 
Tower 
 
 
Originally owned by NHC and TPDC, the project was in 1997 estimated at 
US $ 38 million but due to financial difficulties the project stalled, prompting 
political interference by the then Prime Minister who instructed NSSF to take 
over the project. NSSF had to incur at least US $ 25 million to complete the 
project (Danevad, 2008). The Prime Minister order requiring NSSF to take 
over the project without any investment appraisal is one of the examples 
showing how pension funds are susceptible to political decisions. 
 
House loans to 
politicians and 
senior government 
officials 
 
In what was generally perceived to be unusual, the Prime Minister in 1998 
after earlier denials by his press secretary, admitted to have had obtained a 
house loan amounting to US $ 75,000 from PPF. A similar loan was also 
issued by PPF to the Governor of Tanzania Central Bank of Tanzania 
(Iglesias and Palacios, 2000). These housing loans were widely viewed by 
the public to be issued under political influence, considering the positions of 
the beneficiaries. Such loans were not available to common people and 
following pressure from the public and media, PPF management suspended 
issuing such loans. 
 
Large outstanding 
rent arrears 
 
The problem of rent arrears implying inefficiency in property management 
personnel (both in-house and contracted), is common with properties owned 
by pension funds. For instance, LAPF had in the financial year ending 
2007/2008 reported an outstanding rent balance of TZS 1.1 billion due from 
just one ex-tenant namely, G. K. Hotels & Resorts. Recoverability of the 
balance was reported to be doubtful. In the same year, NSSF also reported a 
rent arrears balance of TZS 1.1 billion due from its ex-tenants (CAG, 2009). 
 
University of 
Dodoma financing 
 
Apart from Dodoma University construction project being generally regarded 
by some FGDs participants as politically conceived and motivated and whose 
speedy realisation was only possible because of politicians’ powers over 
pension funds’ investment decisions, weak contract management in the 
course of its implementation has been noted. CAG (2011) reports absence of 
clear contract between, for instance, NSSF and the government detailing 
mode of loan payment for Phase II of the project. Besides, CAG (2011) also 
notes that despite Phase I of the project having been completed in 2008, 
NSSF had until June 2010 not collected any rent in respect of the buildings 
which were already in use. The contract for Phase I of the project required 
that NSSF collect rent for the use of the buildings for 10 years in addition to 
15% annual loan interest before handing over ownership of the buildings to 
the government. 
 
From the examples presented in Table 5.8, NSSF, probably owing to its relatively 
larger size and higher participation in real estate investment, has more cases of sub-
optimal investment decisions. Again, despite public complaints over some of the 
suspicious decisions made by the pension funds, the government did not seem to take 
any serious actions against the decisions, which either suggests a hidden role of the 
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government officials in the decisions or just laxity of the responsible government 
officials, both of which amount to agency problems. 
 
5.9 Agency problems faced by foreign investors 
In addition to the agency problems discussed in the foregoing sections, foreign real 
estate investors also encountered some problems which were not very common with 
local investors. These problems were noted to be mainly associated with government 
agencies, departments and individual officials. Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) 
officials and government officials involved in land administration and valuation were 
particularly cited to be the major sources of frustration of foreign investors. 
 
An interview with officials representing foreign investors, TIC and government officials 
revealed a number of additional potential areas of agency problems in real estate 
investment activities. Unlike the local investors, foreign investors were less conversant 
with the local market, which compelled them to use more agents in their real estate 
investment activities. Most of the foreign investors in Tanzania did not reside in the 
country; instead they employed local or foreign people to take care of the daily 
management of their investments. For this reason, the interviews were conducted with 
those representatives. Four foreign investors were interviewed. 
 
It was noted from the interviews with a TIC official, that although it was not mandatory 
for investors to go through TIC, many foreign investors found it to be necessary to 
contact TIC while making their initial investment plans. Besides, for foreign real estate 
investors it would not be possible to own land without having to do it through TIC. The 
law did not permit foreigners to own land in Tanzania, except for investment purpose. 
A company was considered to be foreign if more than 50% of its shares were held by 
foreigners, otherwise it was a local company and land ownership issues were treated 
as those of Tanzania citizens. Foreign investors’ title deeds were held by TIC which 
facilitated land rent payment. On top of the actual land rent bill from the government, 
the investors were required to pay a 10% (of land rent) commission to TIC for 
facilitation. 
 
Although, TIC maintained to have reduced the time an investor took to establish a 
business in Tanzania (TIC, 2008), it was noted from the interviews with foreign 
5 Forms, Catalysts and Mitigation of Agency Problems 183 
 
 
investors and a TIC official that there were still many steps that one had to encounter 
in the course of establishing a business entity. The only relief was that most of the 
people involved were stationed at TIC offices. For instance, acquiring a certificate of 
land ownership still involved many steps and days. According to IFC (2011) there were 
22 procedures (an equivalent of 328 days) which one took to obtain a construction 
permit in Tanzania. 
It was also noted from the interviews that, TIC was not always doing what it claimed to 
be doing for investors, especially in expediting the land acquisition process. Investors 
complained about delays in processing various documents related to land ownership 
and building permits. Investors also blamed TIC for recommending land to investors. 
Such land was not always the best land for the investors’ intended use. Various reports 
also show that Tanzania was still not doing well in attracting investors. For instance, for 
the past five years (2007-2011) Tanzania was ranked number 91, 179 and 151 
amongst 183 countries in the world for protecting investors, ease of obtaining 
construction permit and registering property rights respectively (IFC, 2011; Mapunjo, 
2010). 
 
Land officials, at both central and local government levels, were also blamed for being 
highly bureaucratic and corrupt. In some cases, actions of land officers apparently 
resulted into complete failure of foreign real estate investment projects. For instance, 
at one point in time during this study, there was a widely reported dispute between a 
potential foreign investor from USA (Colom Investment Limited), TIC and the Ministry 
of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development. The company was on the 
verge of constructing 212 mortgage housing units and had already spent more than 
TZS 288 million on the project. In this dispute, the investor complained to have been 
mishandled by TIC and the Ministry (The Citizen, 12th October 2010). Responding to 
the accusations, the TIC Executive Director blamed the investor to have failed to 
comply with the country’s laid down laws and procedures for investors who want to 
acquire land for investment (The Guardian, 6th October 2010). The argument ended up 
in the investor issuing a press release in one of the local newspapers disputing the 
counter statement made by the TIC Director. The investor finally decided not to 
continue with the project, despite having already spent some money on the project. 
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This problem could have been avoided if TIC had a comprehensive land bank from 
which investors, especially foreign investors could lease land. Shortage of prime land 
for various developments increases information asymmetry between those looking for 
development land and their agents who range from estate agents to government land 
administrators. In trying to obtain suitable land for their envisaged developments, 
investors inevitably have to engage more than one agent, thereby increasing their 
exposure to the various forms of agency problems such as corruption, falsehood, 
imperfect commitment etc. 
 
An interview with one government land officer and one government valuer, confirmed 
that it was true that some government officials among them were unfaithful, 
bureaucratic and corrupt. In the words of one of the land officers who requested 
anonymity: 
 
……it is quite common for land officers and valuers to demand bribe from clients … 
sometimes they falsely indicate to clients that processing of their requests required a lot of 
time, implying that some special treatment would be needed to expedite the process, which 
created the impression to the client that a tip or some kind of unofficial consideration was 
necessary. In other cases, junior officers would tell clients that their bosses demanded 
something to get documents signed, which was not always true. 
 
Corruption in the land sector in Tanzania is already widely reported in the existing 
literature. URT and PCCB (2009) and Mbele (2009), for instance, note that corruption 
in the real estate sector in Tanzania impedes investment in the sector. Mbele (2009) 
cites vague laws, low salaries, unclear property rights, and lack of computerisation in 
land delivery functions as the main catalysts of corruption amongst government 
officials responsible for land matters. 
 
The efforts by the government to attract investors have also entailed aggressive 
marketing and reaching out to potential foreign investors. Many promises are made, 
assuring potential investors of an investment haven. Apparently some investors get 
convinced by those promises, only to realise that most of the promises were mere 
words. In the presence of unfaithful and irresponsible government officials, chances of 
foreign investors getting into trouble with their business plans may not be completely 
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ruled out. One of the interviewed foreign investor representatives had this to say to 
describe the conflicting views of some foreign investors, government and TIC officials: 
 
In defence of their positions, more often than not, politicians and senior government officials 
have denied reports of malpractices in government offices. The government and TIC have 
been busy painting a rosy picture of the country’s investment climate, covering up some 
weaknesses in the government which have potential of causing losses to 
investors…Similarly, chances for some incompetent foreign investors shifting blame to 
government for their failure could also not be ruled out. 
 
Some TIC problems were long reported by Miller III and Shlman (1999). The authors 
reported that investors criticised TIC for not accurately representing the steps involved 
in acquiring land. They also reported that some investors even suggested that TIC did 
not itself know the process and others believed that TIC was misleadingly optimistic in 
its conversations with would be investors. 
 
It is clear from the facts above that imperfect commitment seems to be the main 
problem which foreign investors face in their contracting with TIC and the government 
at large. The main complaint was that the government agencies and officials either did 
not fulfill some of their promises at all or they did not do it in time. Dishonesty, 
bureaucracy and corruption are the other forms of agency problems which were 
commonly encountered by foreign investors when dealing with government officials. 
 
5.10 Chapter summary 
Several aspects of agency problems in real estate investment activities of the selected 
investors have been covered. The discussion was mainly based on data collected 
using semi-structured interviews with key players in real estate investment activities, 
and focus group discussions with members of pension funds. An overview of real 
estate investment practice in Tanzania was presented before embarking on the 
discussion of how agency problems arose in the various real estate investment 
activities. Catalysts of agency problems or factors which motivated agents to engage in 
opportunistic tendencies were then discussed prior to looking at the various techniques 
employed by principals in dealing with agency problems in real estate investment 
activities. This chapter has also shown how some aspects of informal institutions such 
as norms and spirituality are perceived by principals as remedies of agency problems. 
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The importance of some social attributes, namely age, gender, marital status and 
education, in dealing with agents’ opportunistic tendencies were also discussed in this 
chapter, although further treatment of these social attributes is considered in chapter 6. 
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6 Analysis of Institutional Remedies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of institutional factors constraining agent’s 
behaviour in real estate investment activities in Tanzania. The principal aim of the 
analysis is to determine the effectiveness of the various institutional factors in 
remedying agency problems. The chapter addresses two main questions. Firstly, it 
seeks to confirm whether or not the existing informal institutions are more effective in 
checking agents’ opportunistic behaviour than the existing formal institutions. 
Secondly, it demonstrates the association between institutional attributes and other 
social characteristics, namely age, gender, marital status, and education, in 
constraining agents’ behaviour. 
 
Data analysis was carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics 19. Some descriptive and 
inferential statistics have been used to carry out the analyses and to rank the various 
agency problems remedies according to their perceived importance and effectiveness. 
The data analysed in this chapter was collected using two sets of questionnaire which 
were administered to different respondents amongst key players in the real estate 
investment activities in Tanzania. The first set of questionnaire was completed by 
individuals performing the role of a principal or employers in the real estate investment 
activities. The second set of questionnaire was completed by individuals discharging 
their roles as agents or employees in the real estate investment activities. 
 
6.2 Respondents and institutional attributes 
Execution of the investment activities covered in this study (as introduced in 
subsection 1.1.6, Chapter One), mainly involves land administrators, investment 
analysts, architects, engineers, valuers, property managers, estate agents, lawyers 
etc. Accordingly, owners and/or senior officials (CEOs, directors or managers) of firms 
dealing with real estate investment or real estate consultancy were in the context of 
this study treated as principals. Similarly, in the context of this study, employees 
involved in the various real estate investment activities, owing to their key roles, were 
treated as agents. Respondents for this study were therefore drawn from senior 
officials and employees of pension funds, NHC, and some selected foreign real estate 
investment projects. Other respondents were drawn from owners and employees of 
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firms offering real estate services i.e. property management, estate agency, valuation, 
investment analysis and development appraisal, building designing, and construction. 
 
The questionnaires aimed at identifying attributes which are used to constrain the 
behaviour of agents in the real estate investment activities. Designed to address the 
objectives of the study, the questionnaire covered both formal (contractual) and 
informal (non-contractual) institutions which have been cited in the existing literature to 
be responsible for constraining human behaviour. Using a five-point Likert scale, 
respondents were required to comment on each institutional attribute in terms of its 
importance or effectiveness in checking agent’s opportunistic behaviour while 
executing their contractual duties related to real estate investment activities. 
 
The effectiveness of the various formal policies, laws, rules and regulations which are 
meant to address issues of contract, agency, labour, and other civil and criminal 
matters in mitigating agency conflicts arising in real estate investment activities was 
assessed. The effectiveness of agency/employment contracts in mitigating agency 
conflicts was also tested. Apart from stating duties and obligations of the parties, 
agency/employment contracts, among others, also stipulate fees/salaries, incentives, 
tenure, sanctions, and codes of conduct governing the principal-agent relationship in 
question. Formal organisations such as professional bodies, credit institutions, and 
corporate governance institutions were the other formal institutions whose impact in 
mitigating agency conflicts was also examined. 
 
Similarly, the effectiveness of the various attributes of informal institutions extracted 
from various strands of institutional theory literature was examined. North (1990) 
characterises informal institutions by social sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
social code of conduct. In addition to customs and traditions, Pejovich (2006) further 
cites moral values, religious beliefs, and norms of behaviour as defining aspects of 
informal institutions. Religious belief (spirituality) also emerged in the interviews (refer 
to Chapter 5) as one of the important human behaviour constraints in Tanzania. Some 
literature (e.g. Neusner and Chilton, 2005; Saroglou et al, 2005; Bernt, 1989; Burhoe, 
1979) also associates spirituality with altruism. Brennan (1994) cites altruism as one of 
the important constraints of human behaviour against opportunism. 
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An agent belonging to a society with, for instance, a social code of conduct insisting on 
self respect, respect for others, honesty, trustworthiness, altruism, spirituality and other 
similar aspects would be less likely to be involved in opportunistic tendencies. 
Similarly, an agent whose society regard stealing, cheating, bribing as taboos would be 
less likely to be involved in such acts. Failure to observe social code of conduct and 
taboos normally results into some social sanctions. One’s social network is also very 
important in shaping his or her behaviour (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005; 
Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). For the purpose of this study, these aspects of informal 
institutions were used to test the effectiveness of the institutions in mitigating agents’ 
opportunistic behaviour in real estate investment activities. These aspects are: social 
norms, customs, traditions, taboos, social sanctions, social code of conduct, social 
network, spirituality, altruism, and moral values (e.g. trustworthiness and respect). 
 
6.3 Analysis of principals’ opinions 
 
6.3.1 Respondents’ profile 
A total of 67 questionnaires were given to the identified principals. Response rate was 
47.8% i.e. 32 questionnaires were completed and returned. Out of the 32 respondents, 
21 were individuals involved in real estate investment while 11 were individuals 
involved in real estate consulting. Respondents comprise individuals who occupied 
different senior managerial positions. From the 32 individuals, 6 were companies’ Chief 
Executive Officers, 13 were members of companies’ top management, and 13 were 
middle level managers with a large number of subordinates under their supervision. 
The mean number of years the respondents occupied their present jobs position was 
6.6. The minimum time a respondent was in the present position was 0.8 years and the 
maximum time a respondent was in the same position was 20 years. 
 
6.3.2 Common forms of agency problems 
Analysis of survey data indicates that respondents amongst principals in the real 
estate investment sector agree that agency problem is a serious problem in the sector. 
To determine the seriousness of agency problem, respondents were asked to choose 
the appropriate answer out of five mutually exclusive answers i.e. 1.0 for ‘Not Serious 
at all’, 2.0 for ‘Not Serious’, 3.0 for ‘Neither’, 4.0 for ‘Serious’, and 5.0 for ‘Very 
Serious’. Results show that 78.1% of the respondents indicated that agency problem in 
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the real estate investment process was a ‘serious’ problem. The remaining 
respondents (i.e. 21.9%) considered agency problem in real estate investment process 
to be a ‘very serious’ problem. 
 
Further analysis of principals’ opinions about the forms and extent of agency problems 
in real estate investment activities was carried out. Principals were asked to indicate 
how common the given forms of agency problems in their daily real estate investment 
activities were. Principals’ assessment of agency problems was measured using a five-
point Likert scale i.e. 1.0 for ‘Strongly Disagree’, 2.0 for ‘Disagree’, 3.0 for ‘Neither 
Disagree nor Agree’, 4.0 for ‘Agree’ and 5.0 for ‘Strongly Agree’. The results are 
summarised using two descriptive statistics, namely mean and standard deviation. The 
two descriptive statistics have been used to rank agency problems according to their 
commonness as reported by principals. The results ranking the forms of agency 
problems are summarised in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Importance ranking of agency problems 
Form of agency problem Mean
Mean 
Ranking
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Deviation 
Ranking 
Shirking 4.88 1 .336 1 
Overstatement of capacity 4.84 2 .574 2 
Carelessness 4.75 3 .762 3 
Lack of maximum job commitment  4.50 4 1.107 6 
Overpricing of purchases 4.13 5 1.129 7 
Overstatement of qualifications 3.97 6 1.092 5 
Cheating in reporting 3.88 7 1.185 9 
Theft  3.47 8 1.391 11 
Personal use of confidential information 3.22 9 1.362 10 
Forgery 3.22 10 1.157 8 
Vandalism 2.75 11 .880 4 
Others - - - - 
Analysis Number = 32     
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, shirking, overstatement of capacity and carelessness were 
clearly seen to be the major forms of agency problems. The mean scores for the three 
items indicate that principals almost strongly agree that the three were the common 
forms of agency problems. The results also clearly show that shirking, overstatement 
of capacity and carelessness are consistently highly ranked forms of agency problems 
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by taking the same ranking order for both mean and standard deviation measures. 
This suggests that principals consider them to be more serious forms of agency 
problems. Mean scores also indicate a general agreement amongst principals that lack 
of maximum job commitment, overpricing of purchases, overstatement of qualifications 
and cheating in reporting were other common problems amongst agents. 
 
The respondents were indifferent to theft, use of confidential information for personal 
gain, and forgery, as common forms of agency problems. However, despite being 
generally low-ranked, theft, use of confidential information for personal gain, and 
forgery have high standard deviation scores, implying high disparity of principals’ 
opinion regarding commonness of these problems in their operations. Vandalism, with 
a mean score of 2.75, is at the bottom of the list implying that many respondents did 
not consider it to be a common problem with their employees. Consistency in the 
respondents’ position about vandalism is further supported by standard deviation 
ranking of the problem. Vandalism, with a standard deviation score of 0.880, is ranked 
fourth. 
 
It is clear from the list of problems that, whereas all other forms of agency problems 
are of moral hazard nature, high mean and standard deviation scores for 
‘overstatement of capacity’ and ‘overstatement of qualifications’ suggest existence of a 
serious adverse selection problem. As discussed in Chapter 5, incidents of agents 
cheating about their qualification or capacity when applying for jobs were reported by 
various interviewees amongst real estate investors and other employers. High mean 
score for lack of maximum job commitment implies seriousness of the problem of 
imperfect commitment in agency relationships. Respondents were also asked to 
mention other common forms of agency problems which were not included in the list. 
None of the respondents mentioned additional forms of agency problems. 
 
6.3.3 Contractual remedies of agency problems 
Contractual remedies are those remedies which could explicitly be effected using 
agency contract, employment contracts or any other formal institutions such as 
government enforced laws, policies and regulations; professional bodies’ codes of 
conduct etc. Respondents amongst principals were requested to give their individual 
opinion on the degree of importance they placed on each of the eleven key contractual 
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remedies identified. Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed with 
statements about the importance of each remedy in checking agent’s opportunistic 
behaviour as applied to their own employees in the real estate investment process. 
Again, principals’ opinion was measured using a five-point Likert scale i.e. 1.0 for 
‘Strongly Disagree’, 2.0 for ‘Disagree’, 3.0 for ‘Neither Disagree nor Agree’, 4.0 for 
‘Agree’ and 5.0 for ‘Strongly Agree’. As summarised in Table 6.2, mean and standard 
deviation scores were used to rank the contractual remedies according to their 
importance as viewed by the respondents. 
 
Table 6.2: Importance ranking of agency contractual remedies 
Contractual remedy Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Deviation 
Ranking 
Performance bonuses 4.72 1 .457 1 
Prospects for career development 4.72 2 .772 4 
Amount of salary or fee 4.66 3 .545 2 
Job security 4.50 4 .916 5 
Codified sanctions 4.47 5 .718 3 
Entitlement to share of profit 4.22 6 1.008 7 
Long term job contract 4.16 7 1.167 9 
Other terms of agency/employment contract 4.13 8 1.100 8 
Professional bodies and code of conduct 4.03 9 .999 6 
Policies, laws, rules and regulations 2.94 10 1.268 10 
Corporate governance institutions 2.56 11 1.294 11 
Analsys Number = 32     
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
Performance bonuses, prospects for career development and the amount of salary or 
fee have high mean scores and low standard deviation scores, implying consistency in 
respondents’ opinion about the importance of remedies. Low mean scores for policies, 
laws and regulations and corporate governance institutions suggest ineffectiveness of 
government enforced formal institutions in dealing with agency problems. This 
observation concurs with the existing literature (e.g. Williamson, 2009; Tabellini, 2008) 
which reports that the on-going institutional reforms in many less developed countries 
have had little effect on development partly because the institutions being introduced 
are copied from elsewhere and their imposition disregards the well established 
informal institutions in the subject countries. 
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It is also clear from the results that most of the effective remedies of agency problems 
are within the control of the principals. The principals or employers are capable of 
instituting them to get good results from their agents or employees. For instance, 
employers can use performance bonuses and salaries to improve the performance of 
their employees. They can also provide opportunities for career development and 
guarantee job security for their employees, which would help to align employer’s goals 
with those of their employees. Long term job contracts also enable agents to have long 
term plans for their work, which is important for business sustainability. Sanctions for 
poor performance and agents’ entitlement to profit sharing are other remedies within 
the reach of principals. 
 
From the analysis of interviews (in Chapter 5) it was clear also that principals were 
aware of all these remedies but it was noted that only few of the remedies were 
practically applied by most of them. For instance, performance bonuses were not very 
common except for a few employers amongst property management firms. Although 
the amount of salary or fee was viewed by employers as an important remedy of 
agency problems, still many of them did not seem to apply it in dealing with the 
problem. The general level of salary for employees in the real estate investment sector 
was low and some employers did not even pay their employees regular salaries. Job 
security and prospects for career development was noted to be higher with large 
investors i.e. NHC, pension funds, and few consultant firms. Small real estate 
consultancy firms did not offer job security nor did they have many prospects for career 
development. Such firms were generally regarded by employees as a mere stepping 
stone into serious employment markets. 
 
6.3.4 Non-contractual remedies of agency problems 
Non-contractual remedies refer to those remedies which are normally not explicitly 
provided for in agency or employment contracts or in other codified formal instruments 
such as government enforced policies, laws and regulations etc. Such remedies 
largely entail informal institutions which are responsible for constraining agents’ 
opportunistic behaviour. Respondents were requested to give their individual opinion 
on the importance they placed on each of the eleven remedies identified under this 
category. Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed with a statement 
about the importance of each non-contractual remedy in checking agent’s opportunistic 
194  6 Analysis of Institutional Remedies 
behaviour, as applied to their own employees in the real estate investment process. 
Principals’ opinion was measured using a five-point Likert scale i.e. 1.0 for ‘Strongly 
Disagree’, 2.0 for ‘Disagree’, 3.0 for ‘Neither Disagree nor Agree’, 4.0 for ‘Agree’ and 
5.0 for ‘Strongly Agree’. Mean and standard deviation scores, which were used to rank 
the remedies according to their importance as viewed by the respondents, are 
presented in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3: Importance ranking of agency non-contractual remedies 
Non-contractual variable Mean Mean Ranking Std. Deviation
Std. Deviation 
Ranking 
Social sanctions 4.59 1 1.012 6 
Social norms 4.50 2 .950 3 
Religious belief (spirituality) 4.34 3 1.066 7 
Taboos 4.34 4 1.096 8 
Trustworthiness 4.16 5 .954 4 
Customs and traditions 3.97 6 .999 5 
Social network 3.97 7 1.177 9 
Self respect 3.97 8 .897 2 
Social code of conduct  3.81 9 .738 1 
Altruism 3.22 10 1.385 10 
Respect for employer 2.88 11 1.385 11 
Analysis Number = 32     
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
From the eleven non-contractual remedies considered in the survey, fear of social 
sanction and compliance with social norms appear to be very important remedies of 
agency problems. Although standard deviation scores for the two variables are 
relatively high implying high variation in the respondents’ opinions, their mean scores 
are very high showing general approval that the remedies are important in constraining 
agents’ opportunistic behaviour. Ones’ religious belief or spirituality also appears to be 
quite an important behaviour constraint. The high mean score attributed to spirituality 
concurs with the findings in the analysis of interviews, in which interviewees seemed to 
give the remedy special emphasis. The remedy was initially not considered as a stand-
alone remedy; instead it was impliedly lumped under customs and traditions. But its 
constant recurrence during the interviews led to its isolation from the ‘customs and 
traditions’ generic group. Spirituality therefore stood as a separate variable along with 
other important remedies which were earmarked for further testing in a survey. 
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Taboos, referring to aspects of behaviour which are not allowed by ones’ society, also 
seem to have high importance in the opinion of respondents, in checking agent’s 
opportunistic behaviour. Customs and traditions, social network, social code of conduct 
and other aspects of moral values i.e. trustworthiness and respect, are also viewed as 
important factors in checking opportunistic tendencies. These observations underscore 
the need for understanding agents’ cultural environment prior to devising or 
administering remedies of agency problems. The observations also underline the non-
universality of application of remedies of agency problems. Some existing literature on 
international investment and human resource management (e.g. Tiwari and White, 
2010; Johnson and Droege, 2004) also insist on the need for foreign investors to 
understand the culture and values of the host societies. 
 
‘Respect for employer’ and ‘altruism’ appear to be outliers. Respondents were almost 
neutral about the importance of these remedies. The overall analysis of respondents’ 
opinions on the non-contractual remedies of agency problems confirms that principals 
almost place equal weight between formal and informal institutions in dealing with 
agent problems, although some contractual remedies are given more weight. Different 
strands of literature (Williamson, 2009; Boettke et al, 2008; Casadesus-Masanell and 
Spulber, 2005) equate the importance of formal and informal institutions and insist on 
considering informal institutions whenever new formal institutions were introduced. 
 
However, looking at the techniques applied by principals in mitigating agency problems 
(as discussed in Chapter 5), it is clear that formal institutions are much more applied 
compared to informal institutions. This may be due the ease and objectivity in 
administering them and measuring their effect. It is also possible that application of 
informal institution is more implicit and thus not easily observable. Besides, apart from 
institutional remedies, mechanical and technological remedies were commonly used in 
discouraging or preventing agents’ undesirable actions in the real estate investment 
activities. Some of these techniques include the use of security cameras, security 
guards, computer based controls, and direct supervision of agents or employees etc. 
 
6.3.5 Comparison of contractual and non-contractual remedies 
After separately examining the contractual and non-contractual remedies of agency 
problems, the two categories of remedies were combined and closely examined. 
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Figure 6.1 provides a pictorial representation and ranking of the remedies combined. 
The mean and standard deviation scores of the different remedies, summarised in 
Table 6.2 and 6.3, were used to plot the chart in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Principals’ ranking of contractual and non-contractual remedies 
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Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
The importance of each remedy of agency conflicts (from both contractual and non-
contractual categories) as given by respondents amongst principals is clearly seen in 
Figure 6.1. Although some formal or contractual remedies seem to have been 
accorded slightly more importance by principals, informal or non-contractual remedies 
are still very visible in the ranking. Prospects for career development, performance 
bonus, and amount of salary have the highest mean scores. Standard deviation scores 
for these remedies are low implying high consistency in respondents’ opinion on the 
importance of the particular remedies. Principals strongly agree that social sanctions 
and norms are also important factors in shaping the behaviour of agents. It should 
however be noted that these views are only from one party to the agency contract i.e. 
the principals. The views of agents on the importance between contractual and non-
contractual remedies of agency problems are presented and discussed in section 
6.4.7. 
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6.3.6 Importance of other agent’s social attributes 
Some other important agent’s social characteristics that are important in shaping 
human behaviour were considered. Agent’s age, gender, marital status and level of 
education were the constraints tested. The ranking result are summarised in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4: Importance ranking of other social attributes 
Social attribute Mean Mean Ranking Std. Deviation 
Std. Deviation 
Ranking 
Age 4.69 1 .471 1 
Education 4.50 2 .842 2 
Gender 2.88 3 1.129 4 
Marital status 2.66 4 .937 3 
Analysis Number = 32     
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
Whereas the respondents agreed that ‘age’ was an important factor in constraining 
agent’s opportunistic behaviour, they were neutral on whether opportunistic behaviour 
clearly varied directly or inversely proportional with age. However, there was a stronger 
indication that the older the agent the less was her or his proneness to agency 
problems. It was also apparent from the analysis of interviews (in Chapter 5) that age 
was only effective in checking agent’s opportunistic behaviour with very aged 
employees i.e. people approaching their retirement age. Many of the employees in this 
age category were reported to be risk averse. Such people would not risk engaging in 
undesirable behaviour for fear of losing their jobs. Similar observations are reported by 
other researchers (e.g. Mohammad et al, 2010; Salami, 2008; Wagner and Ruth, 
2000). Niehoff and Paul (2000) also report that young employees are generally more 
prone to dishonesty at workplace than aged employees. Aged employees are however 
blamed for being slow in accepting new changes at workplaces. 
 
Different results are observed for ‘education’. While respondents clearly agreed that 
the level of education an agent possesses is important in checking agent’s 
opportunistic behaviour, they were almost equally divided on how the level of agents’ 
education related with opportunistic behaviour. There were those who agreed that 
agents with high education were less likely to be involved in opportunistic tendencies 
compared to those with less education. Such results would suggest that chances for 
less educated employees to get involved in undesirable behaviour are higher than that 
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of employees with high education, who in most cases occupy high position jobs whose 
operating environments are more transparent to allow some forms of agency 
problems. The results only give a general picture and may even only be valid to some 
specific forms of agency problems. 
 
Other respondents were, however, of the opinion that highly educated agents are more 
opportunistic. This viewpoint may be due to respondents’ specific experiences with 
highly educated people who have been involved in agency problems. In analysis of 
interviews (in Chapter 5), both highly educated and less educated employees were 
reportedly involved in agency problems. The distinction was mainly on the nature and 
form of agency problems that each group got involved in. For instance, it was noted 
that such problems as petty theft, forgery, late arrival and early departure at work, 
doubtful sick leaves, and petty bribes were mainly associated with the less educated, 
and junior staff members. On the other hand, inside dealing, grand corruption and 
embezzlements were associated with more educated and senior officials. Table 6.5 
summarises principals’ opinions on how some social attributes define agents’ 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Table 6.5: Agents’ social attributes and opportunistic behaviour 
Statement about agents Mean Scores 
Mean Score 
Remarks 
Std. Deviation 
Scores 
Aged agents are less opportunistic 3.25 Neither 1.047 
Aged agents are more opportunistic 2.94 Neither 1.076 
Male agents are more opportunistic 3.63 Agree 1.185 
Female agents are more opportunistic 2.06 Disagree .246 
Educated agents are more opportunistic 3.56 Agree .914 
Educated agents are less opportunistic 3.53 Agree 1.047 
High-income agents are more opportunistic 3.41 Neither 1.266 
High-income agents are less opportunistic 4.09 Agree .588 
Married agents are less opportunistic 3.06 Neither 1.076 
Married agents are more opportunistic 2.38 Disagree .707 
Unmarried agents are less opportunistic 2.41 Disagree .712 
Unmarried agents are more opportunistic 3.75 Agree .672 
Analysis Number = 32    
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
Although respondents did not consider agent’s gender to be important in determining 
one’s behaviour, it was clear that female agents were seen to be less prone to agency 
problems than male agents. On the other hand, respondents were divided on the 
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importance of agent’s level of income in determining one’s proneness to agency 
problems. There was a consensus that an agent with low income would be more likely 
to get involved in agency problems. Respondents did not however rule out the chances 
of people with high income also getting involved in opportunistic tendencies. This 
observation can be supported by cases of greed (Niehoff and Paul, 2000), in which 
individuals are motivated to steal despite being wealthy. 
 
Respondents’ opinion on agent’s marital status suggests that unmarried agents or 
employees are more likely to get involved in opportunistic tendencies. However, they 
were undecided as to whether married agents were less opportunistic. The neutral 
position taken by respondents on married agents indicates that despite married agents 
being generally less prone to involvement in agency problems than unmarried agents, 
they were not entirely excluded from opportunistic tendencies. Existing literature also 
associates unmarried employees with undesirable behaviour at workplaces (e.g. 
Moorthy et al, 2009; Murphy, 1993; Clarke and Hollinger, 1983). 
 
6.3.7 Employers’ level of satisfaction with their employees 
Having given their opinion on the various aspects of agency conflicts, employers or 
principals were also requested to indicate their level of satisfaction with their current 
employees or agents. Some key performance and behavioural attributes of employees 
were used to measure employers’ level of satisfaction. The respondents were required 
to show their level of satisfaction by indicating their extent of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the given employees’ attributes. This entailed a five-point scale of 
mutually exclusive answers i.e. 1.0 for ‘Strongly Dissatisfied’, 2.0 for ‘Dissatisfied’, 3.0 
for ‘Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied’, 4.0 for ‘Satisfied’, and 5.0 for ‘Strongly Satisfied’. 
Results are summarised in Table 6.6. 
 
It is clear from Table 6.6 that employers were generally satisfied with their employees’ 
performance and behaviour. All satisfaction criteria have mean scores of between 3.56 
and 3.88, implying that employers are satisfied, although the level of satisfaction is not 
very strong, as all scores are below 4.0. The low standard deviation scores, for all the 
items upon which opinion was given, show high consistency in the opinion given, 
which strengthens the mean-based conclusion. These results are compared with those 
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of agents in order to establish if there is any significant departure of perception on 
some similar aspect between employers and employees. 
 
Table 6.6: Employers’ satisfaction with their employees 
Employees’ attribute 
Mean 
Score 
Mean 
Score 
Remarks 
Std. Deviation 
Score  
Chi-Square 
(χ²(df=2, N=32)) 
p value 
Job performance 3.88 Satisfied .660 .771 .779 
Professionalism 3.66 Satisfied .483 .020 1.000 
Trustworthiness 3.56 Satisfied .619 1.727 .622 
Self respect  3.84 Satisfied .515 .653 .669 
Respect for employer 3.84 Satisfied .369 .034 1.000 
Altruism 3.69 Satisfied .471 .231 .712 
Analysis Number = 32      
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
A test of association between employers’ job experience and the level of satisfaction 
with some aspects of their employees was carried out. This was meant to determine 
whether or not employer’s experience was important in determining the level of their 
satisfaction with their employees. Employers’ job experience was measured by the 
number of years one had occupied the current job position. Given the mean job 
experience of 6.6 years, all respondents with less than the mean value were 
considered to have less job experience; otherwise they were treated as experienced. 
As summarised in Table 6.6, chi-square results for exact p-value tests, at 0.05 
significance level, show no significant relationship between employers’ job experience 
and the level of satisfaction with employees. Sample size limitations may have affected 
the results. 
 
6.4 Analysis of agents’ opinions 
 
6.4.1 Details of the respondents 
In this section, the questionnaire which was administered to people discharging their 
duties as agents in real estate investment related activities is analysed. Out of 285 
questionnaires distributed, 205 (71.9%) were completed and returned. Out of the 205 
respondents, 45.4% were real estate investors’ employees, namely NSSF, LAPF, 
PSPF, PPF, NHC, IPI (T), Mlimani City, CDC and ANC. All of the employees who 
participated in the study were those involved in real estate investment activities. 47.8% 
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of the respondents were employees of firms offering real estate services such as 
property management, estate agency, marketing, valuation, market studies, building 
designing, and construction. The consultancy firms whose employees took part in the 
survey were those frequently engaged by real estate investors as external contracting 
parties. 
 
The remaining 6.8% of the respondents comprised TIC employees, land officers and 
valuers from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development and 
the three Municipal Councils of Dar es Salaam i.e. Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke. Most 
of these government officials were at some stage involved in the real estate investment 
process in handling land administration and valuation issues. Some of the real estate 
investment activities in which such government officials were involved include: 
processing of title deeds, handling land acquisition, estimating land rents, estimating 
property tax, estimating property transfer values etc. 
 
The mean number of years the respondents were in their present job positions (out of 
199 respondents who answered this question) was 4.2. The minimum time a 
respondent was in the present position was 0.3 years and the maximum time a 
respondent was in the same position was 18 years. The mean daily time each 
respondent spent on real estate activities (out of 186 respondents who answered this 
question) was 6.9 hours. The minimum daily time a respondent spent for real estate 
investment activities was 1.2 hours, and the maximum time was 8 hours. 
 
Frequency distributions of the respondents according to the various attributes were 
computed. Out the 205 respondents 69.8% were male and 30.2% were female, 65.2% 
were married, 34.8% were single. Agewise, 31.2% were in the age category of 30 
years or below, 49.8% were between 31 and 40 years, 15.1% were aged between 41 
and 50 years, and 3.9% were aged 51 years or above. Educationwise, 7.8% had lower 
than graduate education level, 62.9% were graduates, 28.8% had postgraduate 
qualifications and 0.5% were PhD holders. Job term distribution frequency showed that 
77.6% of the respondents had permanent job contracts and 22.4 % had short term job 
contracts. 
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6.4.2 Contractual remedies of agency problems 
A similar analysis of selected descriptive statistics used for principals’ questionnaire 
was applied to the agents’ questionnaire. The effectiveness of the same common 
contractual aspects used by principals or employers to mitigate agency problems was 
measured. The respondents, who were also employees, were asked to assess the 
importance of each remedy of agency problem in holding them back from involvement 
in opportunistic tendencies at their workplaces. Respondents’ opinion was measured 
using a five-point Likert scale i.e. 1.0 for ‘Strongly Disagree’, 2.0 for ‘Disagree’, 3.0 for 
‘Neither Disagree nor Agree’, 4.0 for ‘Agree’, and 5.0 for ‘Strongly Agree’. The results 
are summarised in Table 6.7 (see next page). 
 
The amount of salary an employee gets has the highest mean score with a 
corresponding second lowest standard deviation score, implying high consistency of 
opinion on the aspect. The high rank and low standard deviation for the attribute 
‘prospects for career development’ also shows respondents’ agreement that it is an 
important factor. Respondents also ‘agreed’ that job security, performance bonuses, 
employment contracts, long job contract, and entitlement to a share in the profits, were 
important in preventing them from engaging in opportunistic tendencies. Whereas 
respondents generally did not consider ‘corporate governance institutions’ to be an 
important factor, they were also neutral on the remaining remedies i.e. policies, laws, 
regulations, codified sanctions, and professional bodies and codes of conduct. 
 
Table 6.7: Importance ranking of agency contractual attributes 
Remedy of agency problem Mean Score 
Mean Score 
Ranking 
Std. Deviation 
Score  
Std. Deviation 
Ranking 
Salary amount 4.48 1 .817 2 
Prospects for career development 4.40 2 .774 1 
Job security 4.33 3 .891 5 
Performance bonuses 4.21 4 .901 6 
Agency or employment contacts 3.98 5 .954 7 
Long term job contract 3.78 6 1.109 11 
Entitlement to share of profits 3.76 7 1.078 9 
Policies, laws, rules and regulations 3.27 8 .990 8 
Codified sanctions 3.27 9 1.107 10 
Professional bodies and codes of 
conduct 
3.13 10 .881 4 
Corporate governance institutions 2.47 11 .852 3 
Analysis Number = 203     
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
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The amount of salary an employee gets has the highest mean score with a 
corresponding second lowest standard deviation score, implying high consistency of 
opinion on the aspect. The high rank and low standard deviation for the attribute 
‘prospects for career development’ also shows respondents’ agreement that it is an 
important factor. Respondents also ‘agreed’ that job security, performance bonuses, 
employment contracts, long job contract, and entitlement to a share in the profits, were 
important in preventing them from engaging in opportunistic tendencies. Whereas 
respondents generally did not consider ‘corporate governance institutions’ to be an 
important factor, they were also neutral on the remaining remedies i.e. policies, laws, 
regulations, codified sanctions, and professional bodies and codes of conduct. 
 
These results are different from those obtained in the analysis of principals’ opinions. 
Analysis of principals’ opinion indicated that employers ‘strongly agreed’ that prospects 
for career development, performance bonuses, amount of salary or fee, and job 
security were important in discouraging employees from engaging in opportunistic 
tendencies. The only similarity is that both employers and employees seemed to be 
indifferent as to whether government enforced policies, laws and regulations were 
effective in mitigating agency problems. Respondents’ opinion on government 
enforced institutions concurs with observations reported by some authors (e.g. Nganga 
et al, 2003; Ebohon et al, 2002; de Soto, 2000) about the ineffectiveness of formal 
institutions in many less developed countries. 
 
6.4.3 Association between different attributes 
A further test was carried out to determine the association between the contractual 
remedies of agency problems and various employees’ social characteristics namely 
gender, age, marital status and education. Chi-square (χ²) at 0.05 significance level (α) 
was used to determine the associations between the variables, and Cramer’s V and 
Phi (φ) were appropriately used to determine the strength of the established 
associations. Only the results with statistically significant associations are presented in 
Table 6. 8. 
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Table 6.8: Association between contractual remedies and social attributes 
Associated attributes 
Chi-square 
χ²(df, N) 
p 
value 
Cramer’s V/ 
Phi (φ) 
Age and job security χ²(4,197) = 14.710 0.005 0.266 
Age and long term job contract χ²(4,197) = 19.050 0.001 0.311 
Age and codified sanctions χ²(4,194) = 13.727 0.008 0.266 
Marital status and job security χ²(2,204) = 7.346 0.025 0.190 
Marital status and career development  χ²(1,195) = 3.976 0.046 0.143 
Education and professional bodies and codes of 
conduct 
χ²(4,204) = 16.652 0.002 0.286 
Education and long term job contract χ²(4,204) = 12.265 0.015 0.245 
χ²=chi-square, df=degrees of freedom, N=sample size. Significance level (α) = 0.05, i.e. p<0.05 
 
The results presented in Table 6.8 show some logical associations between various 
contractual attributes and some of the other social attributes, namely age, marital 
status and education. No statistically significant association patterns were observed 
between gender and the other social attributes. Separate associations were 
established between respondent’s age and the importance placed on job security, long 
term job contract and codified sanctions. Although all respondents generally agreed 
that job security was an important remedy of agency problems, a close examination 
across the different age groups shows that more aged employees were much more 
concerned about job security than the less aged. The analysis shows that 67.2% of the 
respondents aged 30 years or less, 81.4% of those aged between 31 and 40 years, 
and 100% of those aged 41 years or above years strongly agreed that job security was 
an important remedy of agency problems. Similarly, it was noted that the more aged 
respondents placed more importance on long term job contracts and sanctions as 
remedies of agency problems. 
 
Another association was established between the type of respondent’s job contract 
(permanent or contract job) and the importance placed on the need for long term job 
contract in addressing agency problems. Results clearly show that respondents whose 
jobs were on contract basis indicated a higher level of agreement on the importance of 
giving employees long term job contacts than the respondents who had permanent job 
contracts. Analysis shows that 78.3% of the respondents with contractual jobs, 
compared to 58.5% of those with permanent job contracts, supported the use of long 
term job contract. This observation concurs with the existing literature which supports 
the use of long term contract to align employees or agents plans with those of their 
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employers (e.g. Parkin et al, 2008). It was noted from the analysis of interviews (in 
Chapter 5) that some employers preferred the use of short term renewable 
employment contracts in order to keep employees or agents ‘worried’ about the 
possibility of losing their jobs when the next contract was renegotiated. Such short 
contracts were however normally tied to performance. 
 
Association was also established between marital status and job security. Principally, 
all respondents agreed that job security was an important remedy of agency problems. 
Association results however show that 85% of married respondents, compared to 69% 
of unmarried respondents, strongly agreed that job security was an important remedy 
of agency problems. Marital status was also noted to be associated with prospects for 
career development. Results show that 59.1% of married respondents, compared to 
44.1% of unmarried respondents, placed high importance on prospects for career 
development in checking agency problems. 
 
Another pattern of association was noted between the level of education and the 
importance of professional bodies and codes of conduct, and between the level of 
education and the importance of long term job contract. In both cases, there was a 
high percentage of more educated (graduate and above) placing high importance on 
the two remedies of agency problem. For instance, whereas only 12.2% of the 
respondents whose educational level was less than that of a graduate agreed that 
professional bodies and codes of conduct were important remedies, 48.1% of graduate 
respondents were in support of these remedies. The main reason could be that most of 
the graduates are affiliated to professional bodies such as NCPS for valuers and land 
surveyors, ERB for engineers, AQSRB for architects and quantity surveyors. Most of 
the non-graduate respondents were not affiliated to any professional bodies. The 
associations observed between most of the attributes are not strong. This can be 
confirmed by looking at Cramer’s V and Phi (φ) values, all of which (except that 
between age and long job contract) are less than 0.3, implying small effect size. 
 
6.4.4 Non-contractual remedies of agency problems 
Respondents amongst employees also gave their opinion on various non-contractual 
remedies of agency problems. Similarly, the analysis of their opinion is based on mean 
and standard deviation scores. Like in other cases, respondents were asked to 
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indicate their levels of agreement or disagreement with some statements about the 
importance of some selected non-contractual variables in motivating them not to 
engage in opportunistic tendencies at their places of work. The same set of non-
contractual remedies given to principals was given to agents. Likewise, their opinion 
was measured using a five-point Likert scale i.e. 1.0 for ‘Strongly Disagree’, 2.0 for 
‘Disagree’, 3.0 for ‘Neither Disagree nor Agree’, 4.0 for ‘Agree’ and 5.0 for ‘Strongly 
Agree’. Descriptive statistics results are presented in Table 6.9 (see next page). 
 
Table 6.9: Importance ranking of agency non-contractual attributes 
Attribute Mean Score 
Mean Score 
Ranking 
Std. Deviation 
Score  
Std. Deviation 
Ranking 
Self respect 4.69 1 .555 1 
Religious belief (spirituality) 4.57 2 .928 10 
Trustworthiness 4.54 3 .682 5 
Fear of social sanctions 4.52 4 .586 2 
Altruism 4.49 5 .741 7 
Social code of conduct 4.39 6 .786 8 
Implications on social network 4.29 7 .592 3 
Respect for taboos 4.29 8 .696 4 
Respect for social norms 3.95 9 .721 6 
Respect for customs and traditions 3.87 10 1.039 11 
Respect for employer 3.72 11 .814 9 
Analysis Number = 196     
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
From the descriptive statistics results in Table 6.9, it is clear that all the listed non-
contractual variables seem to be important in constraining agents’ behaviour. 
Respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that self respect, spirituality, trustworthiness, and social 
sanctions are important factors in making them shun opportunistic tendencies at their 
places of work. Respondents also ‘agree’ that all the remaining factors are also 
important in motivating them to abide by their employment contracts. These findings 
are slightly different from those obtained in the analysis of principals’ opinion on the 
same remedies. Principals or employers placed slightly little weight on non-contractual 
remedies of agency problems compared to employees. 
 
6.4.5 Association between other attributes and non-contractual remedies 
Several patterns of associations were noted between non-contractual remedies of 
agency problems and various agents’ social characteristics namely age, marital status, 
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gender and education. Chi-square (χ²) at 0.05 significance level was used to determine 
the associations between the variables, and Cramer’s V and Phi (φ) were appropriately 
used to determine the strength of the established associations. Only the results with 
statistically significant associations are presented in Table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.10: Association between agent’s social characteristics and non-
contractual remedies 
Associated attributes 
Chi-square 
χ²(df, N) p values 
Cramer’s V/ 
Phi (φ) 
Age and self respect χ²(2,193) = 9.048 0.011 0.217 
Age and respect from employer χ²(4,196) = 10.169 0.038 0.161 
Age and care for employer’s welfare χ²(2,183) = 10.928 0.004 0.244 
Age and trustworthiness χ²(1,190) = 6.811 0.033 0.189 
Marital status and self respect χ²(1,200) = 5.956 0.015 0.173 
Marital status and social code of conduct χ²(2,187) = 9.194 0.002 0.222 
Gender and customs and traditions χ²(2,205) = 15.108 0.001 0.271 
Education and care for employer’s welfare χ²(2,190) = 9.056 0.011 0.218 
Education and trustworthiness χ²(2,197) = 7.693 0.021 0.198 
χ²=chi-square, df=degrees of freedom, N=sample size. Significance level (α) = 0.05, i.e. p<0.05 
 
From Table 6.10 it can be seen that although respondent generally agreed that self 
respect was an important agency problem remedy, the degree of the remedy approval 
was noted to be associated with respondent’s age. A larger proportion of the more 
aged respondents, compared to the less aged, strongly agreed that self respect was 
an important remedy. Analysis shows that 59.7% of those aged between 30 years or 
less, 76% of those aged between 31 and 40, and 87.1% of those aged between 41 
and 50 ‘strongly agreed’ that self respect was an important remedy of agency 
problems. Respondent’s age was also associated with the importance placed on 
respect from employer as a remedy of agency problems. Similarly, although all 
respondents agreed that employer’s respect was important, respondents aged 30 
years or less seemed to be relatively less keen on this attribute. The level of 
importance placed on self respect as a remedy of agency problem was also noted to 
be associated with marital status. Results show that 78% of married respondents, 
compared to 61.8% of unmarried, strongly agreed that agent’s self respect was an 
important remedy of agency problems. 
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Respondent’s marital status was also observed to be associated with the importance 
placed on social code of conduct as a remedy of agency problems. Married 
respondents showed more agreement, compared to unmarried respondents, that 
employees’ respect for social code of conduct was an important factor for their non-
involvement in opportunistic tendencies. Results show that 64.5% of married 
respondents, compared to only 41.3% of unmarried respondents, agreed that 
employees’ respect for social code of conduct was an important remedy of agency 
problems. Another association was noted between age and trustworthiness. 
Respondents within the 30 years and less age group showed relatively less agreement 
on the importance of trustworthiness in discouraging employees from engaging in 
opportunistic tendencies. 
 
A relationship was also observed between respondent’s gender and the degree of 
agreement of the importance employee’s respect for customs and traditions in 
checking agency problems. Analysis indicates that 85.5% of the female respondents, 
compared to 76.2% of male respondents, supported that respect for customs and 
traditions was one of the reasons they refrained from opportunistic tendencies at their 
work places. The level of employee’s education was also seen to be associated with 
the importance one placed on care for employer’s welfare and trustworthiness as 
remedies of opportunistic tendencies. Respondents with less than graduate education 
level showed relatively less approval on the importance of both attributes. All the 
observed associations between the different attributes were not very strong. This can 
be observed from the corresponding small Cramer’s V and Phi (φ) values, all of which 
are less than 0.3, thus generally considered to have small size effect. 
 
6.4.6 Important factors when making decisions not related to job 
A further test was carried out to determine whether employees or other agents 
behaved differently when making their workplace decisions and when making other 
decisions not related to their job. For this particular question, respondents were asked 
to indicate the degree of importance they placed on some behaviour constraints while 
making decisions which were not related to their jobs. Similarly, respondents were 
supposed to show their level of agreement with eight different statements, each 
containing a factor when making decision. Similarly, opinion was measured using a 
five-point Likert scale i.e. 1.0 for ‘Strongly Disagree’, 2.0 for ‘Disagree’, 3.0 for ‘Neither 
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Disagree nor Agree’, 4.0 for ‘Agree’, and 5.0 for ‘Strongly Agree’. The results are 
summarised in Table 6.11. 
 
Table 6.11: Importance ranking of attributes for non-work related decisions 
 
 
Attribute Mean Score 
Mean Score 
Ranking 
Std. 
Deviation 
Score  
Std. 
Deviation 
Ranking 
Self respect 4.77 1 .604 3 
Trustworthiness 4.73 2 .572 2 
Altruism 4.63 3 .534 1 
Fear of social sanctions 4.44 4 .622 4 
Legal implications 4.41 5 .781 6 
Religious belief 4.40 6 1.073 7 
Fear of taboos 4.33 7 .684 5 
Respect for customs and traditions 3.80 8 1.101 8 
Analysis Number = 203     
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
It is evident from Table 6.11 that there was no significant difference in the degree of 
importance placed by the respondents on the various factors when making job related 
decisions or when making other decisions. There were some small variations in some 
factors though. Whereas ‘self respect’ ranked first in both decision making scenarios, 
respondents seemed to strongly agree that spirituality, trustworthiness and social 
sanctions were other important considerations when making job-related decisions. 
They also agreed, not strongly though, that the other factors were also important. Apart 
from self respect, employees strongly agreed that trustworthiness and care for the 
interest of others were important when making decisions which were not job-related. 
Spirituality was slightly low ranked in non-job related decisions, which seems to be 
abnormal, but the mean score was not very different (i.e. only 0.17) and standard 
deviation was high, implying inconsistency in the respondents’ opinion on the attribute. 
 
6.4.7 Comparison of contractual and non-contractual remedies 
Having considered contractual and non-contractual remedies separately, this section 
compares the two types of remedies in terms of their perceived importance as 
indicated by the respondents amongst employees and other agents. The results are 
summarised in Figure 6.2 (see next page). These results are further compared with 
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those obtained from a similar analysis of employers and other principals (refer to 
Figure 6.1). 
It is clear from Figure 6.2 that non-contractual remedies take the lead. In a combined 
treatment based on mean scores, the first five top remedies of agency problems 
constitute non-contractual constraints of human behaviour. The five remedies can only 
be administered by understanding the prevailing informal institutions in the society or 
community in question. Employees ‘strongly agreed’ that self moral values 
(trustworthiness and respect), spirituality, and social sanctions were important in 
addressing agency problems among them. 
 
Figure 6.2 Agents’ ranking of contractual and non-contractual remedies 
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Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
Society’s culture defines moral values upheld by the members of the respective 
society. Spirituality is also a key component of culture and has been cited by some 
authors (e.g. Al-Shaikh, 2003; Hanegraaff, 1996) to be one of the determinants of 
people’s behaviour in many societies. Some authors (e.g. Neusner and Chilton, 2005; 
Saroglou et al, 2005; Bernt, 1989; Burhoe, 1979) also associate altruism with 
spirituality. Altruism has been strongly used by opponents of agency theory (e.g. 
Bathula, 2008; Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2005; Temel-Candemir, 2005; 
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Ridley, 1996; Brennan, 1994) to water down the assertion that human beings are self-
centred opportunists. The high mean score (i.e. 4.49) to the attribute ‘care for the 
employer’s welfare’ suggests that many employees have altruistic elements. 
 
Contractual remedies dominate at the bottom, showing respondents’ low approval on 
their importance in constraining their behaviour at workplace. For instance, the last 
four remedies at the bottom namely, policies, laws, regulations, codified sanctions, 
professional bodies and codes of conduct, and corporate governance institutions, all 
constitute formal institutions. Respondents ‘disagreed’ that corporate government 
institutions were important in checking employees’ opportunistic tendencies. They 
were also neutral about the other three remedies. 
 
These findings strongly suggest that formal institutions in Tanzania are still weak and 
less effective compared to informal institutions in constraining human behaviour. 
These results are different from those obtained in the analysis of principals’ opinions 
(compare Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). Respondents amongst employers and other 
principals generally consider contractual aspects of agency problems remedies to be 
more important than non-contractual aspects. This disparity in perception on the 
effective remedies of agency conflicts between employers and employees or principals 
and agents may partly explain the difficulties in addressing agency problems in the real 
estate investment activities in Tanzania. The disparity suggests that principals do not 
always know what can best motivate their agents not to behave opportunistically. 
 
6.4.8 Employees level of satisfaction with their workplace status quo 
The general level of employees’ satisfaction with their current jobs was tested. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with nine attributes 
related to their current jobs. Their opinion was measured using a five-point scale of 
mutually exclusive answers i.e. 1.0 for ‘Strongly Dissatisfied’, 2.0 for ‘Dissatisfied’, 3.0 
for ‘Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied’, 4.0 for ‘Satisfied’, and 5.0 for ‘Strongly Satisfied’. 
Results are summarised in Table 6.12. 
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Table 6.12: Agents’ level of satisfaction with status quo 
Satisfaction attribute Mean Score 
Mean Score 
Remarks Std. Deviation Score  
Job 3.63 Satisfied 1.125 
Salary 3.16 Neutral 1.162 
Monetary incentives 2.98 Neutral .876 
Non-monetary Incentives 3.22 Neutral .870 
Job security 3.90 Satisfied 1.202 
Career development prospects 3.70 Satisfied 1.082 
Decision-making freedom 3.40 Neutral 1.149 
Respect from employer 3.81 Satisfied .984 
Trust from employer 4.20 Satisfied .720 
Analysis Number = 203    
Source: Analysis of questionnaire, 2011 
 
Table 6.12 shows that employees are generally satisfied with some aspects and 
neutral with others. Employees indicated to be satisfied with the respect and trust they 
get from their employers. They also seemed to be satisfied with their current jobs, job 
security, and career development. They were though indifferent about their level of 
satisfaction with the amount of salary they get, incentives (both monetary and non-
monetary) and job related decision-making freedom. Neutrality on these aspects may 
partly explain the prevalence of agency problems in real estate investment activities, 
although it is also quite possible that even if employees had indicated to be satisfied 
with all the given aspects, they could for some other reasons still have been involved in 
agency problems. Various strands of literature (e.g. van Ees et al, 2009; Nagar et al, 
2003; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Jensen and Kevin, 1990) advocate the use of 
incentives to mitigate agency problems. Other authors (e.g. Clarke, 2005; Coffee, 
2004; Gibler and Black, 2004; Healey and Palepu, 2003) indicate failure of incentives 
in addressing agency problems. 
 
A comparison of these results with employers’ opinions on some aspects of their 
employees, shows some disparity between employees and employers level of 
satisfaction. Employers indicated to be generally satisfied with their employees, 
despite acknowledging that agency problem was still a serious problem with their 
employees. It is clear that employers need to be aware of some employees’ aspects 
which are vital in explaining employees’ opportunistic tendencies. Appreciating 
employees’ concerns would help employers deal with agency problems more 
effectively. 
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6.4.9 Association between some attributes and satisfaction with status quo 
The variables listed in Table 6.12 were also considered along with some agent’s social 
factors which constrain human behaviour, namely gender, marital status, age and 
education. Other factors such as time in the job and type of the job were also cross-
tabulated with respondents’ level of satisfaction with their workplaces status quo. Table 
6.13 summarises the results of the analysis. The results shown in the table are only 
those having significant associations. 
 
Table 6.13: Association between agent’s social characteristics and satisfaction 
with status quo 
Associated attributes 
Chi-square 
χ²(df, N)* 
p 
value 
Cramer’s V/ 
Phi (φ) 
Gender and satisfaction with current job security χ²(2, 205) = 7.457 0.019 0.191 
Gender and satisfaction with decision-making 
freedom 
χ²(2,204) = 15.859 0.000 0.272 
Marital status and satisfaction with current job χ²(2,204) = 6.023 0.049 0.172 
Marital status and employer’s trust χ²(2,201) = 14.335 0.001 0.267 
Marital status and satisfaction with career 
development 
χ²(2,204) = 9.717 0.008 0.218 
Marital status and satisfaction with monetary 
incentives 
χ²(2,204) = 9.053 0.011 0.211 
Marital status and satisfaction with current job 
security 
χ²(2,204) = 16.281 0.000 0.283 
Age and satisfaction with current job security  χ²(4,197) = 20.193 0.001 0.226 
Age and satisfaction with current job χ²(4,197) = 13.855 0.008 0.188 
Age and satisfaction with career development χ²(4,197) =18.636 0.001 0.217 
Age and satisfaction with respect from employer χ²(4,197) = 9.952 0.041 0.159 
Age and satisfaction with employer’s trust χ²(4,197) = 15.133 0.005 0.197 
χ²=chi-square, df=degrees of freedom, N=sample size. Significance level (α) = 0.05, i.e. p<0.05 
 
As presented in Table 6.13, chi-square results show significant association between 
some of the attributes and the respondents’ level of satisfaction with some aspects 
related to current jobs. Respondent’s gender was noted to be associated with the 
degree of satisfaction with job security and decision making freedom. In both 
associations, male respondents indicated to be more satisfied than female 
respondents. For instance, 78.3% male respondents compared to 69.4% female 
respondents, were satisfied with security of their current job. Similarly, 65.7% of male 
respondents, compared to 40.3% of female respondents, indicated to be satisfied with 
decision making freedom given by their employers. These findings may be supported 
by the fact that women in Tanzania still generally play little role compared to men in 
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decision making, both at workplaces and in the society as a whole. The effect of the 
perceived women marginalisation could have instilled a feeling of job insecurity for 
some women, as indicated by findings of this study. 
 
Respondent’s marital status was also noted to be associated with respondents’ level of 
satisfaction on a number of aspects, namely current job, career development 
prospects, job security, employer’s trust and incentives. Married respondents were 
generally more satisfied than single respondents. For instance, results show that 
77.4% of married respondents, compared to 62% of single respondents were satisfied 
with current jobs. Similarly, 71.4% of married respondents, compared to 56.3% of 
single respondents, indicated satisfaction with prospects for career development in 
their current jobs. On the question of job security, 83.5% of married respondents, 
compared to 60.6% of single respondents, indicated satisfaction with security of their 
current jobs. Although all respondents showed to be very satisfied with the trust they 
get from their employers, the proportion of satisfied respondents was higher in married 
respondents (i.e. 95.4%, compared to 91.5%) for single respondents. Married 
respondents were however more dissatisfied with monetary incentives compared to 
single respondents. Results show that 47.9% of married respondents, compared to 
29.3% of single respondents, were dissatisfied with incentives offered by their 
employers. Generally, these findings indicate that married employees are more reliable 
than unmarried employees, implying that the former are less prone to agency problems 
than the latter. These findings also concur with observations previously reported by 
other authors (e.g. Robbins et al, 2007; Lam et al, 2001; Niehoff and Paul, 2000). 
 
More associations were observed between respondents’ age groups and the 
satisfaction with their current job, security of their current job, career development 
prospects at the present workplaces, trust and respect they got from their employers. 
The general trend of the results indicates that the level of satisfaction was directly 
related to respondents’ age groups. Except for career development, in which a larger 
proportion of the less aged indicated to be less dissatisfied than the aged ones, in all 
other aspects a larger proportion of the more aged indicated that they were more 
satisfied with the current state. Again, the findings seem to suggest that less aged 
employees (30 years or less, in this case) are more prone to agency problems in real 
estate investment activities than the more aged ones. The findings also concur with 
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those reported in the analysis of interviews, in which young employees were reported 
to have been more frequently associated with opportunistic tendencies than aged 
employees. 
 
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter covered analysis of employers and employees questionnaires. Mean and 
standard deviation scores were used to rank both contractual and non-contractual 
remedies of agency problems in terms of their importance as perceived by the 
respondents. Results show significant disparity in perception on the importance and 
effectiveness of various agency problem remedies between employers and 
employees. The findings show that whereas employers accord more importance to 
contractual remedies, employees are generally of the view that non-contractual 
remedies are more effective in holding them back from opportunistic tendencies at 
their workplaces. Both categories of remedies were also cross-tabulated with other 
social attributes namely, age gender, marital status and education. Chi-square, with a 
0.05 significance level (α), was used to establish association between the different 
attributes. Cramer’s V and Phi (φ) were used to measure the strength of association 
between the attributes. Several remedies were noted to be associated with the other 
social attributes, although the strength of association was not high. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings of the study, conclusion and recommendations. Results 
of the analyses and discussions presented in the previous chapters are matched with 
objectives of the study and the corresponding research questions to draw conclusions 
and make informed academic and policy recommendations. This chapter also shows 
the contribution of the present study to the body of knowledge and in solving real life 
problems faced by investors, consultants and policy makers in the area of real estate 
investment, corporate governance and human resource management. Areas requiring 
further study are also presented in this chapter. 
 
7.2 Findings 
In a broad perspective, this study was based on institutions, both formal and informal, 
which underlie interactions in the real estate investment activities. The focus of 
investigation was real estate investment activities of some selected investors in 
Tanzania. The main objective of the study was to investigate agency problems in real 
estate investment activities and to determine the effectiveness of institutional remedies 
and other human behaviour drivers in mitigating the problems. In addressing this 
objective, four research questions were used. Sub-sections 7.2.1 – 7.2.7 present the 
findings for the research questions. 
 
7.2.1 Property investment and the institutional environment 
The history of real estate investment sector in Tanzania is clearly defined by the 
prevailing institutions of the time. The sector has reflected and mirrored the three 
different main institutional eras through which Tanzania has passed. The pre-
independence period was mainly characterized by colonial institutions which to a large 
extent did not promote equity in urban development. The structure of the built 
environment of urban centres during the period clearly reflected racial and class 
superiority of people. The urban architecture, whose remnants are still evident todate, 
also reflected social classes. Government role in public housing sector was minimal. 
The few foreign banks mainly focused on financing merchandise and plantation 
businesses which were operated by foreigners. The period prior to independence was 
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also characterised by colonial institutions and structures which did not support the 
majority of people, especially the natives, to take part in investment activities. 
 
A few years after achieving independence in 1961, Tanzania started embracing a 
socialist ideology. In 1967, a major policy shift was made and through Arusha 
Declaration the country was officially declared socialist. The ensuing era was 
predominantly characterised by socialist institutions. The state controlled the economy, 
which sidelined the private sector. In the course of implementing the Arusha 
Declaration, a large number of private urban rental properties were nationalised. The 
state was the only key player in the property market sector. Most of the government 
initiatives in the real estate sector during this period were mainly aimed at addressing 
urban housing shortage. Socialist policies significantly attenuated private property 
rights, which consequently paralysed the real estate investment sector. 
 
Persistent economic hardship experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s left the 
government with no option but to reconsider market economy policies. In the mid 
1980s the government started implementing institutional reforms, which marked the 
third institutional phase. Institutional reforms are still on-going. During this period, 
many policies, laws, regulations and rules have been changed to pave way for market 
economy structures. In the course of implementing market economy policies, more 
than 300 state-owned enterprises have been privatized, which has significantly 
reduced government’s active role in commercial activities. The real estate sector has 
substantially benefited from the reforms. Reforms have attracted pension funds and 
other institutional investors into the real estate sector. Foreign real estate investors are 
also gradually getting attracted. Commercial banks too have gradually started issuing 
finance for real estate development. The government still owns some enterprises, 
although most of them are those engaged in offering basic public goods and services. 
 
The process of institutional reforms which is aimed at getting rid of inefficient 
institutions has not been smooth. Sometimes the process took a wrong approach. A 
number of authors (e.g. Williamson, 2009; Alonso, 2009; Tabellini, 2008) have, for 
instance, criticised institutional reforms in developing countries for concentrating on 
transplanting institutional responses which are observed to be efficient in developed 
countries, but do not match with the informal institutional framework of the host 
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countries. The effect of superimposing foreign institutions could partly explain the 
failure of socialist institutions introduced in Tanzania after independence. It could also 
partly explain the ineffectiveness of some formal institutions introduced during the 
reforms period. 
 
As a result, the government has from time to time been forced to amend pieces of 
legislation which received resistance from the society. Many pieces of land legislation 
have been under constant opposition from some section of the society, which put the 
government under pressure to change them. For instance, the Land Act No. 4 of 1999 
and Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999, which are the principal pieces of land legislation in 
Tanzania, have been widely criticised by proponents of the Shivji Commission Report7. 
The government has made some changes to the statutes, but some stakeholders are 
still not satisfied. 
 
Another huddle to institutional reforms is interference by influential people who would 
block any institution that endangers their personal interests. Sometimes inefficient 
institutions persist in the society to serve the interests of those with political power 
(Harriss et al, 1995; Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990). The government of Tanzania has 
similarly been under constant public pressure calling for rewriting or repealing of some 
pieces of legislation, which are considered not to serve the wider interests of the 
society. This includes the long time public struggle to have the constitution rewritten. 
40 pieces of repressive legislation were identified and recommended to be repealed by 
the Nyalali Commission8 in 1992. More changes to legislation were recommended by 
the Kissanga Committee9 in 1998. The government has been very reluctant to 
implement some of the recommended legislation changes. 
 
The three institutional phases experienced by Tanzania clearly demonstrate how the 
real estate investment process is dependently connected to the prevailing institutional 
environment of the market setting in question. The level of real estate sector 
development in Tanzania over the three periods reflected and mirrored the prevailing 
                                            
7 Shivji Commission refers to the presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, formed in 1996. 
The Commission was chaired by Prof. Issa Shivji. 
8 Nyalali Commission refers to the presidential Commission of Inquiry into Political Party System (Mono 
or Multi Party System), formed in 1991. The Commission was chaired by Justice Francis Nyalali. 
9 Kissanga Committee refers to the presidential Committee on Government White Paper, formed in 
1998. The Committee was chaired by Justice Robert Kissanga. 
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institutional environment. During the first two institutional epochs, the sector was 
dormant due to the insignificant presence of institutional and private investors in the 
market. 
 
Despite some success recorded during reforms, real estate investment sector still 
lacks some important institutions. For instance, there are still no comprehensive 
institutions catering for investment performance and analysis. The investment 
performance measurements common in the market are too simplistic and could even 
be easily manipulated to portray results desired by investment managers. Return on 
Investment (ROI) is the investment performance measure used by pension funds and 
NHC. ROI is widely criticised for being a rudimentary measure. Some previous studies 
(e.g. Matotola, 2009; Mpogole, 2006; Geho, 2004) recommend the use of Total 
Returns (TR) measures such as Time Weighted Rate of Return (TWRR) and Money 
Weighted Rate of Return (MWRR). Despite the recommendations, the use of such 
Total Returns measures were, during this study, still not common with pension funds 
and NHC. 
 
7.2.2 Catalysts of agency problems in real estate investment activities 
It is clear that agency conflicts arise out of information asymmetry existing between 
principals and agents. The main assumption being that the agent, having more 
information than the principal, will use the opportunity to pursue own goals at the 
expense of the principal. Practice however suggests that this general assumption does 
not always hold water. Agents subjected to different situations would behave 
differently. The nature of the activity for which the agency agreement is created can 
also determine the extent to which the agent takes advantage of information 
asymmetry. This study has demonstrated how agency problems arise in real estate 
investment activities. 
 
Real estate investment is a complex process involving a number of interrelated 
activities. Some of the common activities in the real estate investment process include 
land acquisition, feasibility studies, building designing, construction, marketing, renting, 
property management, investment appraisal and valuation. Normally, the different 
activities require different people with different professional backgrounds. The number 
and diversity of people required in the process is also a function of the size of the real 
220  7 Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations 
estate investment project. For small family projects, members of families may be 
adequate to accomplish most of the activities, but for large scale undertakings 
engagement of outsiders becomes inevitable. 
 
It was evident from the real estate investors covered in this study that real estate 
investment projects were both labour and capital intensive. Most of the activities also 
demanded much specialised skills and knowledge. The law was used in some cases to 
restrict some activities such as real estate valuation to be done only by registered and 
licenced professionals. It was also evident that a large number of principals, especially 
the ultimate investment owners, either did have little knowledge about real estate 
investment or did not have the knowledge at all. All these facts increased specificity of 
real estate investment activities, which as a result magnified information asymmetry, 
and thus the potential for agency problems. Principal’s exposure to agency problems 
was high, and even the monitoring of agents’ actions was difficult because of lack of 
expertise in what they were doing. 
 
Owing to the complexity and labour intensiveness of the real estate investment 
process, large investors inevitably need to engage many people and firms to execute 
the various activities. Accordingly, all large real estate investors, such as pension 
funds, NHC and some foreign investors in Tanzania had been using different types of 
agents in their real estate investment activities. Common types of agents used by 
these investors were the in-house employees and external contracting parties such as 
property management firms, estate agents, building contractors, architects, 
government agencies, individual consultants etc. For each kind of these agents, a 
different agency relationship was created, triggering agency conflicts. 
 
It was evident from this study that the extent of agency problems differed amongst the 
different employers and principals covered in the study. This reflected the 
effectiveness of remedies applied by the different principals, the nature of the activities, 
and the nature of the agents. A number of common catalysts of agents’ opportunistic 
behaviour were revealed. Whereas most of the catalysts were exogenous to the 
agents, others were endogenous. Greed of individual agents was mostly cited to be 
one of the main drivers of agents’ opportunistic tendencies. Weak controls and 
monitoring systems of some principals were cited to be some of such catalysts. 
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Loopholes in some laws and regulations, and the general lack of respect for such 
institutions were other important catalysts of opportunistic tendencies. 
 
Some drivers of opportunistic behaviour originated from the deeds of principals. It was 
revealed that some agents reverted to opportunistic tendencies in protest of being 
unfairly treated by their principals. This was observed to be common with employees 
getting lower salaries than their expectations. Employees’ salary expectations were 
based on comparison with salaries of their co-workers, similar employees in the sector, 
or their contribution to the earnings of their employers. The practice in the real estate 
industry had been to determine employees’ salary by comparing with salaries of 
people with similar jobs in the market. This method of determining salary only helps the 
employer to retain the employees but not keeping them faithful. It was also not clear 
how some employers determined salaries for their employees. What was clear was 
that salaries paid by the employers in the real estate sector were not index-adjusted, 
which did not guarantee employees basic needs. 
 
Efficiency wage theory provides that the productivity of workers in firms is positively 
correlated with the wages they receive (Krueger and Summers, 1988). Highly paid 
employees tend to have more job satisfaction and therefore work harder (Okpara, 
2005; Okpara, 2004). The importance of sufficient salary was long emphasised by 
Adam Smith (1776), who stated that ‘…a man must always live by his work and his 
wages must at least be sufficient to maintain him…’ Various studies (e.g. Niehoff and 
Paul, 2000; Hollinger and Clark, 1983) also show that financial hardships tempt 
employees’ faithfulness. 
 
Marginalisation of agents in decisions making was also seen to be a potential driver for 
agents’ opportunistic actions. Agents’ opportunistic actions were also noted to be 
aggravated by pressure from the society. It was reported that many employed people 
in Tanzania were under a heavy financial obligation imposed by the extended family 
culture. Sometimes agents, especially young employees, found themselves under 
pressure to maintain pre-marital relationships, some of which required money. It was 
also reported that some young employees could also not stand seeing their peers, 
mainly school or age mates, possess more valuable assets than themselves. Lack of 
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secure social security system, coupled with generally low salaries was also found to 
contribute to employees’ dishonesty to their employers. 
 
The set up of pension funds and the discretion the government enjoyed in changing 
pension funds’ legislation were also revealed to be catalysts of agency problems in 
real estate investment activities. With the current set up of pension funds in Tanzania, 
members cannot precisely determine the amount of pension they would get upon 
retirement. This is mainly contributed by the discretionary powers currently enjoyed by 
the government over the legislation governing pension funds. The government could at 
anytime change the legislation to suit the needs of the politicians in power. At times, 
the legislation change could be to the detriment of the members. With the current 
situation, there is no binding obligation placed on the government to pay out a 
predetermined sum of pension money to members. Although the pension funds seem 
to portray themselves as more of defined-benefits plans, their failure to guarantee 
stable income to pensioners make them look like defined contribution plans. Such 
government powers to change pension funds legislation, give room to the government 
and administrators of pension funds to mismanage the funds or invest the funds in 
sub-optimal investment avenues. 
 
Lack of adequate knowledge about pension funds amongst their members was also 
noted to be another potential catalyst of agency problems. Despite having reasonable 
education (graduate), participants of FGDs, for instance, showed to have very little 
knowledge of what pension funds were and how they operated. This observation 
suggests that many members of pension funds knew little about the activities of their 
pension funds. The little interest in the affairs of pension funds by its members 
provided room to the sponsor (the government) and administrators (Boards and 
Managements) of the pension funds to pursue their own objectives by engaging in 
investment activities that did not always reflect the best management of members’ 
funds. The sponsor and administrators apparently took advantage of members’ docility 
to sometimes take on controversial investment projects. Owing to their capital 
intensiveness and lumpiness, real estate investment projects were cited to be the 
media for misuse and embezzlement of funds. 
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The problem of lack of knowledge was also observed in most of the real estate 
investors. The majority of the senior officials of the pension funds, for instance, did not 
have real estate expertise. Despite having few in-house staff with specialised real 
estate training, they did not make full use of them. Sometimes, real estate investors’ 
officials without much knowledge of real estate issues were reportedly the ones in 
charge of negotiations and agreements with external contracting parties offering real 
estate services. This was very common with pension funds all of which did not have 
any real estate experts amongst management team members. This aggravated 
information asymmetry, and thus increased exposure to agency problems. The 
problem of lack of knowledge was also observed to face tender evaluation committees. 
Again, this was more serious in pension funds. Their tender evaluation committees did 
not always have people with adequate expertise on many aspects of real estate. 
Frequently, less competent officials were used in evaluating technical proposals 
submitted by real estate consultants. The use of less competent people increased 
chances of rejecting good proposals and accepting the bad ones. 
 
It was also revealed that there was an emerging behaviour in the society which 
seemed to condone illegally obtained wealth, especially for the wealth illegally 
obtained from one’s employer or business partner. This is compounded by another 
revelation that some agents, especially employees, got involved in opportunistic 
tendencies in compliance with group norms and culture at their workplaces. This 
suggests moral decay in the society and is a signal that informal institutions were also 
somehow ineffective in checking opportunistic tendencies in the society. On the other 
hand, agents’ dishonesty, especially cheating, was attributed to stiff competition in the 
job market. 
 
7.2.3 Forms of agency problems in real estate investment 
As many strands of literature (e.g. Rebernik and Bradac, 2006; Popov and Simonova, 
2006; Aubert et al, 2003; Cieleback, 2004; Williamson, 1985) suggest, agency 
problems take many forms such as shirking, carelessness, falsehoold, larceny, fraud, 
free-riding, cost-padding, exploitation and negligence. This study has identified a list of 
common forms of agency problems in the real estate investment operations of some 
selected investors in Tanzania. Shirking, carelessness and lack of maximum job 
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commitment are some of the forms of agency problems which were reported to be very 
commonly associated with agents in the real estate investment activities. 
 
Many forms of cheating were also widely reported. Overstatement of agents’ 
qualifications and capacity while applying for jobs was one of the very common forms 
of cheating. This was noted to be common for both individuals applying for jobs and 
consultancy firms tendering for jobs to provide various real estate services. Cheating 
was also observed in unreported or intentional delayed reporting of property lettings or 
sales. Other forms of cheating were overpricing supplies, submitting forged invoices 
and reports, procuring sub-standard materials, delaying cash banking and 
manipulating currency exchange rates in order to appropriate exchange gain. Other 
agents inflated maintenance budgets for buildings, plant and machinery, etc. Cases of 
asset theft by employees were also reported. 
 
Graft was also revealed to be quite common especially amongst employees of the 
pension funds and NHC and some private real estate consultancy firms. Fulfilling of 
political interests and promises using principals’ resources was also found to be a 
common concern. This problem mainly entailed politicians and senior government 
officials informally interfering with pension funds operations. Owing to their labour and 
capital intensiveness, some real estate investment projects undertaken by pension 
funds were noted to have been associated with corruption. Similarly, NHC real estate 
investment operations were also highly vulnerable to politicians’ and senior 
government officials’ interference. 
 
It was also revealed that some agents disclosed principals confidential information for 
their personal gain, or just carelessly. These cases were particularly common in 
competitive tendering of jobs announced by pension funds and NHC. Some unfaithful 
employees were reported to secretly share important inside information with potential 
bidders. Some agents also did not disclose conflicts of interests in some activities they 
were assigned to perform by their principals. This resulted into underperformance or 
sabotages. Conflicts of interest sometimes also resulted into some employees 
redirecting clients to their secret companies in which they had (conflict of) interests. 
Another observation was that, many agency and employment contracts were 
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incomplete or vague, which gave agents discretionary powers to decide on some 
matters. 
 
It was also evident that foreign real estate investors were practically dependent on TIC 
services. One of the ways foreign investors could own land in Tanzania was through 
TIC. Foreign investors also got some information on land availability from this 
government agency. Despite the efforts made by TIC and other government agencies 
to facilitate investment activities in the country, there were many complaints from 
investors. These complaints mainly took the nature of imperfect commitment. Investors 
complained that TIC and other government departments either did not fulfill their 
promises at all, or they did not do it in time. 
 
The set-up of pension funds in Tanzania was also noted to allow many agency 
problems. The government was seen to have been using its powers to manipulate the 
pension system in order to be able to exercise control of investment operations and 
financial management of pension funds. This automatically made the government a 
major source of agency problems in the investment operations of pension funds. Real 
estate related investment decisions were reported to be one of the main media through 
which the government pursued its opportunistic tendencies. The opportunistic tone set 
by the government and politicians on pension funds operations had a trickle-down 
effect, which intensified agency problems. Many authors (e.g. Drucker, 2007; Schwartz 
et al, 2005; Niehoff and Paul, 2000) agree that whatever the tone the senior 
management sets, it will have a trickle-down effect on employees of the company. 
Similarly, the tone set by government officials and politicians has a trickle-down effect 
in the ranks of public corporations. If the tone set by such officials does not uphold 
ethics and integrity, agents or employees would also be inclined to uphold the same 
values, and vice versa. 
 
Although agents were the central focus of agency problems, it has also been revealed 
in this study that principals were also in some circumstances responsible for similar 
problems to their agents. It was evident that some principals interfered with agents’ 
duties, which undermined agents’ interests and reputation. Some principals also did 
conceal some information from their agents when negotiating agency agreements, 
which gave the principals leverage of taking advantage of information asymmetry. 
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It should however be emphasised that some of the forms of agency problems noted to 
be common in the real estate investment operations of the selected investors in 
Tanzania may not necessarily be common in other market settings, especially in those 
settings with strong institutions and technological advancements. Some of the 
problems may also not be common in some societies whose informal institutions are 
more effective in discouraging opportunistic tendencies and illegally obtained wealth 
amongst its members. 
 
7.2.4 Techniques used by principals to address agency problems 
Literature provides different ways of dealing with agency problems. The effectiveness 
of the various remedies of agency problems is however a function of many factors, 
including the prevailing institutional environment. Accordingly, not all remedies were 
applied by the principals in the investigated real estate investment operations in 
Tanzania. Different categories of remedies were identified to be common in real estate 
investment activities. One category was for those remedies aimed at dealing with 
adverse selection problems, and another category was for those remedies meant to 
address moral hazard problems. Other remedies were those aimed at addressing the 
problem of imperfect commitment. Performance bonds were normally used by public 
institutions i.e. pension funds and NHC to deal with agents’ imperfect commitment 
issues. 
 
To address problems of adverse selection in the recruitment of employees, employers 
performed a thorough search of prospective employees to obtain comfort about the 
information provided to them by the earmarked job applicants. This was done through 
authenticity verification of all important documents presented by the job applicants. In 
this exercise, the authorities which issued the documents were consulted. Employers 
also carried out career goals and salary needs assessment of each job applicant. Job 
applicants were also required to identify their referees, who were then contacted and 
requested to give their comments on the applicant’s personal conduct. In some cases, 
employers sought the comments of other people apart from the referees suggested by 
the job applicants. It was also noted to be very common especially for private firms to 
request heads of university academic units or individual academicians to propose 
some names of suitable fresh graduates who could be invited for job interviews. 
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Normally, many employers gave their new employees probationary periods prior to 
their confirmations. This gave employers more time to assess the employees. Other 
employers, in addition to probation, also preferred renewable short-term job contracts 
to permanent job contracts. This was to ensure that employees did not engage in 
undesirable behaviour for fear of not getting a job contract renewal. Similar techniques 
were also applicable to other agents, apart from employees. Some employers also 
considered some social attributes of the job applicants. Some of the common social 
attributes taken into account were age, marital status, gender and the level of 
education. These attributes were found to be important in determining agents’ 
proneness to opportunistic tendencies at places of work. Literature associates some 
social attributes such as gender, age, marital status and education with job satisfaction 
(Mohammad et al, 2010; Salami, 2008; Wagner and Ruth, 2000; Pollard, 1994). 
Employees or agents with high job satisfaction are less likely to engage in some forms 
of opportunism. 
 
In dealing with moral hazard problems, employers used a number of remedies. Agency 
or employment contract was the most common remedy. Most of the principals or 
employers did have written contracts with their agents or employees. The contracts 
normally stipulated the terms, duties, rights and obligations of the parties. This was 
however not common with some employers, who only gave their employees simple 
letters of job offers. To supplement the simple letter, some employers had written 
codes of conduct with which employees were obliged to comply. Other employers did 
not have written contracts with their employees altogether. This was particularly 
common with small consultancy firms. Enforcement of such oral contracts largely 
depended on the prevailing informal institutions (norms, social sanctions, social 
networks, moral values, etc). Employment contracts also stipulated the amount of 
salary, benefits and other incentives to which the employee was entitled. The amount 
of salary and other incentives were found to be important remedies used by employers 
to deal with agency problems. A few employers were also keen on professionally and 
friendly treating their employees in order to win their loyalty. 
 
Other remedies of moral hazard problems were mainly of control and monitoring 
nature. Some principals demanded their agents to submit regular (daily, weekly and 
monthly) job reports. The reports were then reviewed for any abnormalities. Employers 
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or supervisors also sometimes paid surprise visits to sites and branch offices. They 
also carried out surprise cash check. To avoid deliberate late banking of cash or 
exchange rate manipulation by agents, clients were advised to make all payments 
through banks. It was also common practice to frequently swap agents between 
different work stations. This was to ensure that employees did not spend a lot of time 
in one job station, which might have attracted establishing fraudulent networks with 
sub-contractors, suppliers, or clients. Principals also maintained regular 
communication with sub-contractors and clients to ensure that they received 
professional treatment from agents. 
 
In some buildings systems of security cameras (CCTV) were installed. This was done 
to check the actions of both employees and outsiders. The cameras were positioned to 
record activities occurring in sensitive areas. Rooms where vulnerable and valuable 
assets such as plant and machinery were placed, were some of the areas fixed with 
such surveillance equipment. Some principals used quantity measuring metres to 
record supplied and used up quantities of consumables such as water, fuel, and 
electricity. In rare cases, some computer hardware and software were used to 
enhance security to buildings, plant and machinery. Computer software was also used 
by some foreign investors to track and manage financial entries made by agents on 
daily basis. Due to high initial and operational costs of most of the sophisticated 
equipment and software, the use of security guards was common in most of the 
properties. 
 
In some rare cases it was reported that some employers offered shares to some of 
their employees. This was reportedly done in an attempt to retain some good 
employees. The percentage of shares offered to such employees was however very 
small, and in some cases employees rejected such offers because they were given to 
them when they had already given their employers notices of quitting their jobs. 
Sometimes employees were given shares to align their goals with those of other 
company owners. Whereas shares may align goals of employees with those of their 
employers, they need to be valuable in terms of their potential for dividends and capital 
growth. Agency theory literature supports selecting agents on the basis of goal 
alignment mechanism (e.g. Bathula, 2008; Aubert et al, 2003; Davies et al, 1997; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The main argument is that, when agent’s goals are aligned with 
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those of the principal, agency conflicts would cease to exist. The consistency of the 
agent’s interests with the principal’s objectives motivates the agent to dedicate his or 
her efforts to the principal’s interests (Basu and Lederer, 2004). The importance of 
goals alignment is also propounded by the proponents of stewardship theory, who 
argue that employees derive greater utility from satisfying organisational goals than 
through self-serving behaviour because organisational success also satisfies the 
personal needs of the employees (Davies et al, 1997). 
 
7.2.5 Informal institutions in mitigating agency problems 
It was posited in the present study that, like formal institutions, informal institutions 
were equally useful in discouraging agents’ opportunistic behaviour. From the 
evidence gathered in this study, it can affirmatively be argued that informal institutions 
are indeed useful in discouraging agents’ opportunistic tendencies. It was revealed that 
principals were quite aware of the role of informal institutions in mitigating agency 
problems. Some employers were very keen on non-contractual remedies of agency 
problems. This was evident in employees’ recruiting procedure, which involved among 
other things background search focusing on non-contractual aspects such as 
trustworthiness, self respect and similar aspects related to job applicants. Job 
applicant background search conducted by employers entailed obtaining comfort on 
most of the aspects suggested in the literature. According to Greaver (1998), for 
instance, the information principals normally collect during recruitment include agent’s 
financial situation, reputation, strengths, cooperation with clients, superior 
performance, management capabilities, and commitment to continuous improvement, 
transition experience, trust, security and confidentiality, positive attitude, good cultural 
fit, flexibility, cost-consciousness, willingness to share cutting edge knowledge, and 
shared approach to problem solving. 
 
Similarly, results of a survey on the perception of both employers and employees on 
the importance of various attributes of informal institutions in mitigating agency 
problems show that, informal institutions were accorded some importance by both 
principals and agents. Although both employers and employees principally agreed on 
the importance of informal institutions, employees indicated more approval of the 
institutions in holding them back from opportunistic tendencies at their places of work. 
It was however also noted that, over the recent years some section of the society was 
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increasingly becoming more lenient with illegal means of obtaining wealth and other 
undesirable behaviour of employees such as late arrival and early departure at 
workplaces, unnecessarily long lunch breaks, leaves of absence, use of employers 
assets for private purposes. This tendency somehow suggests failure of informal 
institutions in checking opportunistic tendencies. 
 
The level of informality was found to be high in real estate investment activities. For 
instance, exclusive use of informal institutions was observed in some employers 
amongst small real estate consultancy firms. Such firms did not have any written 
employment contracts with their employees. Some of these employers did not even 
pay their employees regular salaries nor did they remit pension contributions for their 
employees. Such employment contracts guided by unwritten (informal) rules and 
norms were however generally considered to be not very binding by both parties. Jobs 
in such firms were widely considered to be insecure and the employees remained 
uncertain as to how much salary they would receive and when they would actually get 
it. As a result, employees’ turnover in such firms was very high. It was however also 
observed that some employees in such firms were happy and did not have any 
immediate plans to leave their employers for more formal jobs. Some of such 
employees confirmed to have been with such firms for many years. Some of the 
employees were also noted to have been switching between similar employers. 
 
7.2.6 Comparison of formal and informal institutions 
It was also posited in this study that, in the absence of strong formal institutions, 
informal institutions become effective and replace the role of formal institutions. A 
similar position is taken by North (1992) who suggests that formal rules and informal 
norms can either compensate or substitute for each other. The findings of this study 
give non-conclusive evidence. From the survey, it is clear that agents’ behaviour is 
shaped by both formal and informal institutions. There is no compelling evidence 
showing that either of the institutions was more important than the other. The results 
show that, despite agreeing that informal institutions are important in dealing with 
agents opportunistic tendencies, a large number of employers consider formal 
institutions to be important than those who indicated that informal institutions were 
important. Performance bonuses, amount of salary, prospects for career development 
and job security were the formal or contractual institutions on which many employers 
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strongly agreed as important remedies of agency problems. This was also evident in 
the common remedies noted to be used by most of the principals. Most of the 
remedies used were those based on formal institutions. Social sanctions and norms 
were the two informal or non-contractual institutions which were considered by many 
employers to be important remedies of agency problems. 
 
On the other hand, despite acknowledging the importance of formal institutions, a 
larger number of employees strongly indicated that informal institutions were important 
in holding them back from opportunistic tendencies at their workplaces, than those who 
viewed formal institutions to be important. Fear of social sanctions, compliance with 
spiritual beliefs, and moral values (self respect and trustworthiness) were the core 
aspects of informal institutions which got strong approval by a majority of employees 
as important remedies of agency problems. Many employees also strongly agreed that 
altruism i.e. unrewarded good action for the sake of another person, was an important 
factor that motivates them to shun opportunistic tendencies at their places of work. A 
large number of employees also strongly agreed that the amount of salary was an 
important contractual attribute in determining their behaviour towards opportunistic 
tendencies. All in all, this revelation underscores the importance of informal institutions 
in dealing with agents’ opportunistic behaviour, despite the marginal importance given 
in the agency theory literature. 
 
It was clear that both employers and employees also agreed that some formal 
institutions such as government enforced policies, laws, regulations and rules were 
ineffective in dealing with agency conflicts. Employers and employees also showed a 
general disapproval that corporate governance institutions were effective in checking 
agency problems. The problem of weak corporate governance and other formal 
institutions in developing countries is widely reported in the existing literature (e.g. 
Williamson, 2009; Nganga et al, 2003; Ebohon et al, 2002; de Soto, 2000). It was also 
noted that the society had started tolerating some evil deeds, which suggests failure of 
some informal institutions in dealing with social vices. These findings are likely to be 
relevant to most of developing countries due to weakness of prevailing formal 
institutions. 
 
232  7 Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.2.7 Association between institutional attributes and social attributes 
Both informal and formal remedies of agency problems were cross-tabulated with other 
social attributes, namely age, gender, marital status and education. Several remedies 
of agency problems were noted to be associated with such social attributes. Agent’s 
age was found to be associated with the degree of approval agents placed on the 
importance of ‘self respect, trustworthiness, principal’s respect to agent, job security, 
codified sanctions, and length of job contracts’ in dealing with agency problems. More 
aged employees strongly agreed that these attributes were important remedies of 
agency problems. Agents’ marital status was also observed to be associated with the 
level of importance agents placed on ‘self respect, respect for social code of conduct, 
career development prospects, and job security’. Results show that more married 
employees agreed that the institutional attributes were important remedies of agency 
problems, compared to unmarried employees. 
 
There was also a relationship between agents’ gender and approval for ‘respect for 
customs and traditions.’ Results indicate that female agents approved this remedy 
more than male agents. The level of agents’ education was observed to be associated 
with the importance of ‘altruism, trustworthiness, professional bodies and codes of 
conduct and length of job contract’ in dealing with agency problems. Agents with less 
than graduate education level showed relatively less approval on the importance of all 
of these attributes. 
 
Further analysis came up with more patterns of association between different 
attributes. For instance, some interesting relationships were observed between some 
agents’ social attributes and level of agent’s satisfaction with their current jobs and 
other aspects related to their current jobs. Gender was found to be associated with the 
degree of satisfaction with job security and decision making freedom enjoyed by the 
agent. In both cases, male agents indicated to be more satisfied than female agents. 
Marital status was also found to be associated with the level of satisfaction on such 
aspects as current job, career development prospects, job security, employer’s trust, 
and incentives. Married agents were generally more satisfied than single agents. 
Generally, these findings indicate that married agents are more reliable than single 
agents, implying that the former are less prone to agency problems than the latter. 
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Association was also noted between employees’ age and the level of satisfaction with 
their current jobs, security of their current job, career development prospects at their 
present workplaces, trust and respect they got from their employers. The general trend 
of the results indicates that the level of satisfaction was directly related to agent’s age. 
Except for career development prospects, for which a larger proportion of the less 
aged agents indicated to be less dissatisfied than the aged ones, in all other aspects a 
larger proportion of more aged agents indicated to be more satisfied with status quo. 
Again, the findings seem to suggest that less aged agents (30 years or less, in this 
case) are more prone to agency problems than the more aged agents. 
 
Another association was established between the type of respondent’s job contract 
(permanent or contract job) and the importance placed on the need for long term job 
contract in addressing agency problems. Results clearly show that agents whose jobs 
were on contract basis indicated a higher level of agreement on the importance of long 
term job contacts than the agents who had permanent job contracts. This observation 
concurs with the existing literature which supports the use of long term contracts to 
align agents’ plans with those of their principals. The use of long term job contracts as 
a remedy of agency problems is widely supported in the existing literature (e.g. Parkin 
et al, 2008; Rebernik and Bradac, 2006; Aubert et al, 2003). All of the patterns of 
association observed between the different attributes can be important in dealing with 
agency problems. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
It is evident from this study that, unlike many other investment activities, real estate 
investment activities require specialised skills and knowledge, of which most of the 
investors and their senior managers in Tanzania do not have. Besides, owing to the 
infancy of market and corporate governance institutions, investment activities take 
place in a market setting which is shrouded with imperfect information, making most of 
the activities less transparent. Agency contracting under this environment is highly 
affected by information asymmetry, which increases incidents of agency conflicts. 
Existence of attenuated legal and economic property rights further complicates agency 
contracting. Using the agency theory perspective, this study demonstrates how agency 
conflicts culminate into sub-optimal investment activities. The study also reveals the 
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different forms of agency problems which are common in real estate investment 
activities, and the techniques applied in mitigating them. 
 
By testing the effectiveness of institutional remedies of agency conflicts in real estate 
investment activities, this study demonstrates the importance of informal institutions in 
agency theory modeling. The study shows that human beings, contrary to agency 
theory presupposition, are not always opportunistic and self-centred. Apart from formal 
incentives, it is evident from this study that agents are also capable of being motivated 
by principals’ honesty, equity, transparency, trust, respect, and sincerity. It is also clear 
that altruism, spirituality, social sanctions, taboos, social networks, among others, are 
important constraints of agents’ behaviour. All these findings underscore the 
complexity of human behaviour. They also underline the role of both formal and 
informal institutions in shaping human behaviour. Any attempt to constrain the 
behaviour of any human being, must therefore take into account all the important 
variables which are responsible for shaping the respective individual. It is thus 
inevitable to use both formal and informal institutions to effectively mitigate agency 
conflicts in real estate investment activities. Similarly, even the on-going institutional 
reform process must ensure that the newly formulated formal institutions map onto the 
logic of the society’s ingrained informal institutions. 
 
It is also clear from this study that the government which is supervising institutional 
reforms is also one of the main opportunistic agents. A number of real estate projects 
manifesting government opportunism have been revealed. The powers and benefits 
enjoyed by the government over pension funds and NHC investment decisions are 
suggestive of how difficult it could be changing inefficient institutions in the society. It is 
unlikely that the government would easily relinquish its powers in controlling pension 
funds. The current institutional set up of pension funds empowers the government to 
force pension funds to finance certain government’s projects. Pension funds have, for 
instance, been dragged into financing the construction of multi-billion buildings for 
public institutions such as higher learning institutions and public servants’ housing. 
Similarly, some of NHC real estate projects are apparently undertaken to fulfill 
politicians’ and senior civil servants’ needs. This was observed in some new housing 
projects being carried out in sub-prime locations where some influential politicians 
apparently had some interests. Other sub-optimal decisions made by NHC include 
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allocation or sale of rental houses located in prime area to some influential people or 
their relatives. Such opportunistic actions by people in power have attenuated the 
process of institutional reforms thereby making agency problems mitigation a daunting 
task. 
 
Foreign real estate investors have also had problems starting up or running their 
projects. This has partly been contributed by opportunistic actions by different agents 
involved in convincing the investors into the country and into particular investment 
activities. Again, the government through its agencies and officials, is blamed for 
opportunism which has manifested itself mainly in the form of imperfect commitment, 
bureaucracy and corruption. On the other hand, local real estate consultants have also 
played an important part in opportunistic tendencies against foreign investors. Cultural 
(informal institutions) differences between foreign investors and the local community 
also presented some problems in the pursuit of real estate investment activities. 
 
This study enriches institutional theory literature by presenting evidence supporting the 
role of informal institutions in constraining human behaviour. The evidence was 
gleaned from a developing country setting, which is representative of the settings that 
are dominated by informality and nascent formal institutions. Nascence of formal 
institutions has forced societies in such countries to continue heavily relying on 
informal institutions in monitoring people’s interactions. This is a pioneer study based 
on agency theory which focuses on real estate investment institutional framework of 
Tanzania. Its findings are the first to be reported in the real estate investment sector in 
Tanzania. The findings may also be relevant for some similar settings. Similarly, 
although the study is based on real estate investment activities, some of its findings 
may be useful to a wider spectrum of investment activities, especially those taking 
place in similar developing countries. Apart from academic contribution, the findings of 
this study also have an implication on real estate investment decision making, 
formulation of employment policies, drafting of agency or employment contracts, and 
devising of agency problem remedies packages. 
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7.4 Recommendations 
 
7.4.1 Mapping institutional reforms onto the prevailing informal institutions 
In addressing the inefficient real estate investment institutional framework, both 
inefficient formal and undesirable informal institutions must be replaced. There are still 
many aspects requiring the attention of institutional reforms. More institutions, in terms 
of policies, laws, regulations and rules are required to address such issues as 
corruption, absence of markets of indirect property investment vehicles, rudimentary 
investment performance measurements, wasteful competition amongst consultants, 
unprofessionalism and dollarisation of the prime property market etc. The introduction 
of the new institutions should not however fall into the trap of mimicking the 
development path taken by the developed countries. This would disregard the native 
informal institutional framework. The institutional reforms should take advantage of the 
good prevailing informal institutions by ensuring that the newly formulated formal 
institutions incorporate and reflect the prevailing informal institutions. 
 
7.4.2 Application of informal institution remedies 
Informal remedies are a response to the prevailing informal institutions governing 
people’s interactions. Different societies have different informal institutions. Similarly, 
different sub-societies or social groups have different informal rules and norms. Unlike 
formal institutions, informal institutions are harder to identify, partly because their 
rewards and penalties are less well articulated and partly because they may be highly 
specific and idiosyncratic responses to the conditions of a determined social group 
(Alonso, 2009). Complexity of informal institutions is also acknowledged by North 
(2005) who admits that informal institutions are not amenable to deliberate short-run 
change and the enforcement characteristics are only very imperfectly subject to 
deliberate control. This makes it difficult to devise universally applicable informal 
remedies of agency problems. 
 
It is, however, important for principals in real estate investment activities to appreciate 
the role of informal institutions in dealing with agents’ opportunistic tendencies. This 
will enable them devise, and sometimes improvise, informal remedies which are 
compatible with their environment. Employers, for instance, could promote corporate 
environment and culture which uphold honesty, equity, transparency, trustworthiness, 
respect, altruism, hardworking, loyalty, responsibility and citizenship. They should also 
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apply both formal and informal means to openly discourage social vices such as greed 
and dishonesty etc. 
 
Similarly, the observed associations between different agent’s behaviour determinants 
could be useful to principals when selecting agents especially for jobs which are more 
vulnerable to agency problems. It has generally been observed that, female 
employees, aged employees and married employees are less prone to opportunistic 
tendencies than male employees, young employees, and unmarried employees. Such 
an insight could be used as one of the criteria to be used by principals when selecting 
agents. Care must however be taken to ensure that agents are not selected only on 
these criteria. Human beings are dynamic and so is their behaviour. Not all female 
employees, married or aged, would behave in a similar way all the time in different 
situations. As such, principals should ensure that they assess their agents using 
multiple criteria. 
 
7.4.3 Enhancing property market transparency 
Several steps should be taken to address property market opacity. Addressing market 
opacity will provide a suitable environment for dealing with agency problems in real 
estate investment activities. Below are the steps which are considered necessary to 
achieve property market transparency for Tanzania. 
 
7.4.3.1 Strengthening corporate governance institutions 
It is clear from this study that corporate governance institutions have played little role in 
mitigating agency problems in the real estate investment activities in Tanzania. This is 
partly contributed by the absence of the appropriate corporate governance institutions. 
It is also contributed by the overall less respect for formal institutions in the society. It is 
however clear that the real estate industry lacks vibrant institutional machinery to 
enforce even the existing rules and regulations. Professional bodies such as TIVEA 
and IST have not been active enough to spearhead good governance in the industry. 
Their presence can hardly be felt, even by their own members. TIVEA, for instance, 
has for some recent years not even been able to hold its regular constitutional annual 
meetings. NCPS has similarly also not been very active, especially in terms of issuing 
comprehensive professional guidelines and standards that reflect contemporary 
challenges and needs. 
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It is important that corporate governance institutions are introduced to supplement the 
existing and proposed institutions. Having comprehensive corporate governance 
institutions in place would raise investors’ confidence. Stakeholders in the real estate 
industry in Tanzania should consider putting in place the necessary structures by way 
of introducing specific corporate governance institutions for the industry. All large 
investors would then have to be obliged to abide by the corporate governance codes 
and principles. All pension funds investing in real estate, National Housing 
Corporation, private real estate investors, real estate professional bodies (such as 
TIVEA and NCPS) and trade unions should spearhead the formation of the institution 
to enforce and oversee corporate governance in the real estate industry. In the 
presence of effective corporate governance structures in the real estate industry, 
complaints about suspicious or suboptimal real estate investment transactions done by 
the management of the corporations investing in real estate would also be minimised. 
Corporate governance institutions would also make investigations of fraudulent or 
opportunistic actions by managers or board members much easier. 
 
Tanzania could similarly take advantage of the already existing institutions developed 
in other countries. For instance, the codes and principles developed by ICG of 
Germany could also be useful in other markets which face similar problems to which 
the German real estate market was facing prior to instituting such measures. Although 
the property market in Tanzania is still not well developed, the sector could still 
significantly benefit by drawing on the experience from ICG. Real estate professionals 
in Tanzania should also be encouraged to become RICS members. Students in the 
fields of real estate should be encouraged to apply for RICS student membership. This 
would make it easier for them to upgrade to full membership upon attainment of 
relevant professional qualifications. Ardhi University should apply for re-accreditation of 
its courses. This would provide access to RICS resources for both professional 
members and student members. Association with RICS would also increase 
professional standards amongst local practitioners, which would increase confidence 
of the international clientele. Similarly, in the wake of economic and political integration 
of East African countries, efforts should be aimed at establishing institutions similar to 
INREV and EPRA which would cater for the regional real estate 
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7.4.3.2 Intensifying research and training activities 
Some issues of agency problems in the real estate industry in Tanzania could be 
addressed through research and training. Increasing research and training activities on 
corporate governance and human resource management in the field of real estate 
could help reduce some of the problems. Through research more feasible techniques 
of dealing with agency problems in real estate investment activities could be devised. 
Research could also be useful in policy making. Training opportunities could also be 
arranged for various groups of stakeholders ranging from executives to technical 
operatives. Business ethics education should also be expanded to cover interactions in 
real estate activities. Business ethics education should also be mainstreamed in the 
curricula of all learning institutions. Some ethical issues noted in the real estate 
investment activities were also noted to be partly a result of moral decay in the entire 
society. Besides introducing ethics in the curricula of learning institutions, it is also 
important that the process of re-writing the Constitution of Tanzania which is underway 
explicitly imposes high ethical requirements on senior political leaders and civil 
servants. This will eliminate the current norm of regarding such leaders as individuals 
who are ‘above the law’. If senior politicians and civil servants observe ethics, it is likely 
that other citizens will follow suit. The trickle-down effect of the tone set from above in 
corporate set up should also apply in a large society set up when it comes to restoring 
ethics in Tanzania. 
 
Undertaking research and training activities may however be hampered by financial 
constraints. It should be in the interest of real estate investors and consultancy firms to 
fund various research and training activities. Apart from the government, pension funds 
and National Housing Corporation are some of the main beneficiaries of a more 
transparent real estate market who must be engaged in funding research and training 
which is aimed at improving transparency and professionalism in the real estate 
industry. There are also few foreign institutions which could potentially be strong 
partners in research and training in the real estate related disciplines. Some of these 
institutions include the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) of the UK and 
IREBS Foundation for African Real Estate Research of the University of Regensburg in 
Germany. 
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RICS has already funded several research projects in Tanzania and other countries in 
Africa. Similarly, IREBS Foundation which was established in 2010 has also already 
financed several activities such as co-sponsoring AfRES annual conferences, offering 
full scholarships to two M.Sc. Real Estate students at Ardhi University, sponsoring two 
Best Paper Awards for papers presented at AfRES annual conferences, offering travel 
grants to participants of various conferences organised by real estate societies which 
are under the umbrella of the International Real Estate Society (IRES). IREBS 
Foundation has also been involved in searching for industrial training placements in 
European real estate firms (e.g. at Tishman Speyer in London) for young African 
academics. 
 
Funding academic exchange and researchers’ short stays in Africa or Germany are 
other activities for which IREBS Foundation can provide funding. This should be a 
good opportunity for African universities to benefit from expertise already developed in 
Germany. Academics from the International Real Estate Business School (IREBS) of 
the University of Regensburg could be requested to visit African universities offering 
real estate education to conduct lectures or facilitate in workshops and seminars for 
subjects that the African universities have yet to develop capacity. Issues of corporate 
governance, ethics and sustainability in real estate are some of such areas that 
academic support from IREBS may be sought. Joint research activities between 
German and African academics can also be funded by IREBS Foundation. IREBS 
Foundation is also a co-sponsor of the Journal of African Real Estate Research. 
 
Emerald and IPD are other potential international partners in both basic and market 
research. Emerald, one of the world’s leading publishers of real estate and 
management journals, has over the recent years shown interest in African real estate 
related research activities. In 2010, the publisher produced a special issue of one of its 
journals (namely, International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 3) 
in which only papers covering African markets were published. Besides, Emerald has 
also been sponsoring the Best Paper Award for a paper focusing on housing which is 
presented at AfRES annual conferences. Similarly, IPD has also been sponsoring the 
Best Paper award for papers focusing on property investment and finance presented 
by university students at AfRES annual conference. IPD has also over the recent years 
shown keen interest in carrying out joint research activities with local real estate 
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experts and practitioners in some African countries. Deutscher Akademischer 
Austausch Dienst (DAAD) is also one of the potential benefactors of research 
activities. 
 
7.4.3.3 Establishing investment performance measurement institutions 
Many problems of moral hazard nature could be addressed using performance 
standards, benchmarking, and performance based payment. Establishment of well 
defined level of performance with clear criteria, controlled regularly, and with 
benchmarking providing information on performance of similar activities are the 
important steps (Basu and Lederer, 2004; Aubert et al, 2003; Greaver, 1998). The real 
estate sector in Tanzania lacks comprehensive performance measurement tools for 
both investment and investment managers. It is thus important to establish investment 
and managers’ performance institutions. The institutions would also be helpful in 
determining amounts to be paid to the agents. 
 
To enhance objectivity in real estate investment measurement and reporting, there is a 
need to establish an institution that would independently produce performance 
benchmarks and indices. Availability of property indices would improve transparency in 
the real estate market, and thus reduce agency problems. In the presence of 
comprehensive investment performance measurements, the performance of agents 
responsible for real estate investment decisions would be more objectively and 
accurately evaluated. An institution providing investment performance benchmark 
would also address other problems facing real estate investors in Tanzania. 
 
Establishing such an institution may also be achieved in cooperation with the 
Investment Property Databank (IPD) of South Africa. IPD South Africa is an 
independent operating subsidiary of the IPD Holdings UK. Some of the main services 
offered by IPD include portfolio analysis and benchmarking, index production, bespoke 
research projects and some other customised services. IPD also serves as an 
important provider of data for researchers and academics. The institution has played a 
significant role in increasing real estate market transparency of the various markets in 
which it has operations. The indices produced by IPD enable existing and prospective 
real estate investors and other stakeholders to compare investment property returns 
amongst different countries, to compare property returns with those of other asset 
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classes, to split property returns into capital growth, income return and total return, and 
to identify trends in the major market sectors and be able to forecast future returns. 
IPD is well respected by international real estate investors for its independence and 
high standards, which make it important to consider partnering with it in an effort to 
attract investors in any country. 
 
IPD, through its South Africa subsidiary, has also been actively involved in all events 
organised by AfRES. IPD has been contemplating a Pan-African property index project 
which would get Africa an index of its own. The challenge has however been the 
fragmented nature of the African real estate markets. Poor infrastructure is another 
challenge for the initiative. Over the recent years IPD has also been reaching out to 
several real estate experts and practitioners in different African countries in order to 
carry out joint market research and data collection activities in the respective countries. 
IPD has also already made contacts in Tanzania and has shown willingness to carry 
out joint projects with some local experts. This should be a good opportunity for the 
real estate industry in Tanzania and many other African countries to enhance their real 
estate market transparency. A more transparent real estate market will attract foreign 
investors especially those from developed countries who are still overly skeptical about 
the African market partly due to lack of transparency (Rothenberger, 2010). 
 
In an effort to establish a mortgage market in Tanzania, the central bank of Tanzania 
has also shown keen interest in facilitating a property index project. In 2010 some 
consultative meetings involving some experts from Ardhi University and a former 
Director of IPD/ROZ (the Netherland) Prof. Dr. Aart Hordjik were held at the bank’s 
headquarters in Dar es Salaam, aiming at exploring possibilities of setting up a 
property index. The meeting was also attended by NHC executives and some senior 
officials from various commercial banks. It is thus clear from such developments that 
there is a will by stakeholders to enhance market transparency which would reduce 
asymmetrical information amongst market players and thus attract more investors into 
the sector. 
 
7.4.3.4 Increasing publicity of property investment market activities 
Prevalence of agency problems in the real estate investment activities in Tanzania is 
also contributed mainly by lack of market transparency. Apart from establishing 
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investment performance measurement institutions, some other steps should be taken 
to improve real estate market transparency in Tanzania. These may include having in 
place regular market reports and newsletters, having comprehensive and frequently 
updated investors’ and regulators’ websites, and holding regular industrial workshops 
and seminars. The proposed institutions and information media would improve 
availability and quality of information about total returns, performance of different 
market segments, investment flows arising from sales and developments, structure of 
property portfolios, investment volumes, regional property prices and rents, 
investments of various institutional investors, and the macroeconomic environment. 
Schulte et al (2005) also recommend some of the above mentioned steps of enhancing 
market transparency to be adopted by real estate markets with less maturity features. 
 
Transparency of the Tanzania real estate market could also be improved by 
introducing a peer reviewed journal catering for the industry. The journal could publish 
both academic and practice articles. Ardhi University through its School of Real Estate 
Studies may spearhead the establishment of such a journal. The only journal (Journal 
of Building and Land Management) which is currently published by Ardhi University is 
mainly dominated by articles from environmental engineering, thereby calling for a 
different journal focusing on real estate economics. Such a journal would promote 
research in different sub-areas of real estate economics such as investment, finance, 
corporate governance etc. Currently, researchers have mainly focused on property 
rights, land acquisition and compensation, and property taxation issues. TIVEA, on the 
other hand, should also revive its newsletter in which industry’s current news and 
briefings could be reported. TIVEA, jointly with AfRES (local chapter) should organise 
more seminars and workshops on issues of transparency and corporate governance in 
the real estate industry. Transparency and positive publicity of the Tanzania real estate 
market could also be achieved by local real estate consultancy firms or individual 
professionals forging links with some reputable international real estate consultancy 
firms such as Jones Lang LaSalle and CB Richard Ellis. Working with such 
international firms could entail, among other things, producing transparency indices 
and real estate market reports which could be helpful in changing foreign investors’ 
current attitude. 
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To ensure that the outlined market transparency enhancement efforts have far 
reaching effects, it would be important to also embark on deliberate efforts aimed at 
informing the international community of such developments. International print media 
should also be used to clear the lingering negative foreign investors’ image on 
Tanzania and many other African countries. This could be done by Tanzanian and 
other African real estate scholars jointly with their counterparts in the various 
developed countries co-authoring articles which could be published in some 
international press with wide readership. Such articles should dwell on the recent 
positive developments recorded in investment markets in Tanzania and other African 
countries. Similar initiatives are already in place. In Germany, for instance, Prof. Dr. 
Karl-Werner Schulte and Dr. Steen Rothenberger, both from IREBS Foundation for 
African Real Estate Research, have been writing such articles in some mainstream 
newspapers. The articles are mainly meant to allay German real estate investors’ fears 
about the riskiness of Africa as an investment destination for international investors. 
The government of Tanzania should sponsor and promote similar initiatives. The 
government should also embark on aggressive advertising of the investment 
opportunities available in Tanzania using international media. Such efforts would also 
reduce information asymmetry between foreign investors and local information 
agencies and contracting parties. 
 
7.4.3.5 Establishing credit reference and criminal record institutions 
To discourage opportunistic tendencies, credit reference and criminal records 
institutions should be established. Such institutions would reduce information 
asymmetries between agency contracting parties. These institutions can help solve 
some principal-agent problems, such as capping the amount of risk that the agent can 
take on behalf of the principal (Katz et al, 2009). Agents’ opportunistic behaviour or 
even similar behaviour by principals, resulting in serious criminal or civil forms would 
then be reported to the credit rating institutions. This would discourage such 
opportunistic behaviours because the individuals involved would have difficulties doing 
businesses in future. In addition to credit rating institutions, an active criminal records 
institution should be established. This may only entail empowering the respective 
police department, which is currently responsible for keeping such records. Individuals’ 
criminal records should, at request, be easily accessible to any member of the public. 
This would enable principals and agents to make informed decisions when 
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contemplating agency relationships. With these institutions in place, employers or 
principals may also require job applicants or bidders to submit along with other 
documents, criminal reports and credit rating reports. Mere existence of such 
institutions would discourage the parties in agency relationships from engaging in 
serious opportunistic tendencies.  
 
In February 2011, the Bank of Tanzania invited interested firms to apply for licences for 
operating Credit Reference Bureaus. Establishment of such bureaus would be a 
positive step towards attaining transparency in the bank lending business. In view of 
the findings of this study, it would be important to widen the scope of such institutions 
to cover more people and more information apart from banking or other formal financial 
records. This recommendation takes into account the fact that only about 6% of the 
Tanzania’s population has access to banking services. 
 
7.4.3.6 Regulating fees of professional real estate service providers 
The current practice of letting real estate managing agents decide on the fees for their 
services has resulted into the ‘lowest fee competition’. This has often compromised the 
quality of services, and sometimes resulted into total failure by the agent to deliver the 
contracted services. To deal with this problem, an institution setting and controlling the 
pricing of real estate services, especially property management, estate brokerage and 
valuation, should be established. This would ensure that job bidding competition 
amongst service providers focuses on demonstrating bidders’ competence for the job, 
and not lowest fee competition. This could be done by either having a specific statute 
catering for the pricing of real estate services or by establishing a regulatory authority 
to oversee the practice of real estate managing and estate agents. 
 
Professional fees for some professionals in Tanzania are already institutionally 
monitored. For instance, fees charged by professional architects and quantity 
surveyors are regulated by the Architects and Quantity Surveyors (Registration) Act, 
2010. Similarly, Engineers Registration Board (ERB) regulates fees charged by 
professional engineers’ and firms. Similar institutions existing in some countries have 
significantly addressed the problem. In Kenya, for instance, fees for professional 
valuers and real estate brokers are regulated by the law. Regulating fees for 
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professional real estate services may also protect investors against monopolistic 
tendencies of some service providers. 
 
During this study, some positive developments were noted regarding the regulation of 
valuation services fees in Tanzania. Section 72(1) of the Valuation and Valuers 
Registration Bill (scheduled to be tabled in Parliamnent during the 2011/1012 financial 
year), empowers the Minister for the Ministry responsible for valuation matters to make 
regulations providing for fees for valuation services. Section 72(2) further provides that 
no valuer shall charge or accept payment or other consideration in respect of valuation 
services which is less than that prescribed in the regulations. The fact that this is 
merely a bill, there are no guarantees that all the provisions will be passed by 
Parliament. The findings of this study underscores the need to have the Bill passed, 
with section 72 of the Bill remaining intact. It would also be important for the Real 
Estate Agents Bill which is also in the process of enactment to have a section 
prescribing mandatory minimum professional fees. Alternatively, a fee range subject to 
regular review could be set for the various services of estate agents and property 
managers. However, this could be much easily attainable if property managers and 
agents were also regulated by professional bodies. It should however be emphasised 
that any attempts to prescribe the fees for professional services should also observe 
the provisions of the Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003 and the Public Procurement 
Act No. 21 of 2004. 
 
7.4.4 Use of selected contractual remedies 
Formal contracts are common for many real estate investment activities involving the 
use of agents. There are some key aspects of contract which could be used to 
discourage opportunism in the execution of contracted job. Below are some of the 
contractual aspects which should be applied in agency contracting in real estate 
investment activities in Tanzania. 
 
7.4.4.1 Use of strict penalties 
To address adverse selection problems, agency contracts with stern penalties could be 
used to scare incompetent or unsuitable agents to apply for some jobs. Such penalties 
should be aimed at dealing with the consequences of poor performance or 
misrepresentation of facts made by agents during job application. As such, the contract 
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should be made available to all prospective agents at the time of invitation to apply for 
the jobs. Such contracts are likely to scare less competent agents, thereby allowing 
competent agents to be selected. This approach is suitable when selecting tenderers 
i.e. suppliers of goods and services. The approach would discourage cheating and 
overstatements which have been noted to be a norm in bid proposals. The technique 
can also be applied during the recruitment of employees to fill up vacancies in various 
real estate investment activities. 
 
Apart from contract termination and civil suits, some other penalties that could be 
included in the agency contracts may include submitting the names of the agents to 
professional bodies (e.g. NCPS, CRB, AQSRB, ERB, etc.) for appropriate actions. 
Penalties could also entail the principal submitting the names of such agents to credit 
institutions, corporate governance institutions (CMSA and DSE if relevant) and criminal 
law enforcers such as police and PCCB. The penalties could also entail the names of 
such agents being publicised in the media. 
 
7.4.4.2 Use of commitment bonds 
Reneging on promises and commitments was noted to be a common problem for both 
principals and agents. To address the problems associated with imperfect 
commitment, the use of bonds is recommended. Posting of bond could be an 
appropriate way of committing the parties to the agency contract (Aubert et al, 2003). 
With the use of bond, each party would remain worried that if an agreement was 
breached on their part, the amount in the bond would be forfeited. The value of the 
bond would normally depend on the gain that one would get by pursuing opportunism. 
If the gain one gets by acting opportunistically is greater than the value of the bond, the 
use of bond becomes ineffective. The use of monetary bonds is however likely to be 
limited to some forms and types of agency relationships. Other bonding devices may 
include reputation and heavy penalties. It could be provided in agency contracts that if 
either party reneges on their promises and commitment, a heavy penalty would be 
applied or their reputation would be at risk because the affected party would avail such 
action to the public domain. 
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7.4.4.3 Use of long term agency contracts 
In some real estate activities, long term agency contracts have the potential of 
enhancing performance and reducing costs to both agents and principals. Agents 
having long term contracts are likely to align their goals with those of their principals, 
which would promote co-existence. Besides, long term property management 
contracts are likely to miminise costs associated with new property managers such as 
settling down, re-staffing, comprehending buildings’ problems, understanding the 
landlord, tenants and sub-contractors, etc. Retaining property managers for a long time 
allows the principal to capitalise on their experience. It also smoothens building 
performance seasonalities, which are associated with the frequency of changing 
property managers. When property managers become certain of the expiry date of 
their contracts they tend to be less concerned about any events occurring after expiry 
of their contracts. New property managers would normally need some time to get 
accustomed to the new environment. Buildings whose managers have been changed 
are likely to record poor performance for a spell of time when the changeover takes 
place. This recommendation is only valid if the change of property manager is not 
necessitated by poor performance, breach of contract, or other similar problems. 
 
Similarly, long term job contracts could also be used by employers. Employees with 
long term employment contracts would have their goals aligned with those of their 
employers. Such employees are likely to behave more like stewards than agents, as 
they would tend to associate the performance of their companies (employers) with their 
own welfare. This is however more likely to be the case if employees’ remuneration is 
based on their contribution to the earnings of the company, or is somehow related to 
company’s performance. Alternatively, if long term contracts are not possible for some 
reason, employers should have transparent staff retention policies. This would 
encourage employees to work hard in order to guarantee their positions in the 
company. 
 
7.4.4.4 Using performance based contracts 
The current practice of public institutions (pension funds and NHC) frequently changing 
service providers, especially property managers, was sometimes wasteful. Property 
managers were sometimes changed not because their performance was not good, but 
simply because their contracts had expired and according to public procurement 
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procedures tenders for fresh application were to be floated. Such a practice slowed 
down some important activities. The process did not guarantee the outgoing 
contractors, chances of being awarded a new contract despite their good performance 
record. There is a need to amend public procurement laws to ensure that performance 
becomes the overriding motive of changing a contractor. This would result into 
performance based contracts rather than term contracts. Property managers’ 
performance could be measured by looking at rent collection, occupancy rates, length 
of lease terms with existing tenants, and other benchmarks available in the market. 
The effectiveness of this approach is however a function of availability of effective real 
estate investment performance institutions. 
 
7.4.5 Use of equitable pay and performance incentives 
It is important for employers to observe equity in remunerating their employees. 
Employers should also ensure that key aspects of employment contracts aim at 
aligning the goals of the employer with those of the employee. Below are some of such 
aspects which are relevant for employees in the real estate investment activities in 
Tanzania. 
 
7.4.5.1 Payment of adequate remuneration 
It is paramount that employers pay their employees’ wages that are adequate to 
sustain them. It was also noted in this study that employers in real estate investment 
related activities believed that the amount of salary was very important in discouraging 
opportunistic tendencies, although it was evident that most of the employees were paid 
salary which was not sufficient to meet their basic needs. It is important that 
employees, especially new and young employees, are paid index-adjusted salaries to 
reflect living standards. Besides paying index-adjusted salaries, the salaries should 
also reflect employee’s performance and contribution to income generation. The 
rewards for good performance and individual’s contribution to firms’ income may not 
necessarily have to be in the form of salaries; they may be in the form of bonuses, 
prizes and other incentives. Such kinds of rewards were not common with the real 
estate investors covered in this study. There were only few cases, which were also 
only limited to senior officials. 
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7.4.5.2 Promoting good employees to partners or shareholders 
Goal alignment is one of the major approaches in addressing agency problems. Goals 
alignment may be applicable to the different kinds of agency contracts. For instance, 
investors and other employers in the real estate industry could make their professional 
employees as associates i.e. potential partners. This would motivate them to work hard 
and comply with their employment contracts hoping to be elevated to partners, 
directors or just shareholders. Although it was observed that some few real estate 
consultancy firms had promoted some of their staff to shareholders, there was no clear 
procedure of how one could became a shareholder. The promotions were purely 
based on the discretion of the existing owners. Employers amongst consultancy firms 
in the real estate sector could use the system used by some large consultancy firms 
such as PwC, KPMG, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst and Young, etc. These firms have most 
of their mainstream professional staff employed as Associates i.e. employees who can 
potentially become Partners i.e. shareholders of the respective firms. These firms have 
a clear system of promotion culminating into partnership, although it is still very difficult 
for an employee to become a partner. 
 
7.4.6 Utilising real estate specialists and reputable consultancy firms 
Some of the agency problems could be avoided by utilising real estate specialists and 
reputable real estate consultancy firms in investment decisions and other activities. 
The importance of utilising real estate specialists and reputable consultancy firms is 
discussed below. 
 
7.4.6.1 Utilising real estate specialists 
Despite the specialised nature of most of real estate investment activities, some 
investors, especially pension funds, did not show keenness in utilising the right experts 
in some of the activities. Pension funds also did not have many in-house real estate 
experts, despite their significant engagement in real estate investment. Sometimes, 
even the few in-house staff were not fully utilised in key decisions. Weak real estate 
professional bodies and the absence of aggressive promotion of professional services 
may be some of the reasons for the low appreciation of the role of the real estate 
experts amongst pension funds. Absence of lobbying groups for the real estate 
profession also contributes to the marginalisation of real estate professionals in key 
real estate investment decisions. 
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Many real estate investment decision problems facing pension funds could be 
addressed by fully utilising their in-house real estate experts and introducing a senior 
job position for a real estate investment specialist. Similarly, considering pension 
funds’ huge real estate investment portfolios, it may be important to have at least one 
real estate investment expert as a member of the Board of Trustees for each pension 
fund. Pension funds should engage appropriate experts (in-house or contracted) in 
evaluating technical proposals submitted by service providers when bidding for various 
jobs. This would address adverse selection problems likely to be unnoticed by 
incompetent tender evaluators. 
 
7.4.6.2 Using reputable consultancy firms 
For agency contracts involving consultancy firms, principals should ensure that they 
select firms which have well established reputation and values. Such firms are likely to 
be more concerned about their long term prospects than short term profit opportunities. 
Such firms would also be keen not to tarnish their reputation and goodwill, which would 
make them shun some forms of opportunistic tendencies. Long term goals of such 
large reputable consultancy firms are likely to be closer to those of large scale 
investors. Multinational consultancy companies could be one of the ideal companies to 
deal with, although most of them charge relatively high fees. 
 
7.4.7 Changing pension funds set-up 
Under the current set-up, the pension funds are not under any strict obligation to pay 
their members index-adjusted pension when they retire. It is very clear to everyone 
though, that members are obliged to remit 20% of their gross monthly wages to their 
respective pension funds. The law does not strictly place much responsibility on 
pension funds and their sponsor (government) to guarantee members a steady income 
upon retirement. The policy and legislation should be changed to place heavy 
obligation on pension funds, which will ensure that members’ retirement income can be 
precisely determined from the date when a member joins the scheme. Administrators 
and sponsors of the pension funds should be under pressure to ensure that members’ 
savings are protected and grow over time. This would force the administrators of the 
funds to carefully choose investment avenues and properly manage the investments. It 
is also important that any adverse changes to pension funds legislation do not affect 
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the existing members. If such changes are necessary, they should only be applicable 
to new members. 
 
7.4.8 Privatising National Housing Corporation 
In order to sustainably deal with political and management opportunistic tendencies 
which have characterised NHC for many years, the corporation should be privatised. 
Although this option may not be very popular with some members of the public 
considering some bad past experience with the privatisation of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the option has many advantages. The problems previously encountered in the 
privatisation of other SOEs should rather be taken as lessons in the privatisation of 
NHC. Besides, there are also some good examples of successfully privatised 
companies, which include Tanzania Breweries Ltd and Tanzania Cigarette Company 
Ltd. Privatisation of NHC will free the corporation from direct political interference, 
thereby increasing management freedom, accountability and competence. The 
privatisation will also promote corporate governance which will consequently increase 
transparency in the management of the corporation. All these are key attributes to 
easing the mitigation of agency conflicts and thus enhancing performance of the 
corporation. 
 
7.4.9 Foreign investors forming partnership with local investors 
The fact that cultural factors have influenced the behaviour of the real estate industry, 
calls for foreign investors to, prior to committing resources, understand the institutional 
environment which defines the business culture and market behaviour. Foreign 
investors, instead of owning land through or relying on TIC as the only source of 
information, could own land through and obtain information from local investors. Local 
investors could also be potential partners. Investing through joint ventures with local 
investors could enable foreign investors to avoid many agency problems with a chain 
of local agents they would be required to engage. 
 
Notwithstanding the proposed alternative actions to be taken by foreign investors, it is 
important that the government and its agencies build the trust of foreign investors by 
fulfilling promises and improving the business environment. TIC and the government 
must also improve their services to investors by increasing efficiency and transparency 
in their activities. Assertions and promises of good services offered by the government 
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and TIC should be accompanied by testimonials from satisfied existing foreign 
investors, which should be publicised to give the prospective foreign investors more 
comfort. TIC should also establish a comprehensive land bank which would ease the 
process that foreign investors have to go through in acquiring land in Tanzania. 
 
7.4.10 Computerising real estate activities 
It was noted that many property management activities were done with minimal 
computerisation. This increased incidents of agency problems, mainly cheating and 
forgery. Computerising property management activities would substantially reduce 
such problems. Computerisation would also reduce the number of people (agents) 
needed to perform some activities. The number of building caretakers could for 
instance be significantly cut down by automating some systems in the buildings such 
as air-conditioning and security. Water and fuel consumption controls could also be 
computerised. Reducing the number of agents automatically reduces agency 
problems. Although the adoption of this alternative could require substantial initial 
capital, its benefits in the long run are likely to outweigh the costs. 
 
7.5 Areas for further study 
 
There are some important questions which have been raised in this study whose 
answers require further inquiry. There is a need to demonstrate empirically how 
agency conflicts are reflected in the actual performance of real estate investment in 
Tanzania. This can be done by comparing the real estate investment performance 
indicators of different investors with their levels of corporate governance compliance. A 
different study could also be carried out to investigate investment performance 
seasonality of buildings whose property managers are frequently changed due to the 
short-term nature of property management contracts which are common in Tanzania. 
Another study could also be conducted to examine the role of non-contractual 
attributes of employment terms on the survival of the small real estate consultancy 
firms in Tanzania. The aim of such a study would be to show the role played by 
informal institutions in keeping the small firms in the market despite their inability to 
offer competitive salaries and other financial incentive packages to their employees. 
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Appendix I: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND CONSULTANTS 
 
Name of interviewee……………………..…………………………..………………………..………… 
Name of Firm/Organisation/Institution………………...…………………….…………………………. 
Position of interviewee…………………………….………………………………............................... 
 
1. What are your core duties in relation to real estate investment? 
2. What is your general evaluation of the real estate investment sector in Tanzania? 
3. What is your firm’s core business with regard to real estate investment? 
4. What is the value of the real estate investment portfolio under the ownership/management 
of your firm (if relevant)? 
5. If your company has a mixed-asset portfolio, what is the percentage of real estate in the 
entire investment portfolio? 
6. How many agents or employees are involved in the real estate investment activities 
undertaken by your firm? 
7. What percentage of your company’s real estate investment is held in indirect investment 
vehicles (if relevant)? 
8. For which real estate investment activities does your firm engage external service providers 
(if relevant)? 
9. Which activities of your real estate investment are more vulnerable to agency problems? 
10. What are the common forms of agents’ opportunistic behaviour in your real estate related 
activities? 
11. What are the catalysts of agents’ opportunistic behaviour in real estate investment 
activities? 
12. What are the common forms of principals’ opportunistic behaviour in your real estate 
related activities? 
13. How do you deal with agency problems in the real estate investment activities? 
14. What additional agency problems do foreign real estate investors face? 
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Appendix II: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR RESEARCHERS 
 
Name of interviewee…………………………………………………………………………….……… 
Name of Firm/Organisation/Institution……………….…………………………..…………………….. 
Position of interviewee…………………………………………...……………………….…………….. 
 
1. What are your core activities in relation to real estate investment? 
2. What is your general evaluation of the real estate investment sector in Tanzania? 
3. What is your general impression of pension funds investment decision making practice in 
Tanzania? 
4. What is your opinion about pension funds’ current allocation to real property investment in 
Tanzania (too large/too small/optimal)? 
5. What are the common forms of agency problems in real property investment activities of 
pension funds in Tanzania? 
6. What are the catalysts of agency problems in property investment of pension funds? 
7. How serious are the agent problems in the property investment activities of pension funds? 
8. What activities are more vulnerable to agency problems in the property investment of 
pension funds in Tanzania? 
9. How serious are agent conflicts in the property investment activities of foreign investors in 
Tanzania? 
10. What are the common forms of agency problems in the property investment activities of 
foreign investors in Tanzania? 
11. What activities are more vulnerable to agency problems in the property investment of 
foreign investors in Tanzania? 
12. In your experience, how effective are the existing formal institutions (legislation, agency 
contracts, corporate governance institutions such as CMSA; DSE etc) in addressing the 
agency conflicts in place in Tanzania? 
13. In your experience, how effective are the informal institutions (social and moral norms, 
culture, traditions etc.) in mitigating agency conflicts in property investment activities in 
Tanzania? 
14. Comparing the formal and informal institutions, which one is more effective in controlling 
the opportunistic behaviour of agents for the institutional environment prevailing in 
Tanzania? 
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Appendix III: QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUPS DISCUSSION 
 
1. How satisfied are you with the investment decisions of pension funds in Tanzania? 
2. How satisfied are you with the property investment decision process of pension funds? 
3. How are you represented in the investment decision process? 
4. How satisfied are you with your representatives in the investment decisions of pension 
funds? 
5. What are the common forms of agent problems experienced from your 
representatives/agents in the pension funds? 
6. What are the sources of agency problems in real estate investment activities of pension 
funds? 
7. How serious are agency problems between you as members of pension funds and your 
representatives (Government and Board members)? 
8. What remedies are in place to rectify the agency conflicts? 
9. What more remedies of agency problems would you recommend? 
 
Appendices  257 
 
 
Appendix IV: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRINCIPALS/EMPLOYERS 
 
 
20 August 2010 
 
INTRODUCTION LETTER 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
I am a doctoral student undertaking my research at Ardhi University (Tanzania) and 
Regensburg University (Germany). My research focuses on real estate investment decision 
process. Precisely, my thesis investigates the agency conflicts mitigation process in the real 
estate investment activities of some large investors in Tanzania. In accomplishing the task, I 
am conducting a survey which aims at collecting data from real estate investors or their 
representatives, senior investment officials of companies involved in real estate investment or 
consultancy and officials responsible for hiring/firing and supervising agents or employees 
involved in the real property investment activities of such companies. 
 
I kindly request you to participate in this survey by filling out the attached questionnaire. I 
would also like to assure you that all information and opinions obtained through this 
questionnaire will be strictly used for the stated academic purpose and, analysis of the 
questionnaire will purely be for scientific purposes; inference to individuals or 
firms/corporations will therefore not be possible. 
 
I would be very grateful if I could get the filled out questionnaire from you as soon as possible. 
I would also greatly appreciate if you can also call me to come and collect the questionnaire 
after completing it. Below are my contact details: 
 
Moses Mpogole Kusiluka 
P.O. Box 79456 
Dar es Salaam - Tanzania 
Mobile Tel. +255 754 318905 or +49 171 9403805 
E-mails: mpogole@aru.ac.tz and moses.kusiluka@stud.uni.regensburg.de 
 
I would like to thank you in advance for taking your precious time to fill out this questionnaire. 
 
Yours, 
 
 
Moses Mpogole Kusiluka 
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For Question 1-6, write down or mark the appropriate answer. 
1. Your Name (optional): ……………………………….……………………………………………… 
2. Name of Firm: ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. In which category is your firm with regard to real estate investment? 
Investor  Consultant  
4. What is your job position: ……….…………………………………………………………………. 
5. For how long have you been occupying the present position: …………………………….…… 
6. What is the value (in Tanzania Shillings or US Dollars) of the real estate investment 
portfolio under your firm’s ownership/management?…………………………………………….. 
 
For Questions 7-12, mark the box that best fits your opinion. 
7. How serious is agency problem in the real estate investment process? 
Not Serious at all  Not Serious  Neither  Serious  Very Serious  
8. What is your opinion on the commonness of the particular agency problems as observed 
from your agents or employees involved in the real estate investment process? 
 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SA 
It is common for agents/employees to overstate their 
qualifications when applying for jobs 
     
It is common for agents/employees to overstate their 
capacity to perform the job during job application  
     
Carelessness during job execution is a common behaviour 
of agents/employees after getting the job 
     
Lack of maximum job commitment is a common behaviour 
of agents/employees after getting the job 
     
Shirking is a common behaviour of agents/employees after 
getting the job 
     
Unlawfully using confidential information for personal 
benefits is a common problem with my agents/employees 
     
Theft of assets (money, equipment, etc.) is a common 
problem with my agents/employees 
     
Forgery is a common problem with my agents/employees      
Vandalism is a common problem with my agents/employees      
Overpricing of purchases is a common problem with my 
agents/employees 
     
Cheating in reporting is a common problem with my 
agents/employees 
     
Other common agency problems (please specify)           
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9. What is your opinion on the importance of the stated contractual/legal remedies (FORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS) in checking opportunistic tendencies of your agents/employees involved in 
the real estate investment process? 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SA 
The amount of salary/fee is very important in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour 
     
Performance bonus is very important in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour 
     
Sanctions for poor performance are very important in 
checking agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour 
     
Job security is very important in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour 
     
Prospects for career development are very important in 
checking agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour 
     
Long term job contract is very important in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour 
     
Entitlement to share in the profits/earnings is very 
important in checking agent’s/employee’s opportunistic 
behavior 
     
Other terms and conditions of agency/employment 
contracts are effective in checking agent’s/employee’s 
opportunistic behavior 
     
Government enforced policies, laws, rules and 
regulations are effective in checking agent’s/employee’s 
opportunistic behavior 
     
Professional bodies and codes of conduct for 
professionals are effective in checking agent’s/employee’s 
opportunistic behavior 
     
Corporate governance institutions are effective in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behavior 
     
Any other contractual/legal remedies which are effective in 
checking agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour (please 
specify)  
     
 
10. What is your opinion on the importance of social/cultural remedies (INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS) in checking opportunistic tendencies of your agents/employees involved in 
the real estate investment process? 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SA 
Opportunistic behaviour of an agent/employee differs with age      
Opportunistic behaviour of an agent/employee differs with 
gender (male/female)     
 
Opportunistic behaviour of an agent/employee differs with 
marital status     
 
Opportunistic behaviour of an agent/employee differs with the 
level of education     
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 SD D N A SA 
Social norms (society’s ways of doing things) are important in 
checking agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour     
 
Taboos (society’s don’ts) are important in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour     
 
Social sanctions (society’s punishment for breaking taboos) 
are important in checking agent’s/employee’s opportunistic 
behaviour 
     
Social networks are important in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour     
 
Religious belief (spirituality) is important factor that prevents 
an agent/employee from involvement in opportunistic 
tendencies 
     
Respect for customs and traditions is an important factor 
that prevents agent/employee from involvement in 
opportunistic tendencies 
     
Altruism (unrewarded good action for the sake of another 
person) is an important factor that prevents an agent/employee 
from involvement in opportunistic tendencies 
     
Self respect is an important factor that prevents an 
agent/employee from involvement in opportunistic tendencies     
 
Respect for principal/employer is an important factor that 
prevents an agent/employee from involvement in opportunistic 
tendencies 
     
Agent’s/employee’s trustworthiness is an important factor 
that prevents him/her from involvement in opportunistic 
tendencies 
     
Social code of conduct is an important factor that prevents 
him/her from involvement in opportunistic tendencies     
 
Any other social/cultural aspects that are effective in checking 
agent’s/employee’s opportunistic behaviour (please specify)      
 
 
11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the social attributes of 
your agents/employees involved in the real estate investment process? 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SD 
The older (more aged) the agent/employee the less is his/her 
involvement in actions that result in agency conflicts     
 
The older (more aged) the agent/employee the more is his/her 
involvement in actions that result in agency conflicts     
 
Male agents/employees are more involved in actions that result 
in agency conflicts than female agents/employees     
 
Female agents/employees are more involved in actions that 
result in agency conflicts than male agents/employees     
 
The more educated the employee the less is his/her 
involvement in actions that result in agency conflicts     
 
The more educated the employee the more is his/her 
involvement in actions that result in agency conflicts     
 
The more the income the agent/employee has the less is his/her 
involvement in actions that result in agency conflicts     
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 SD D N A SD 
The less the income the agent/employee has the more is his/her 
involvement in actions that result in agency conflicts     
 
Married agents/employees are less involved in actions that 
result in agency conflicts than unmarried ones     
 
Married agents/employees are more involved in actions that 
result in agency conflicts than unmarried ones     
 
Unmarried agents/employees are less involved in actions that 
result in agency conflicts than married ones     
 
Unmarried agents/employees are more involved in actions that 
result in agency conflicts than married ones     
 
 
12. How satisfied are you with the below attributes with reference to your agents/employees 
involved in the real estate investment process? 
VD = Very Dissatisfied,  D = Dissatisfied,  N = Neither,  S = Satisfied,  VS = Very Satisfied 
 VD D N S VS 
Performance      
Professionalism      
Trustworthiness       
Self respect       
Respect for principal/employer      
Altruism (unrewarded good action for the sake of another person) i      
Others (please specify)      
 
Thank you for taking your time to fill out this questionnaire. 
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Appendix V: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AGENTS/EMPLOYEES 
 
 
 
20 August 2010 
INTRODUCTION LETTER 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
I am a doctoral student undertaking my research at Ardhi University (Tanzania) and 
Regensburg University (Germany). My research focuses on real estate investment decision 
process. Precisely, my thesis investigates the agency conflicts mitigation process in the real 
estate investment activities of some large investors in Tanzania. You, being one of the key 
players in the real estate in Tanzania, are kindly requested to take part in a survey which aims 
at collecting data from individuals working as employees or agents/contractors in the sector. 
The main aim of this survey is get your opinion about your relationship with your employer or 
principal on important matters related to human behaviour. 
 
This is an academic research. All information and opinions obtained through this questionnaire 
will be strictly used for the stated academic purpose and, analysis of the questionnaire will 
purely be for scientific purposes. Inference to individuals or firms/corporations will therefore not 
be possible. 
 
I would be very grateful if I could get the filled out questionnaire from you as soon as possible. 
I would also greatly appreciate if you could notify me when you are through filling out the 
questionnaire. Below are my contact details: 
 
Moses Mpogole Kusiluka 
P.O. Box 79456 
Dar es Salaam 
Mobile Tel. +255 754 318905 or +49 171 9403805 
E-mails: mpogole@aru.ac.tz and moses.kusiluka@stud.uni.regensburg.de 
 
I would like to thank you in advance for taking your precious time to fill out this questionnaire. 
 
 
Yours, 
 
 
Moses Mpogole Kusiluka 
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For Question 1-13, write down or mark the appropriate answer 
 
1. Your Name (optional): …………………………………………………………………..………….. 
2. Gender: Male   Female  
3. Age (in years):  
30 or less  between 31 and 40  between 41 and 50   
between 51 and 60  61 or above  
4. Marital status: Single  Married  Other (please specify)…………………………………… 
5. Education: 
Secondary School/Certificate/Diploma  Graduate  Postgraduate Diploma/Masters  
PhD  Other  (please specify) ……………………………………………...………………. 
6. What are your other professional qualifications? ………………..………………………………. 
7. Name of firm: ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
8. Job position: …………………………………………………...……………………....................... 
9. For how long have you been occupying the present job position: …………………………….. 
10. Is your current job for a specific time or permanent? …………………………………………… 
If your job is for a specific period, how long is the contract period? ………....................... 
Is the contract renewable? Yes  No  
11. What are your key roles in real property investment related activities at your place of work? 
………………………………...................................................................................................... 
12. How much of your daily work time (stated in percentage) is spent on real property 
investment related activities? ………………………..…………………………………………….. 
13. Are you entitled to any performance bonuses for your duties related to property 
investment? Yes  No  
 
For Questions 14 -18, mark the box that best fits your opinion. Use the scale on the 
column headings to match your opinion. 
 
14. What is your opinion on the importance of the stated contractual/legal aspects (FORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS) in motivating you to abide by your contractual (agency or employment) 
obligations? 
 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SA 
Amount of salary/fee is very important in motivating you to abide 
by your contractual obligations      
Performance bonus is very important in motivating you to abide by 
your contractual obligations      
Sanctions for poor performance are very important in motivating 
you to abide by your contractual obligations      
264  Appendices 
 SD D N A SA 
Job security is very important in motivating you to abide by your 
contractual obligations      
Prospects for career development are very important in motivating 
you to abide by your contractual obligations      
A long term job contract is very important in motivating you to 
abide by your contractual obligations      
Entitlement to share of profits/earning is very important in 
motivating you to abide by your contractual obligations      
Other terms and conditions of your agency/employment 
contract are very important in motivating you to abide by your 
contractual obligations 
     
Government enforced policies, laws, rules and regulations are 
very important in motivating you to abide by your contractual 
obligations 
     
Professional bodies and codes of conduct for professionals 
are very important in motivating you to abide by your contractual 
obligations 
     
Corporate governance institutions are very important in 
motivating you to abide by your contractual obligations      
Any other contractual/legal motivator (please specify)             
 
15. In keeping you trustworthy to your employer/principal, how important are the following 
aspects? 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SA 
I am trustworthy because of fear to have my agency/employment 
contract terminated     
 
I am trustworthy because of fear of being sued for breaching 
agency/employment contract      
 
I am trustworthy because of fear of being charged for criminal 
offenses     
 
I am trustworthy because of fear of being blacklisted by potential 
employers/clients in the industry     
 
I am trustworthy because of fear of being deregistered from 
professional bodies such as NCPS, RICS, TIVEA, AfRES etc.     
 
I am trustworthy because of fear of losing credit worthiness with 
credit institutions such as banks etc.     
 
Other reasons that keep you trustworthy (please specify)           
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16. While making decisions related to your work, are the following cultural/social aspects 
important? 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SA 
Trustworthiness is an important consideration while making my 
job-related decisions      
Altruism (unrewarded good action for the sake of my employer) is 
an important consideration while making my job-related decisions      
Social code of conduct is an important consideration while 
making my job-related decisions      
My religious relief (spirituality) is an important factor while 
making my job-related decisions      
Respect for customs and traditions are important consideration 
while making job-related decisions      
Fear of taboos (society’s don’ts) is an important factor while 
making my job-related decisions      
Fear of social sanctions (society’s punishment for breaking 
taboos) is an important factor is an important factor while making 
my job-related decisions 
     
Self respect is an important consideration while making my job-
related decisions      
Respect for my principal/employer is an important 
consideration while making my job-related decisions      
Social norms are important consideration while making my job-
related decisions      
Implications on my social networks is an important consideration 
while making my job-related decisions      
Other social/cultural considerations (please specify)           
 
17. While making other decisions apart from those related to your work, are the following 
cultural/social aspects important? 
SD = Strongly Disagree,   D = Disagree,   N = Neither,   A = Agree,   SA = Strongly Agree 
 SD D N A SA 
Trustworthiness is an important consideration while making my 
decisions which are not related to my work     
 
Altruism (unrewarded good action for the sake of my employer) is 
an important consideration while making my decisions which are not 
related to my work 
     
My religious belief (spirituality) is an important factor while making 
my decisions which are not related to my work     
 
Fear of taboos (society’s don’ts) is an important factor while 
making decisions which are not related to my work     
 
Fear of social sanctions (society’s punishment for breaking 
taboos) is an important factor while making decisions which are not 
related to my work 
     
Respect for customs and traditions is an important consideration 
while making my decisions which are not related to my work     
 
Self respect is an important consideration while making my 
decisions which are not related to my work     
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 SD D N A SA 
Legal implication is an important consideration while making my 
decisions which are not related to my work     
 
Others important considerations (please specify)           
 
18. What is the level of your satisfaction regarding the following? 
VD = Very Dissatisfied,  D = Dissatisfied,  N = Neither,  S = Satisfied,  VS = Very Satisfied 
 VD D N S VS 
Your current job      
Salary/fee you get      
Monetary incentives      
Job security      
Prospects for career development       
Freedom to make decisions related to your job      
Respect from employer/principal      
Trust from your principal/principal      
Others (please specify)           
 
Thank you for taking your time to fill out this questionnaire. 
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